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PREFACE 
Beginning my research into this topic it seemed that
 the New Zealand 
legislature had "got it wrong" in omitting provisions on 
exclusive 
dealing- This view was largely influenced by my initial focu
s on the 
Australian provisions and Australian writers- With resear
ch complete 
I am of the opposite 
the Commerce Act 1986. 
view. Thus the paper justifies the approach of 
In doing so it reviews the regulation of 
exclusive dealing practices and examines the reasons why New 
Zealand 
has opted not to follow overseas legislative practice. 
The paper is 
effects of 
also intended to 
competition law 
provoke consideration of the potential 
on franchising. This practice is central 
to the structure of many New Zealand Businesses-
1 
involve an exclusive dealing arrangement ("EDA"). 
Often franchises 
Therefore it may 
prove extremely difficult to displace one without upsetting th
e other-
I was informed, when considering this topic, that "it would 
be naive 
to think that little had been written about this area." 
However, the 
paper presents the material available with (it is hope
d) a fresh 
perspective. 
has not been 
It provides a marketing analysis of competition which 
used before and reviews 
competitive effects of exclusive dealing. 
existing arguments on the 
Included is a discussion of 
the Application for· Authorisation by Fisher and Paykel
2 (the "F&P" 
case). This is the first New Zealand decision on exclusive
 dealing 
per se as such it has implications for current business pra
ctice. 
In drawing together the material for this paper withi
n 
constraints, I received assistance from a number of people-
the time 
I should 
like to thank Yvonne van Roy, Stephen Kos and Richard F
letcher for 
their help, information and ideas-
1 
INTRODUCTION 
The Commerce Commission Draft Determination on the F&P case was 
released on 13 July. This decision examined an exclusive dealing 
clause- 3 The tenor of the draft is against granting an authorisation 
for this restrictive practice- On the evidence revealed, it seems 
this is merely the unlikely that this view will change-
4 However, 
first bite of the apple- Finding exclusive dealing distasteful, the 
Commission may look for more of the franchising worm. It remains to 
be seen whether the unappetising effects of that one bite are compen-
sated by the sweetness of the remaining fruit. 
This paper-
the focus 
examines the practice of exclusive dealing. 
is upon whether- New Zealand should adopt 
Particularly 
specific leg-
islation prohibiting exclusive dealing as has 
occurred in other 
jurisdictions, most notably Australia and the USA. However, as the 
paper's title suggests, exclusive dealing is a central element in most 
franchising arrangements- A secondary theme is 
of exclusive dealing decisions on franchising. 
therefore the effect 
The Commerce Commis-
sion's decisions on exclusive 
have a significant impact 
bodies who are involved in 
areas, competition law~ is 
dealing and franchising generally will 
on the many corporate and unincorporated 
these practices. In this, as in other 
increasingly important for- legal prac-
titioners and company officials- However, the Commerce Act 1986 ("the 
Act") does not expressly deal with either exclusive dealing or 
franchising. This has been criticised with one writer stating that 
"non-adoption of 
omission •.• 116 
exclusive dealing [provisions] .•• is an unfortunate 
Section one examines the development of competition law. It analyses 
the way legislation has changed and the emphasis of various statutes. 
Nost importantly it looks at the rationale behind competition law. 
The focus of the Commerce Act 1986 is upon market competition, not 
justice between individual traders- This 
exclusive dealing practices are regulated. 
Section two 
chising. 
defines exclusive dealing and 
directly effects the way 
its relationship to fran-
2 
~ '"Sect~C\n three examines New Zealand's present law - the Commer-ce· A-et 
1986- Sections relevant to exclusive dealing are examined with an 
analysis of the fundamental t~rms of each provision. New Zealand and 
overseas case law is drawn upon to assist in t~is task. 
the effectiveness of these sections are also discussedr · 
Arguments on 
Section four contains an examination of the approach taken in Aust-
_ .. ,.ralia and the USA regarding exclusive dealing practices. The Austral-
ian discussion focusses on decisions under the Trade Practices Act 
1974• This is particularly relevant as the Commerce Act 1986 was 
modelled on this Australian legislation. Under the TPA certain facets 
of exclusive dealing are made illegal- 7 
question is whether New Zealand should 
particularly in light of the Australia/New 
I , Relations trade agreement ("CER")and the 
Therefore, a fundamental 
adopt similar provisions 
Zealand Closer Economic 
desire for greater har~ 
monisation of commercial law between the two countries- Arguably 
exclusive dealing provisions may be proscribed under the Commerce Act 
-1986 if they are imposed by persons in a dominant position in the 
market (s36) or if they substantially lessen competition (ss27 & 28). 
This section examines whether these sections alone are sufficient to 
effectively regulate this practice-
The United States material traces the development of exclusive dealing 
practice in that country. Although the USA does not provide a 
co,npar-able market it is relevant to New Zealand as a source of 
advanced case material, particularly in the changing economic analysis 
of exclusive dealing. It is also a useful guide to future Australian 
case law as the Australian decisions have increasingly moved towards a 
more American approach in their analysis of competition law questions. 
Section five is an analysis of the Commerce Act provisions which 
regulate exclusive dealing and the case law to date on these pro-
visions. 
Section six examines the extensive economic material which is in-
creasingly of vital importance to exclusive dealing decisions. An 
initial evaluation is made of the traditional explanations for the 
JI L 
3 
practice• Further analysis examines the competitive effects of 
exclusive dealing. 
Section seven outlines a new approach tor analysing competition-
Porter's Nfive Forces" Model provides a further avenue for assessing 
the competitive effects of 
assess the F&P case facts. 
exclusive dealing and is used here to 
Section eight examines the F&P draft determination in more detail both 
on the law and regarding the economic analysis-
'"The' 'conclusion outlines the writer's reasons why the New Zealand 
legislature has 'got it right' and the advantages of this approach 
over that taken overseas-
Further, it is intended that by providing the whole 
spectrum of 
infort11ation necessary for the analysis of exclusive dealing in one 
paper, readers may be able to reach their own conclusions with greater 
ease-
4 
SECTION ONE: COMPETITION LAW 
Background Information 
In New Zealand "competition law" 0 as such has come into greater public 
focus with the redirected thrust of the Commerce Act 1986- This 
e>q:rlains 
topical. 
dates back 
the perception of competition 
However, it belies the fact that 
law as relatively new and 
New Zealand antitrust law 
to 1908- 9 The initial New Zealand legislation was rather 
piecemeal and often as much concerned with the protection of domestic 
markets from overseas encroachment as with maintaining competition. 
Thus, although in form the legislation dealt with competition matters, 
the intent of the Act was not the promotion of this ideal- The Trade 
Practices Act 1958 marked the first broad move towards controlling 
restrictive trade practices in New Zealand and provided the direction 
for the development of competition law until the 1986 Act. The 1958 
Act was based on the UI< equivalent 10 and adopted its pragmatic "case 
by case" approach. Emphasis at this stage was on the form of the 
practices examined. In 1975 the first Commerce Act consolidated the 
Trade Practices Act and the Control of Prices Act 1947- The emphasis 
on form was again retained. Over the period from 1958 to 1975 there 
had been an increase in the number and type of trade practices 
restricted by the law- However the policy behind the law was still 
more focussed upon individual cases and justice between the parties, 
rather than the wider goal of market competition which resulted from 
the 1986 Commerce Act. Thus the focus of the earlier legislation was 
again not solely on competition- 11 In understanding the changes which 
occurred in the 1986 Act some assistance is 
structure of its predecessor-
The Commerce Act 1975 
gained by examining the 
The Commerce Act 1975 was divided into six parts- As with the present 
Act Part II dealt with Trade Practices- This proscribed four classes 
of trade practices: 
(i) PYohibited tyade pYactices; these were absolutely unlawful-
Practices included: 
mandatory trade-ins, 
an element of EDAs. 
collective tendering, profiteering, 
and third-line forcing 12 which may be 
5 
(ii) AppYovable trade pYactices; these were collective pricing 
and resale price maintenance 
on unti 1 
arrangements. 
approved by 
Such practices 
the Commission. could not be carried 
Transitional authority was given to many collective pricing 
arrangements under the Trade Practices Amendment Act 1972, a 
few up until 1985. The requirements of this class were 
similar to the authorisation process which exists under the 
present Commerce Act- It is under this head that EDA 
authorisation would be sought. For instance, as has 
occurred in the F&P case 13 • 
(iii)Examinable trade pyactices; such practices could be carried 
on until made the subject of a Commission prohibition or 
modification order-- These practices included - collective 
boycotts; collective pricing arrangements not subject to 
prior approval; collective pricing arrangements on prices or-
terms; collective arrangements on terms, market division, 
restrictions on resources, production and supply, and 
enforcement of restrictive agreements; unjustifiable 
exclusions from trade associations; excessive royalties, and 
directed lending. Many of these practices may be elements 
of an EDA-
(iv) Other; these could become examinable following a recommen-
dation to the Minister by the Commission- 14 
Central to the scheme of the "examinable and approvable" 
the 1975 Act, was the public trade practice provisions of 
interest test outlined in s21- Certain effects of a tr·ade 
practice were deemed to be contrary to the public interest, 
such as increasing or maintaining prices or costs or 
preventing, reducing or limiting competition or supply to 
consumers. These effects could be offset by finding that 
demonstrable public benefits arose from the practice or that 
an adverse effect was "not 
was also to be guided by 
scribed in s2A of the Act. 
unreasonable". The Commission 
a range of general objects pre-
The burden of proof was on the 
• 
-·. Examiner to establish the 
and the effects- It was 
· - " 6 
existence of the trade practices 
then for the parties to the 
restrictive trade practice to convince the Commission of 
demonstrable public benefits, or alternatively that any 
adverse effect was "not unreasonable". However, because of 
the procedure required by the Act it rarely arose that the 
Commerce Commission formed the opinion that a practice was 
contrary to the public interest. Under the 1975 Act only 
approvable trade practices (category (ii)) required a 
Commerce Commission decision. All others could be handled 
by the Examiner- Unless the Examiner reported to the 
Commission that a practice was contrary to the public 
interest the Commission was not involved- This control of 
restrictive trade practices (including EDAs) was largely the 
province of the Examiner with the Commission taking on an 
"inquisitional role of a quasi-judicial tribuna1 11 • 1 e 
CoCAmission decisions involving considerable time and expense 
and (often unwanted) publicity were avoided by seeking 
agreement with the Examiner or at least a recommendation of 
approval in the case of approvable trade practices- Thus 
the system actually worked in a manner which denied the 
Commission much opportunity to exercise an enforcement role-
The Commerce Act 1986 
The 1975 Act was replaced by the present legislation. Five general 
changes are notable for this paper. The new focus of the legislation 
was solely upon the promotion of competition. The long title of the 
Commerce Act providing that it was: 
An Act to promote competition within markets in New Zealand 
and to repeal the Commerce Act 1975-
This is consistent with the market deregulation aims of the present 
Labour Government who introduced the Act and with the terms of the CER 
agreement. 
~·Tfre· second major change is in the onus requirements under the Act. 
Now practices covered by the Act are prohibited and it is for t
he 
person operating the practice to argue that it has pro-competitive or 
other public benefits. This has lead to the Commission becoming much 
more involved in enforcement. 
Thirdly, the trade practices regime has moved from listing 
the 
restrictive practices and an emphasis on form to one which examines 
the economic substance and effect of the practices concerned.
1 • This 
is particularly important for exclusive dealing and franchising 
arrangements as the determination of the competitive effects often 
depends on an economic analysis of complex market situations. Fourth-
ly, there is a change in the remedies available- Where previously 
-breaches of trade practices provisions resulted in fines or in-
junctions, new private remedies are available- Injunctions r ·egard'fng·- ., · 
restrictive trade practices may be gained in the High Court -under :sat ·· .-.-_.~ -· 
by the Commission 17 or any person. Under s80 the Commission may 
receive pecuniary penalties, with s82 providing for damages claims for 
persons suffering "any loss or damage"-
The last point relates to the application of the Act- Although the 
Act included some transitional provisions 1 •, s27 has applied to all 
contracts since 1 March 1988- Thus all EDAs since that date have been 
subject to the provisions of the Commerce Act. 
The basic rationale b~hind the competition focus in the Act is that 
controls on anti-competitive practices will result in greater market 
efficiency and resource allocation. This in turn will be passed on to 
the community in social benefits such as lower prices and/or better 
services. However, it is arguable whether market regulation through 
the law can compel greater competition- Indeed it is argued that:
1 ~ 
changes will tend to occur in the foNA in which the competitive 
inclinations are expressed- If this is so, then giving primacy to 
co~petition may prove to some extent incompatible with an overriding 
efficiency objective- 20 
Therein lies the iMportance of the way the Commerce Cofllfflission applies 
the Act for in areas such as exclusive dealing and franchising, there 
8 
may appear to be clear anti-competitive effects. The degree to which 
the Courts and the Commission follow the philosophy behind the Act 
will have a substantial impact upon trading practices throughout New 
Zealand• In the case of EDAs this will require recognition of t
he 
pro-competi~i.ve 
particularly in 
effects and public benefits of these practices, 
situations where there may be some 'harm' done to a 
specific trader- The focus of the Act is the promotion of competition 
with the ultimate goal of increased social benefits and efficient 
resource allocation- 21 That this goal may be clouded by the desire 
for justice in individual cases22 merely accentuates the importance 
that the Commission and the Courts exclusively deal with the effects 
on competition in the market when making decisions in this area-
The Government seems to perceive competition law as complementary to 
the deregulation of industry. To achieve the goal of efficient 
resource allocation, it is clearly not perceived as sufficient to let 
the competitive forces of the market take their course- This risks 
the development of market power (the ability to act independently of 
other mar·ket parti cipants) 23 whi eh may "substantially lessen competi-
tion- 11 This may seem contradictory, but it is clearly necessary to 
have some "regulation" to provide a framework for· activity, even in a 
deregulated market- Competition law provides that framework-
Generally the Commerce Act, although it ''regulates" competition, does 
not seek to govern the behaviour of market participants- It is this 
type of more active control which is seen by some writers
24 as 
"regulatory". Admittedly parts of the legislation such as that which 
deals with price control are regulatory in the sense outlined, but on 
the whole the Act aims only to establish the boundaries of conduct for 
firms in the market. 
This distinction between passive regulation and active regulatory 
provisions may seem semantic but it highlights the policy basis of the 
Act. This policy may be undermined by decisions of the Courts or 
Commission. The danger is that in deciding individual cases boun-
daries may be set which actually undermine the Act's efficiency ob-
jective and its social benefits-
9 
Although free competition has been seen as the most effective
 way of 
ensuring efficient resource allocation and p
ricing, other social 
benefits have been relevant in the past. This flexibili
ty e>:ists in 
the present Act which permits the authorisation o
f most anti-corn-
petitive practices- 2 ~ This reflects the pragmatic 
approach26 which 
the New Zealand legislature has taken in providing fo
r a balancing 
process which may take account of a variety of benefits. 
It also 
on the 
reflects the statements made by the Commiss
ion Chairman 
introduction of the new Act:
27 
"[c]ompetition, while being a worthwhile objective, 
the sole objective to be pursued-" 
may not be 
In the area of exclusive dealing this is especially pe
rtinent- The 
anti-competitive effects of this practice may be quite obvious 
and it 
is only by examining the total market situation that a corre
ct legal 
conclusion can be reached- Further-, one must keep in mi
nd that the 
ultimate goal is efficient allocation as a means of 
providing in-
creased consumer welfare- The promotion of competition for
 its own 
sake may not achieve this result-
Because of its pervasive effects competition law has links w
ith other 
branches of the law- Particularly in the context of this p
aper, it is 
an additional restriction on the trading activities of corp
orations 
and unincorporate bodies- As many practices come under the au
spices 
of the Commerce Act 1986, gr-owing attention by practitione
rs and 
company officials must be paid to the way they organise the af
fairs of 
companies- For those incorporated bodies involved in practices
 which 
may be restrictive such as franchising or exclusive dealing, an 
additional constraint is added to the burdens of compliance wit
h 
commercial, contract and company law. 
One final point on the development of competition law in New Zea
land 
relates to the reaction of the business community whom it most 
directly effects. As in the USA and Australia,
28 some New Zealand 
businesses have voiced negative comments regarding the compet
ition law 
provisions of the Commerce Act. It would seem that although gre
ater 
freedom to trade without restriction is called for, it is not desire
d 
10 
if it increases the competitive pace of the market. So for instance, 
Ford Motor Co (NZ) believed that the New Zealand consumer would "lose 
- ·out" under the Commerce Act and receive "shoddy service"
29 ; the 
Agricultural Chemical and Animal Remedies Manufacturers Association 
believed that consumers may be serviced by inexperienced and untrained 
sellers as a result of the Act30 ; a restructuring of the motor vehicle 
industry to consumer detriment was predicted as a result of the 
legislation31 ; and that the Act is claimed to be based on "outdated 
·theory"32 • These comments are typical of those voiced by businesses 
in response to the introduction of the Commerce Act. In other 
specific areas comments have not occurred as those areas are as yet 
unchallenged under the Act. This has been true of exclusive dealing 
up until the F&P case• With a direct attack on its exclusive dealing 
arrangements F&P stated33 that the company's franchise system was 
under threat with the Commerce Act being passed and that: "We will be 
fighting to retain it 
petitors are trying 
[the existing franchise system] our com-
to use the law to do what they can't do com-
mercially-" This seems rather ironic as F&P's strong position in the 
market is in part the result of many years of import protection by the 
law. 
Thus, although the aim of competition law is more efficient trading 
and greater consumer welfare, for those whom the law directly effects, 
these positive policy aims are ignored- The individual business tends 
only to see as far as the threat to its profitability. As the 
interpretation of the Act is still at an early stage, it is possible 
that the Courts may also take a narrow approach- That the Commerce 
Act focusses on competition is clear. The degree to which this focus 
will be obscured by desires for individual justice is still develop-
ing. For exclusive dealing cases a clarity of focus is imperative. 
Therefore the decisions of the Courts and the Commission, particularly 
at an initial stage, will determine the future of exclusive dealing 
and, to the extent they are linked, franchising. 
SECTION 2: EXCLUSIVE DEALING: DEFINITION AND RELATIONSHIP 
TO FRANCHISING 
11 
An exclusive dealing contract exists when one firm contracts to buy or 
sell a particular product solely from/to another firm- Exclusive 
dealing is seen most frequently when a dealer agrees to buy some line 
of goods exclusively from a single manufacturer- However, exclusive 
arrangements also occur between a manufacturer and its input sup-
pliers- 34 For example, requirements contracts, where a bu
yer agr-ees ... .,:._ .... .,. 
to purchase all of her3 e requirements of some input from a single 
source and the supplier agrees to make such quantities availabl'e; are··-~·-
· 
'~ als~ ·a · ··form of exclusive dealing-
The practice is thus a vertical 
one- Arrangements relate to parties operating at different market 
levels- Thus in the first example above a dealer in the retail market 
for a good contracts to buy goods exclusively from a party who is in 
the manufacturing market for that good- These different market levels 
are known as "functional markets". Thus generally EDAs are betwe
en 
parties who are not in direct competition- The practice may relate 
to 
product, customer and/or territorial exclusivity; and may include such 
devices as: 
(a) Vertical resale price maintenance - this refers to attempts by a 
party in one functional market (usually a manufacturer) to 
control the prices set by a party in another functional market 
(e.g. retailer). A common method used is to issue recommended 
retail price lists with a disclaimer emphasising that they are 
only 'recommended'· However significant pressure can be brought 
to bear on individual dealers who choose not to follow such 
lists. 
(b) Territorial restrictions - these involve contractual agreements 
defining the areas in which dealers may sell their products. As 
part of the agreement to purchase solely from one manufacturer a 
dealer may have his sales territory limited. This particularly 
occurs where there are a number of dealers in one area contracted 
with the same manufacturer. 
This paper will focus on the situation where a manufacturer imposes 
conditions on a retailer or distributor. For this purpose, Marvel's
3 • 
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simple definition of exclusive dealing is sufficient: "a contractual 
requirement by which retailers or distributors promise they will not 
handle the goods of competing producers-" The F&P case also fits 
neatly into this framework and will therefore be used as a case-study. 
In the writer's opinion (and it would seem according to the Commis-
sion) the facts of the case do not provide a balance of pro and anti-
competitive effects- As will be discussed later, F&P seems to have a 
dominant market position and the use of EDAs assists the maintenance 
of that position without providing significant benefits- However the 
case is typical of the way exclusive dealing is used within franchis-
ing arrangements. It also shows that distinctions between exclusive 
dealing and franchising may be blurred when examining the effect of 
these practices on competition-
Franchising 
The practice of franchising covers a wide variety of activities and 
generally is not known to the law. For instance, franchising may not 
require an express contract; there is no agency and normally no fiduc-
iary relationship between franchisor and franchisee. As Toohey J put 
it37 , "a franchisee is something more than a middleman and less than 
an agent"38 • Thus definitions are difficult- 39 Simply put a fran-
chise is a grant of a right to deal in goods or services over which 
the franchisor has some control- It may be a right to sell a product 
manufactured by the franchisor or use their name, trademarks or image. 
Franchises may often be accompanied by a patent or other licence of 
intellectual property rights40 or may simply involve a particular 
method of doing business41 - Sometimes there may be no 'granter' of 
rights or express franchisor, merely a group of independent businesses 
conducting themselves under a single name or following a similar 
system. However, according to Harkin's definition a franchise 
contains three elements: 42 
1. an original idea; 
2- some distinc·tive embodiment of that idea (for instance the 
golden "M" of McDonalds); and 
3. one or more products 
woven. 
or services around which the idea is 
13 
A fourth element, although obvious, should be added: 
4. an ongoing concern. 
This relates to franchises being more than single transactions. What 
the franchisor is offering is a relationship in which it takes a 
continuing interest in the manner in which the franchisee conducts her 
business- The relationship may be extremely wide, extending in some 
cases (as in McDonalds) to specifying the interior design, providing 
training, supplying specific accounting systems and other details of 
the collective "image" desired. 
Exclusive dealing is a common element in franchising arrangements. It 
may take the form of some or all of the following: 
(a) Prohibiting the franchisee from dealing in rival products. 
(b) Requiring that the franchisee purchase only from the franchiser 
(and in some cases, third parties) 
(c) The franchisor undertaking not to sell to others in a territory 
or outside the territory 
(d) Requiring the franchisee to sell one product only when with 
another product. For example that Big Macs must be sold in the 
McDonalds polystyrene containers (tied sales). 
(e) Requiring the franchisee to stock a full inventory of goods. 
But as stated, a franchise is merely the grant of certain rights- it 
need not involve an exclusive dealing arrangement at all- 4 ~ Without 
going into the economic arguments at this point44 exclusive dealing is 
more likely to arise in franchising arrangements where the connection 
between the "intangible goods" relating to the franchise image and the 
franchise is more tenuous- In these situations it is difficult to 
charge a rental or fee for the franchise and exclusive dealing is 
arguably utilised to safeguard manufacturer investments particularly 
the promotion of the "image" which is an element of the franchising 
package. 
The Commerce Act does not expressly provide for either franchising or 
exclusive dealing. Indeed, it has been suggested by Pengilley 4 e that 
the omission of a special section on exclusive dealing in the New 
Zealand Act meant such arrangements were outside the ambit of the 
Commerce Act46 • However, it is submitted that exclusive dealing could 
fit under sections 27, 28 and 36 of the Act and this view has been 
confirmed in 
case-
14 
the Commerce Commission's Draft Determination on the F&P 
SECTION 3: THE PRESENT NEW ZEALAND LAW 
EXCLUSIVE DEALING 
. . 
15 
THE COl1t1ERCE ACT AND 
The present Commerce Act aligns the New Zealand and Australian 
legislative regimes in many areas of commercial and corporate law- As 
stated, the new trade practice provisions of Part II replace the 
previously central concept of public interest (in the old Act) with a 
primary inquiry as 
affects competition. 
to whether or not particular conduct adversely 
This broad promotion of competition is reflected 
in the Act and 
examined here. 
those sections relevant to exclusive dealing will be 
Sections 27 and 28 of the Act prohibit contracts, covenants, arrange-
ments or understandings which have the purpose or have or are likely 
the effect of substantially lessening competition in a to have 
market- 47 If the Commerce Commission determines that an exclusive 
dealing arrangement contravenes sections 27 or 28 it may grant an 
authorisation if it is satisfied the trade practice will result, or is 
likely to result, in a benefit to the public which would outweigh the 
lessening of competition that would result or is likely to result from 
that practice (see particularly ss58 and 61). 
If either party is held to be in a dominant position in the market and 
is acting for one of the purposes in s36 then the practice is pro-
hibited- These purposes are: 
(a) restricting the entry of another person into a market; or 
(b) preventing or deterring any person from engaging in competitive 
conduct; or 
(c) eliminating any person from the market in question or any other 
market. 
These sections contain a number of basic concepts. Some of these are 
defined in the Act- All must be understood for an adequate under-
standing of the effect of the Act on exclusive dealing. As such, many 
have been subject to judicial interpretation in New Zealand and 
overseas, though often with regard to areas 
law. 
other than competition 
16 
Fundamental Terms 
»1.· "Contract, arrangement or understanding" (s27) 
Contract formation poses few problems largely because of the vast 
number of authorities and material on the subject.
49 It is an 
agreement enforceable at law but note that s2(6)(a) extends the 
meaning to include leases and licences of land and buildings-
However, the other two terms have received less fr
equent judicial 
con sideration- For present purposes, it is sufficient 
to note that · 
the Court5 have set aside formalities in looking at business conduct. 
In the case of Wellington Fencing Materials Association
49 an arrange- · ·- -
ment is "·--apt to describe something less than a binding contract, 
something in the nature of an understanding between two or more 
persons---a plan arranged between them which may not be enforceable at 
law." The usefulness of this statement is reduced because the terms 
in s27 are not defined separately- It does show that an arrangemen
t 
may exist, whatever form of communication is used, between the parties 
and further, that in some cases an arrangement may grow up 
over 
time.eo However a more useful test of arrangement comes from the 
English courts. In British Basic Slag Ltd v Registrar of Restrictiv
e 
Trading Agreementse 1 Lord Diplock modified an earlier teste
2 and held 
that: 
u ••• all that is required ••• to constitute an arrangement in law is 
that the parties to it shall have communicated with one another 
in some way, and that as a result of the communication each has 
intentionally aroused in the other an expectation that he will 
act in a certain way." 
· Because of the informal requirements the so-called "wink and nodue::s 
agreement clearly falls within the Act- However, there is no arrange-
ment or understanding if one merely follows the prices of another, 
though if challenged the price leader and follower would need to 
demonstrate that no communication occurred. 
In assessing price leadership certain factors are useful in determin-
ing whether such conduct results from some arrangement between 
competitors. These factors result from a number of decisions, but 
particularly from the British Slage
4 and Re Master Grocers Fed-
eration88 cases. The factors include: 
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(a) Whether or not there is an independent business rationale for the 
action taken- If the action is clearly consistent with a 
person's best interests then no inference of an arrangement is 
possible- (Dalglish J. : Master Grocers)~6 
(b) The existence of any motives for entering into such an arrange-
ment. 
(c) Broad price indicators such as: 
(d) 
(e) 
General similarity in pricing conduct, particularly in the 
timing and amount of any changes 
High prices, particularly where contrary to economic factors 
- may be links to output restrictions particularly in 
monopolistic situations where the level of supply is kept at 
a level below societies optimal (desired) output. Thus an 
agreement to restrict output which results in product 
scarcity may also result in higher prices. 
Increased standardisation of products. 
Refusal to quote customers after price increases by other 
suppliers. 
2. "Substantially lessening competition" (ss27 and 28) 
In these sections the lessening of competition must be outweighed by 
"a benefit to the p~lic" which "in all the circumstances" will result 
from the practice-~7 Under s 2(1) of the Act "substantial'' is defined 
as being "real or of substance". In itself this extension of the 
definition adds little- However, judicial interpretation has provided 
additional guidelines. 
The phrase is used in the 1974 Australian Act~
8 and has received 
considerable judicial interpretation- In the Tillmanns Butcheries~
9 
case, substantial was held to mean "more than trivial or minimal". 
Similar epithets and synonyms such as "big''
60 do not take one very 
far. The cases do indicate that substantial does not require a very 
significant lessening of competition but further precision is often 
difficult because of the limitation of many judgments to their own 
factual situation and because of the wording of the statutory def-
inition. However, there is a useful analysis in the text by Donald 
and Heydon- 61 There it was stated that a substantial lessening of 
competition must: 
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be interpreted to refer to a Yeduction in the factoYs which make 
a market workably competitive. It should not be interpreted to 
strike down conduct which happens to damage one firm; that loss 
may merely be the result of the success of the very competitive 
endeavour which the Act wishes to promote- Even if a market 
development leads to the exit from business of many small firms, 
the major participants may be left as competitive as before, each 
effectively constraining the others to act efficiently and each 
having the scale to act efficiently- In the application of the 
Act it must be recognised that short term restrictions are often 
part of longer term growth and that without them markets cannot 
grow ••• the assessment of substantial effects on competition can 
never be simply a quantitative assessment. It must involve 
qualitative judgments about the impact of conduct on the market 
in general. 
This statement focusses broadly on competition in the market rather 
than examining the actions of specific competitors. It is this broad 
overview which is vital- From the quotation two factors are par-
ticularly important: 
(i) that analysis must be upon the degree that competition is 
reduced, not the proportionate reduction relative to the previous 
level of total competition; and 
(ii) that market definition is central. Market delineation will 
directly affect the way the 
ceived- 62 
lessening of competition is per-
These factors are also mentioned in the first New Zealand case@ this 
phrase which is discussed below. 
The New Zealand authorities in examining ''substantially lessening 
competition" have built upon the definition of overseas authorities 
particularly those of the Australian Trade Practices Tribunal. The 
first New Zealand decision was in Whakatu/Advanced Meats
63 • In that 
case the phrase wsubstantially lessening competition in a market- was 
closely examined and the Commerce Commission made a number of comments 
which are useful to the present discussion. 
Firstly it was emphasised that the test of "substantial lessening" 
related to the competition in a market(s) affected by the particular 
practice under consideration- The delineation of the market was 
therefore of importance. Guidance as to the appropriate market 
definition was taken from the Edmonds Food Industries Ltd v W F Tucker 
& Co Ltd case64 which laid down guidelines to market delineation (see 
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later summary) and stated that: 
"Ultimately the judgement as to the appropriate market - and
 its 
delineation by function, product and area - is a question of 
fact 
which must be made on the basis of commercial common sense in
 the 
circumstances of each case---" 
This statement formed the basis for the s3(1) definition of t
he market 
in the 1986 Act- The statement was itself based to some de
gree on the 
Australian decision of Re Queensland Co-operative Milling A
ssociation 
in which the importance of substitution was stressed-
"substitution between one product and another, and between o
ne source 
of supply and another, in response to changing prices-
1166 So a market 
is "the field of actual and potential transactions between b
uyers and 
sellers amongst whom there can be strong substitution, at lea
st in the 
long run, if given a sufti~ient price incentive-"
67 
The Whakatu/Advanced Meats68
 decision made a further relevant point 
which relates to the degree of precision possible- In discussi
ng the 
Tillmann Butcheries case, the Commission said
69 : 
"Accordingly, it seems reasonable to assume that 'real o
r of 
substance' in New Zealand was intended to mean not insignific
ant, 
not ephemeral, not nominal or minimal- Of course, as Dea
ne J 
says, such a test conceals a lack of precision- In this resp
ect, 
the evaluation of the question of degree, based on the crite
rion 
of "not insignificant, ephemeral, nominal or minimal'', must 
be a 
matter of judgment for the appropriate adjudicating body." 
The Commission perceived this choice of wording by the legis
lature as 
a desire to "cast the net widely"
70 • Thus, in the writer's opinion, 
any lack of precision exists to provide freedom for bodies de
ciding on 
restrictive trade matters to define the boundaries of ap
propriate 
competitive practice- This has advantages in this area as 
significant 
problems may arise in trying to precisely define concepts w
hich must 
apply to a range of practices- However in not laying
 down more 
definitive criteria, the legislature leave open the po
ssibility that 
decisions will distort their policy objectives particu
larly as 
mentioned where this objective conflicts with an apparent inj
ustice to 
an individual trader- Indeed, this possibility is in part 
responsible 
for the decision by the Australian legislature opting for p
rovisions 
covering specific difficult areas such as exclusive dealing-
71 
Several further points are relevant before discussing the tw
o most 
important concepts in the Act (being "competition" and "ma
rket"). 
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Section 3(5) of the Act permits that, for the purposes of s27, assess-
ment may be made of the other provisions of the contract, arrangement 
or understanding in question; or· of the provisions of any other 
contract, arrangement or understanding, together with the specific 
provision in question- Any of these combinations together "shall be 
deemed to 
lessening 
regarding 
s3(7). 
have or to be likely to have the effect of substantially 
competition 
"covenants" 
in a market 11 72 • Similar provisions exist 
"engaging in conduct" under under s3(6) and 
3. "Competition" 
This term is relevant to all of the sections which may proscribe 
exclusive dealing or franchising. 
as meaning "workable or- effective 
It is defined in s3(1) of the Act 
competition"73 and must be con-
sidered in relation to markets in New Zealand. Under s3(3) allowance 
is made for the effects on competition of importers, both actual and 
potential- This definition seems to deny a belief in the model of 
perfect competition74 which assumes as an ideal a mar·ket of many 
buyers and sellers with perfect knowledge of market events, complete 
mobility and identical costs (for example the costs of transactions or 
taxation). 
practical 
involves 
The New Zealand definition focusses on achieving a more 
reality. As the evaluation of competition inherently 
the economic analysis of a given situation the economic 
writing on what constitutes "workable or effective competition" is 
extensive. 7 e Particularly useful are comments by Donald and Heydon.
76 
They see some merit in the model of perfect competition
77 if one 
relaxes the assumptions to a degree and thus allows the reality of 
"oligopolistic markets in order to keep the good attainable." That 
is, per-feet competition may provide a guide to the level of com-
petition when one allows the reality of few sellers (oligopoly) to be 
considered under the model- Although the degree to which a market 
tends towards perfect competition may provide some clue to the level 
of competition, in itself this model may distort perceptions of what 
the competitive ideal should be. As Donald and Heydon add:
78 
Workable competition exists when 
sufficient influences to exist in 
into account by each participant 
haviour. 
there is an opportunity for 
any market, which must be taken 
and which constrain its be-
Thus, as will be discussed later, it is submitted that workable or 
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effective competition may exist without numerous sellers- 7 ~ This fact 
is accommodated in the New Zealand definition with its focus on the 
reality of competition in a market. Further guidance regarding the 
term "competition" can be gleaned from John Collinge's words on intro-
ducing the 1986 Act. 00 
"Effective competition is, in essence, whether new or potential 
entry is reasonably practicable in a given market. That, in 
essence, is the same judgment which a businessman makes in 
deciding whether to enter a market. Any trade practice which 
restricts such entry has the potential to substantially reduce 
competition in terms of the Act-" 
The chairman goes on to state that competition has different meanings 
for different people or organisations- Competition policies may mean 
"more freedom for some and less freedom for others- The ultimate goal 
is, however, more competition overall-" This pragmatic view provides 
a yard-stick for assessing what type of competition best fits the 
conditions of the market economy under consideration- In New Zealand 
it is important to bear in mind the unique commercial setting of this 
country particularly the size and structure of the market and the 
legal framework which exists here- Thus: 81 
Competition is not an easy concept. It is highly judgmental, 
multi-faceted and dynamic- It means different things from 
different perspectives- It may not be the best policy in all 
cases- Balanced judgments between competing facts, interests and 
policies are constantly required-
However, the Commission and the Courts have devised some factors 
useful in assessing whether there is "workable and effective corn-
petition". Some of these factors were outlined in the Air New Zealand 
v Commerce Commission case- 82 There the Chief Justice made reference 
to the QCMA83 case and the factors which the Australian Trade Prac-
tices Tribunal saw as relevant. Likewise in the earlier Commerce 
Commission decision in the Visionhire Holdings Ltd/Sanyo case84
 
reference was made to that Australian judgment. In QCMA the Tribunal 
saw competition as an ongoing process that could not be analyse<l on a 
static point in time basis-
market structure and five 
important. These were: 
Competition was seen as a factor of the 
factors were held to be particularly 
(1) the number and size distribution of independent sellers, es-
pecially the degree of market concentration; 
(2) the height of barriers to entry, i-e- the ease with which new 
firms may enter and secure a viable market; 
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(3) the extent to which the products of the industry are character-
ised by extreme product differentiation and sales promotion; 
(4) the character of "vertical relationships" with customers and with 
suppliers and the extent of vertical integration; and 
(5) the nature of any formal, stable and fundamental arrangements 
between firms which restrict their ability to function as 
independent entities-
The Tribunal in the QCMA case noted that of these factors, barriers to 
entry was the most significant- However, identifying the appropriate 
test and factors which help the assessment of "workable and effective 
competition" 
petition"-
conveys only half of 
Equally important is the 
the meaning of the term "com-
realisation of the aim of this 
test- As stated, a competition goal for its own sake may be counter 
productive in terms of the social benefit goals desired- Again, the 
QCMA case can provide a good statement of the policy objective! 
Thus 
"in identifying the 
industries or markets, 
device for controlling 
existence of competition in particular 
we must focus upon the economic role as a 
the disposition of society's resources-" 8 e 
effective competition describes a contestable86 market which 
should be permitted to operate without interference while it is 
efficiently allocating resources-
Although in the writer's view the New Zealand decisions have not 
always fully reflected this policy 1 87 adjudicating bodies have built 
on the interpretation of the Australian authorities. In the Whakatu/-
Advanced Meats case00 , the Commerce Commission provided guidance for 
future decisions- Some of the Commission's observations have been 
mentioned above, however a summary of 
is useful: 
the main points on competition 
1- Competition can only be assessed in terms of a particular market-
2. Such a market may have several elements: generally these are 
assessed in terms of the geographical, functional and product 
components of the market (see "market" discussion below). 
3- In defining "effective competition" the Commission made reference 
to Visionhire/Sanyo 8 ~ (discussed above) and other merger or 
takeover cases. 
lessening of 
Although 
competition 
these did not deal with a substantial 
(s27) the Commission stated that 
4. 
4. 
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effective competition is "consistently applied throughout the 
Act". 90 Therefore the discussions have equal application 
field of exclusive dealing. 
in the 
The antithesis of competition is market power- 91 Thus increases 
in the ability of one firm to act independently of others in the 
market represents a reduction in competition. Again reference 
was made to the Visionhire/Sanyo decision- The factors outlined 
in the latter case provide a guide to determining changes in 
market power which may effect competition in the market. 
"Market" (ss 27 2 28 and 36) 
This is the most vital concept discussed here- As stated a market 
definition is necessary to the analysis of the other concepts. This 
point was made by Justice Brennan in the US Supreme Court with regard 
to equivalent legislation in the area of monopolies: 92 
Determination of the relevant market is a necessary predicate to 
finding a violation of the Clayton Act because a threatened 
monopoly must be one which will substantially lessen competition 
within the area of effe et i ve competition. "Substantial 1 y" can be 
determined only in terms of the market affected-
The term "market" is defined in s 3(1) of the Act to mean "a market 
for goods or services within New Zealand that may be distinguished as 
a matter of fact and commercial common sense-" 93 As this definition 
suggests individual cases must be decided on their specific facts-
Although other authorities can provide assistance the final decision 
must depend on the circumstances to be assessed- From the case law 
the most important factor in determining the market is substitution. 
This may be relevant in any of the three market dimensions: 
(a) the product market; 
(b) the functional market; and 
(c) the geographical market. 
Substitution refers to the ability of buyers and sellers in each of 
these dimensions of the market to switch their source(s) of supply. 
"Whether such substitution is feasible or likely, depends ultimately 
on consumer attitudes, technology, distance, [time constraints], and 
cost and price incentives-"94 
effect the choice of product, 
Most particularly substitution will 
but in the long run with sufficient 
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price changes one may also alter the level at which one is supplied: 
e.g. moving from wholesale purchasing to manufacturing (a change in 
the functional market); or changing the location of sales (effects the 
geographical market). However, in deciding restrictive practice
 
matters, the capacity to switch the source(s) of supply must be an 
economically viable alternative. For instance, it is possible that an 
Australian company could import beer into New Zealand and distribute 
it by purchasing on-licence facilities throughout the country. But as 
an economic alternative it is an unlikely possibility. Thus the 
market is that field where substitution is possible- It represents 
the area in which literally firms must be competitive to avoid the 
substitution of other products and/or suppliers. 
In the Edmonds/Tucker case~~ the Commission referred to a number of 
other factors relevant in determining the appropriate market def-
inition- These are summarised below: 
1. Technology 
2. Distances involved (particularly for distribution to customers) 
3. Cost and price incentives 
4. Substitutability (and associated switching costs) 
5. Evaluation of any market trends/growth 
6. Potential competition 
7- Evaluation of industry viewpoints 
a. Public tastes and attitudes 
9. Public knowledge 
These factors do not seem exhaustive as the Com,nission added that 
"(u]ltimately the judgment 
delineation by function, 
as to the 
product 
which must be made on the basis of 
appropriate market and its 
and area - is a question of fact 
commercial common sense in the 
circumstances of 
extensive guide to 
each case ••• ". 
defining the 
Thus the Commission provides an 
market but keeps the focus upon 
individual cases- Further factors may therefore be relevant to 
different market circumstances. 
Market definition is of great importance when dealing with exclusive 
dealing issues. Because exclusive dealing arrangements reduce the 
avenues open to competitors they may form powerful barriers to entry 
and/or constrain existing competition (this will be discussed further 
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oelow)- Therefore a wider market definition results in more outle
ts 
or sources of supply for competitors being considered relevant. This 
provides a consequent reduction in the overall anti-competitive 
effects of the exclusive dealing practice. 
The use by the Commission of three market dimensions was adopted in 
the Nathans/McKenzies merger case- 96 These 'dimensions' assist in 
defining where 
should be-
competition occurs and thus what the market as a whole 
The product market dimension 
are substitutable for and 
examines the goods and/or 
competitive with those 
services which 
in question-
Obviously the wider the range of competitive substitutes, then the 
wider the product market definition and the less likelihood that the 
practice will be held to "substantially lessen competition" 
the parties hold a "dominant position"-
or that 
Functional markets are defined according to their horizontal level. 
retailing. Although normally parties For example, manufacturing or 
in different functional levels cannot be said to be in operating 
competition this distinction may become blurred especially when 
arrangements such as exclusive dealing or 
Again, the separation of markets will depend 
franchising are involved. 
on the particular facts 
of the case. However, the vertical nature of these arrangements means 
that they do not fit neatly within the market definition. 
Geographical markets examine the area in which buyers and sellers are 
willing to operate- People may be willing to travel a much greater 
distance to get a good deal on a new car than for a haircut-
97 Thus 
factors such as local patterns of demand, convenience and transport 
costs will be important. However, it should be noted that generally 
the Commission has defined the geographic market as the whole of New 
Zealand and has been reluctant to sub-divide this-
98 
An example which shows the importance of market delineation is seen in 
Air New Zealand v The Commerce Commission and Anor-
9 ~ In this appeal 
the Chief Justice revoked a majority decision of the Commission 
refusing consent to Air New Zealand to acquire up to 77~ of Mount Cook 
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Group Ltd- In so doing, His Honour
 rejected the view of three members 
of the Commission that Air New Zealand and Mount Coo
k were potential 
competitors in the same market described as the dome
stic air services 
market- It was held that the minority view of the
 Chairman of the 
Commission was correct, namely, that Air New Zealand
 and Mount Cook 
were operating in different markets viz, the tour
ist air services 
market (Mount Cook) and the main trunk and provinc
ial air services 
market (Air New Zealand). 
A final point is that made in QCMA that th
e concepts of "market" and 
"competition" should not be regarded as totally sepa1-
ate. One cannot 
be adequately determined without an examination of the
 other. As the 
New Zealand authorities have also pointed out, the
 level of com-
petition can only be assessed in its market conte
xt. This market 
definition will itself be determined by the field 
of competition. 
This market 'field' will result from a number of facto
rs, particularly 
the extent 
petitors. 
that substitution is possible between differen
t com-
5. "Dominant position in a market" (ss 36, 66 and 67) 
For the purposes of this paper, the last concept to 
be examined only 
concerns s36- As stated, exclusive dealing and fran
chising arrange-
ments may fal 1 within this provision so an u
nderstanding of what 
constitutes a "dominant position" is essential- Tha
t is particularly 
so given the small and relatively isolated nature of
 the New Zealand 
market and the structure of the industries within it. 
Section 36 is broadly modelled on s46 of the A
ustralian legislation. 
However, the 
New Zealand's 
basic test 
"dominant 
in the New Zealand provision is different. 
position" test stems fr-om the Eur-opean 
Economic Community Treaty, Article 86- As such the 
Australian auth-
Ol"ities are of less significance than elsewhere- Ind
eed the extended 
definition of "dominant position in a market" ins 3
(8) reflects the 
decision of the Commission of European Communities in
 Re Continental 
Can Company Inc 100 • It should also be noted that the 
s 36 test is two 
tiel"ed. One must have a dominant position in a market a
nd one must 
use that position in an anti-competitive manner. Th
us the "dominant 
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position" test is whether a person as a supplier or acquirer 
of goods 
or services either alone or with any interconnected body corp
orate is 
in a position to exercise a dominant influence over the pro
duction, 
acquisition, supply or price of goods or services in their m
arket and 
does so- 101 The factors listed ins 3(8) (a)
 to (c) are to be con-
In News Ltd/In-sidered in determining whether the test has been met. 
dependent Newspapers Ltd 102 the Commission felt 
factors into account where they were relevant. 
an "extended and expanding list of ••• factors." 
it could take other 
It therefore set out 
These are set out 
below with an asterix beside those which are implicit in any 
of paras. 
(a) (c) of s 3(8): 
(i) The structure of the market which requires a consideratio
n of: 
* 
* 
(ii) 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
(f) 
(g) 
(h) 
(i) 
the share of the market of the 
merged new concern; 
the degree of market concentration; 
[allegedly dominant] 
the size distribution of all concerns in the market; 
the extent to which the products in question are 
characterised by product differentiation and sales 
promotion, ie, whether there are reasonably close 
substitutes; 
materials and capital; 
the [allegedly dominant] 
to other operators in the 
access to technical knowledge, 
the financial stability of 
merged concern in relation 
market; 
the nature of any formal, 
contracts, arrangements or 
concerns in the market; 
stable, and fundamental 
understanding[s] between 
the extent of corporate integration (eg, interlocking 
shareholdings and cross directorships) among concerns 
in the market; 
the extent of vertical integration. 
* The extent of restraints imposed by 
competitors or potential competitors or by 
which requires a consideration of: 
the conduct of 
others affected 
(a) the extent to which competition exists o~ has existed 
and is likely to continue; 
* (b) the extent to which the concern is constrained by the 
conduct of competitors; 
* (c) the capacity of the concern to determine prices in or 
to exclude entry to the market without being inhibited 
in that determination or action by suppliers and 
acquirers; 
(d) the height of barriers to entry in the market and the 
ability of potential competitors to enter the market 
and to sustain a position in the market. 
These factors extend the earlier market definitions mention
ed above, 
Particularly regarding delineation of markets in terms of ba
rriers to 
28 
entry-
It is submitted that although the focus here is upon dominance 
in a market, this is still a question of defining the level 
of market 
power held by one party. As market
 power is the 'antithesis of 
competition', market concepts should be consistent when discussing s27 
or s36-
Two tests of "dominant position'' arose from the News Ltd/INL case-
103 
The first of these required "an absence of effective competition". 
This focussed on the statutory objective of promoting competition and 
dominance arose when a par-ty could make "significant 
decisions" without being constrained by other market par-
held that 
business 
ticipants- This independence was inferred to arise only when there 
was an absence of workable or effective competition. 
The second test comes from the Australian case of TPC v Ansett
104 • 
There Justice Northrop had to consider the meaning of the words 
"contr-ol or dominate" (s50 Australian TPA). He concluded that 
"dominate" should be construed in its 
Shorter Oxford dictionary definition: 
ordinary sense and used the 
"having a commanding influence 
on". The case contains a careful analysis of some of the cases 
decided under Eur-opean Economic Community trade practices law
10~ but 
its definitions of market dominance are of less use as they tend to be 
merely reformulations of the statutory test incorporating synonyms-
The Australian test refers to "control and dominate", and distinctions 
relating to this are irrelevant to the New Zealand situation as s36 is 
framed only in terms of market dominance. However, it is interesting 
that in that case a share of 43-46Z of the market was not held to be 
dominance. It is to be noted that other factors were seen as central 
particularly the ease of entry and controls on Avis' pricing policy by 
competitors. 
share was 
In the USA a broadly similar result regarding market 
reached in the ALCOA decision. 106 In that case Judge 
learned Hand stated that: 
"Ninety percent of output is enough to constitute 
is doubtful if sixty to sixty four percent would 
certainly thirty three percent is not." 
a monopoly; it 
be enough; and 
The conclusion is not that market share alone provides dominance but 
that when a firm has a significant market 
intentional or not, will generally follow. 
share,dominance, whether 
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This is interesting as in the F&P case the market share over a number 
of products ranged between 55S and 85S- 107 Thus the Commission is 
drawing narrower boundaries. But market share should arguably not be 
the primary concern- Market power which focusses on the independence 
of a party to act without regard to other market participants is of 
more relevance- This view is supported by the factors to be con-
sidered ins 3(8) of the Act and the further factors added in the 
cases; in the writing in this area; 100 and is implicit in comments by 
the Commission in the Draft Determination on the F&P application 10~. 
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SECTION 4: EXCLUSIVE DEALING: EXMINING THE RELEVANT SECTIONS OF THE 
COtlNERCE ACT 
For the purposes of this paper only s27 and s36 will be analysed in 
terms of exclusive dealing. The fundamental terms have already been 
discussed but further comments on the way these sections apply to 
exclusive dealing arrangements is necessary. 
Section 27 
This is a general 'catch-all' provision which prohibits contracts, 
arrangements or understandings which have the purpose of, or are 
likely to, substantially lessen competition in a market. Under s27 
such arrangements are unenforceable- Most anti-competitive practices 
will be caught by this section, however in some areas specific 
provisions (such as those on price fixing) will also regulate these 
activities- As Yvonne von Roy points out in her text: 
Section 27 is well designed to catch horizontal anti-competitive 
arrangements, etc. It does not cover the range of vertical 
practices well, however, for it covers only contracts, arrange-
ments and understandings, and not unilateral actions of one party 
alone- Most vertical practi=es will not affect competition 
sufficiently anyway, but some will, for example a refusal to 
supply ••• 
However, exclusive dealing practices require a contract, arrangement 
or understanding of some sort- As such they ma~ be caught under s27-
In the area of exclusive dealing (as stated) Australia has provided 
specific provisions to regulate this practice. New Zealand's omission 
of similar provisions has received some criticism which will be 
examined here- Pengilley makes two arguments regarding the s27 
provisions- Both refer to the ineffectiveness of the section in 
dealing with this practice. The first has been briefly mentioned. 
That as Australia has a specific provision for exclusive dealing,as 
well as general provisions (upon which New Zealand's Part II is based) 
then by implication the latter are considered insufficient to control 
this practice- By analogy Pengilley argues
110 that the New Zealand 
Provisions are therefore of no effect-
In the writer's opinion this argument is flawed- The Commerce Act is 
not a reproduction of the Australian Trade Practices Act. It is a 
response to a different market environment and open to interpretation 
'i I 
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by the New Zealand courts. Although s47 of the Australian legislation 
does provide specific provisions for exclusive dealing these practices 
could be dealt with under the general provisions in s45- The basic 
premise of this paper is that if the aim of the Commerce Act is 
increased competition as a vehicle for greater consumer welfare then 
the New Zealand provisions are sufficient to deal with anti-com-
petitive exclusive dealing situations-
The question is then: What does s47 of the Trade Practices Act provide 
(if anything) that is missing from the New Zealand provisions? 
As is indicated in the later discussion on the Australian jurisdiction 
s47 is not easily interpreted- It is also apparent from s45 that the 
exclusive dealing practices covered by s47 would be caught, as s45 
regulates all arrangements- The reasons for the specific treatment of 
exclusive dealing are unclear. One possible reason was the desire of 
the legislature, following the Swanson Committee Report 111 , to clearly 
define what exclusive dealing practices would be lawful-
However several degrees of potential anti-competitive effect mean that 
the s47 provisions must deal with various exclusive dealing sit-
uations. As Heydon and Donald put it: 
"Some of them [the exclusive dealing arrangements which s47 
regulates] may promote or retard competition, and so need only be 
prohibited in particular cases where they have detrimental 
effect. Others are considered to have no possible competitive 
benefits, but they may produce public benefits and so ought to be 
permitted if such public benefits can be proved." This is the 
case with third line forcing under s47(6). 
With all due respect to Mr Pengilley (and others) it is submitted that 
though the intention of the Australian provisions may have been to 
clarify what exclusive dealing practices were unlawful they do not 
provide further protection against anti-competitive effects than the 
New Zealand provisions-
In all of the s47 categories of exclusive dealing a minimum require-
ment for a breach would appear to be substantially lessening com-
petition- Although the conduct which brings about this result may be 
··· defined in greater specificity, the requirement for a breach is no 
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~ore than the general provisions of s27 provide. The foc
us of the New 
zealand legislation is the promotion of competition. T
he prohibition 
under s27 concerns practices which substantially lessen
 competition. 
That these practices are not precisely defined sho
uld not impede 
finding that there has been a breach of the Act under e
ither s27 or, 
where appropriate, s36-
Pengilley's first argument would seem to be further
 denied by the 
approach of the Commerce Commission in the F&P case. Ho
wever, in that 
situation, there was a substantial market share and th
e conclusions 
seem largely based on the dominant position of F&P in 
the whiteware 
market. 
The second argument 
"inrpose" terms on 
raised 
dealers 
by 
there 
Pengilley is that because suppliers 
is no mutuality of obligation. 
Agreement, even if only an informal "wink or nod
11112 is required for 
the purposes of finding a contract, arrangement or
 understanding 
within the meaning of s27- 11 ~ According to Pengilley t
his problem is 
alleviated in the Australian 
imposition of a "conditionH 
legislation (s47(2)) by prohibiting the 
(widely defined) 
this results in anti-competitive effect(s). 
on a supplied party if 
Thus the supplied party 
does not have to "agree" to the condition for a breach. 
This seeins to 
Nfer to unilaterally dictated terms: "[t]he usual posi
tion would be 
that the supplied party simply had no choice in the matt
er." 114 
Again, with respect, this seems a distorted view of t
he New Zealand 
law. As Hill and Jones point out
11 e under s27 of the Commerce Act, 
all that is required is a contract, arrangement or 
understanding, 
"containing a provision" that is anti-competitive.
 It does not 
require mutuality of all the provisions of the trading a
greement. 
These are the only major criticisms of s27, to date, 
that relate to 
exclusive dealing. 
this practice will 
It is likely that any future actions regarding 
result in further comments. To date the only 
exclusive dealing case where a breach of s27 was alleg
ed was Bond & 
Bond Ltd v Fisher & Paykel Ltd
11•. In that case Barker J found that 
in the circumstances the application for an interim in
junction could 
not be based on s27 because of s111(1) which provided t
hat s27 should 
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have no application until 1 March 1987-
The writer's view is that s27 is the most appropriate method for 
regulating exclusive dealing- Although s27 is usually concerned with 
horizontal competition, that is, agreements between two competitors in 
the same functional market, the provision can accommodate vertical 
practices- With consistent judicial interpretation this broad section 
together with s36 can catch those EDAs which are anti-competitive. 
This avoids further difficult drafting and provides the scope for 
adjudicating bodies to deal with practices which may not fit within 
specific definitions- A wide provision such as s27 is useful in a 
commercial context where the development of new Narrangements" to 
circumvent existing legislation may be quite rapid- This is par-
ticularly so in the Commerce Act where the focus is on promoting 
substantiv~ competition and not merely prohibiting a certain foMt of 
enterprise-
Section 36 
This provision regulates monopolistic conduct- It focusses upon 
preventing enterprises misusing dominant market positions and is one 
of three approaches used to deal with increases in market power. Part 
III of the Act examines monopolistic structures focussing upon mergers 
and takeovers where market power is increased- Part IV deals with 
price control and particularly regulates monopoly pricing. 
Section 36(1) provides that: 
"No person who has a dominant position in a market shall use that 
position for the purpose of-
(a) Restricting the entry of 
market; or 
(b) Preventing or deterring any 
petitive conduct in that or 
(c) Eliminating any person from 
any person into that or any other 
person from engaging in com-
in any other market; or 
that or any other market." 
EDAs may result in any one of these circumstances, though the degree 
to which EDAs alone may eliminate a person from the market is limited. 
However they may form a strong barrier to entry and they clearly 
prevent or deter certain types of competitive conduct- Thus if a firm 
is held to be in a dominant position in a market and engages in EDAs 
for any of the purposes listed above then the danger of an action 
1 \ 1 I 
under this section is high. 
Thus s36 has three major elements: 
(i) market dominance (discussed previously); 
(ii) The use of that dominant position; and 
34 
(iii)One of the three listed purposes- This "purposew need not be the 
only one, however it must be a "substantial" purpose of the 
conduct in question. 11 7 For the present discussion "purpose" 
only refers to deterring or restricting competitors. 
~It is not proposed to examine the general points raised by the Act 
under 536. These are discussed in detail elsewhere- 118 However two 
points are of specific relevance to exclusive dealing. The first 
effects all alleged breaches of s36 but may have particular relevance 
in the exclusive dealing area- It 
section. In contrast to the rest of 
refers to power affecting "any person"• 
result in the award of damages to an 
suffered. Thus the section may be 
concerns 
the Act, 
Further, 
individual 
perceived 
the wording of the 
in 536 the language 
breaches of s36 may 
trader for any loss 
as focussing upon 
individual rights. As Land states in his discussion 119 this is 
inappropriate. The Act aims to promote competition. The elimination 
or restriction of competitors by a firm may reflect inefficient 
resource use by those competitors 120 • Their demise in itself may not 
be inconsistent with the objective of greater consumer welfare; indeed 
efficiency may be improved by such a departure. The focus is there-
fore on the purpose of any such action by dominant firms. 
purpose may manifest as: 
This 
(i) Predatory Pricing - particularly pricing below marginal cost 121 
(ii) Refusals to supply: e.g. As was the case in the Bond & Bond Ltd v 
Fisher & Paykel Ltd case 122 , 
(iii)Denial ot Access to Essential facilities; 
(iv) Enforcement of intellectual property or contractual rights; and 
(v) Exclusive dealing and related practices-
All of these practices, and others 123 which are employed aay give 
results, which are illegal under s36- Thus if a firm is dominant the 
SUbstantial purpose of such action should clearly be other than one of 
the three prohibited purposes: e.g. Refusal to supply because 
t ' I I 
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retai'ler is a proven credit-risk~ Howeve·r, Cut11peti tion often d
emands 
that practices whi eh give prohibited results be used. Suc
cessful -
competition on an individual basis involves the fu
rtherance of one 
person or organisation's aims, often at the expense of others. 
the threshold level of "dominant position in a market" is vital-
Thus 
Therefore the second major point is that in adjudicating dispu
tes it 
is important that the bodies concerned do adhere fairly closely 
to the 
objective of the Act. Because of the nature of the lang
uage in s36 
and the problems assessing market dominance it is likely th
at dif-
ticulties will arise. 
of the Australian cases, 
The first New Zealand decisions 124 , like many 
seem to focus on individual justice rather 
than a competition objective. As Land states: 
It is far from certain, however, that the courts in New Zeala
nd 
will take an approach which gives sufficient weight to th
e 
economic objectives of the Act. The Australian courts, wi
th 
respect, have failed to do so in most of the cases on section 
46 
of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Aust-), the provision on whi
ch 
our section 36 was based- Two of the first three New Zeala
nd 
decisions on section 36 are also not encouraging. 
The writer is in agreemen~ with the general point made,
 that the 
policy objective of the Commerce Act may not have been give
n suf-
ficient weight. However, it is submitted that the New Zeal
and cases 
to date have not had sufficient opportunity to develop in this
 area. 
So for example in Bond & Bond Ltd v Fisher & Paykel Ltd
12e Barker J 
commented that it is: 
"desirable for the Court; when feeling its way in determining th
e 
proper approach to be taken to litigation under the statute, 
to 
confine itself as much as possible to the issues before i
t, 
leaving general principles to be distilled from a number 
of 
judgments." 
Therefore, a clear judicial approach to the policy objectives 
has not 
developed yet, however there have been some encouraging com
ments. 
Barker Jin the later case of ARA v Mutual Rental Cars (A
uckland 
Airport) Ltd126 in discussing the nature of competition stated t
hat: 
The test of competition is not concerned with the economic fa
te 
of individual competitors but with the level of rivalrou
s 
behaviour in the market. The relevant service or function
al 
market is the provision of rental cars to the public- T
he 
geographic market is national-
The Commerce Commission particularly seems to be viewing 
t I 
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monopolisation and oligopoly as economic phenomena and abandoning 
judgment of such conduct on more moral grounds- For exclusive dealing 
and franchising the degree to which this development continues will 
determine the 
form• 
continued existence of these practices in their present 
Future Interpretation in Light of Present Uncertainty 
As stated it is the author's view that the existing New Zealand 
provisions are appropriate to regulate anti-competitive exclusive 
dealing practices- This area has not received much interpretation to 
date- The decided cases have, with respect, tended to give less 
weight to the competitive objectives of the Act in response to 
situations of perceived unfairness to individual traders- This is not 
the role of the Act and would seem to cause problems for company 
officials in determining any liability under the Act. Up until 
recently the Commerce Commission has been unsure of the application of 
the Act to exclusive dealing127 and even the F&P Draft Determination 
does not provide a guide to the approach of the Commission to ex-
clusive . dealing cases except in fairly extreme cases of market 
dominance-
An examination of other practices similar to exclusive dealing which 
have been examined under the Act may provide a useful guide to future 
interpretations under the relevant legislation. Particularly useful 
in this context are those examining franchising arrangements. As 
stated, these, like exclusive d~aling, may impact upon vertical 
competition. In Auckland Motors v Todd Motors 128 , one of the issues 
was whether franchising agreement contravened s27 of the Act. 
" However, the test formulated by Justice Craig does not assist us much 
more than the Draft Determination. It merely states that if either 
party in the franchising arrangement has significant market power the 
risks of being caught under s27 or s36 will be greater. On the 
previous analysis in this paper this risk will largely depend on the 
court's definition of the market. This is itself uncertain until 
there are a greater number of decisions and a more obvious and 
consistent line in the reasoning. 
Until the final determination on the F&P case and probably, of more 
I I I 
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use, a decision on a more 'balanced' case (regarding pro-and anti-com-
petitive effects) involving exclusive dealing the present uncertainty 
of the law in this area will remain• This uncertainty itself may be a 
factor behind agitation for a separate section on exclusive dealing as 
is the case overseas (notably in Australia). However it is submitted 
that such specific provisions will not alleviate the problems of 
uncertainty for New Zealand organisations regarding their exclusive 
dealing and franchising practices-
l ' I I 
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SECTION 5 1 OTHER 3URISDICTI0NS 
. Introduction 
A comprehensive focus on co
mpetition in the New Zeala
nd law is 
relatively recent- The USA 
has nearly a century of anti
trust leg-
islation; the United Kingdom an
d the European Economic Comm
unity over 
40 years; and Australia more th
an a decade. It is therefore
 useful in 
the continuing development of
 our own legislation to loo
k to these 
overseas authorities-
A broad trend can be 
seen in the legislative develo
pment of all the 
countries mentioned- From 
viewing exclusive dealing as p
er se illegal 
and focussing only on the mo
nopolistic structure of arrange
ments, now 
most legislations apply some f
orm of the "Rule of Reason"
12 ... This 
latter approach requires a bal
ancing process and takes grea
ter account 
of economic analysis- In som
e jurisdictions this develo
pment has 
progressed a step further to v
iewing the practice of exclusi
ve dealing 
as per se legal-
Only two jurisdictions will be
 aftalysed here: Australia
,focussing 
upon the Trade Practices Act
 1974 - this is relevant beca
use of CER 
and as it formed the model f
or our own legislation; and 
the United 
States, . because Australian 
legislation has tended to t
ake a more 
American style antitrust appro
ach since 19741
30 and the United States 
also has the most extensive hi
story of competition law. 
I. AUSTRALIA: THE TRADE PRA
CTICES ACT 1974 
Much of the relevant Austral
ian law has been alluded to, s
uch is the 
degree of harmonisation in th
is area. But it is importa
nt to note 
that harmonisation does not r
equire replication of other le
gislation-
It should be the case that l
ocal conditions temper the 
provisions 
enacted. 131 Thus even sho
uld one reach a decision tha
t specific 
exclusive dealing and/or franc
hising provisions are necess
ary it may 
not be sensible simply to imp
ort the equivalent overseas le
gislation. 
This may be particularly so in
 the case of s47 of the Trade
 Practices 
Act 1974. 
·' Ex·cltt5iv·e dealing under t
he Australian Act is governe
d by s47 132 • 
However this section has been 
described by Justice Stephen a
s "replete 
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with double negatives and proliferating alternatives (which defy) 
accurate synopsis-" 133 Indeed in their extensive text on restrictive 
trade practices134 Ransom and Pengilley suggest that "[t]he first task 
in studying exclusive dealing is to decipher what s47 actually says-
This is not easy13s.u However although in the writer's opinion the 
language is unclear and often ambiguous, it is possible to outline 
reasonably clearly the manner in which s47 regulates exclusive 
dealing136 • Section s47(1) prohibits the practice: "subject to this 
section, a corporation shall not in trade or commerce, engage in the 
practice of exclusive dealing ••• ". The section details four different 
kinds of conduct which it defines as exclusive dealing: 
Restrictions imposed by one person in the chain of distribution 
on another person lower down (e.g. by the manufacturer to the 
retailer)- This includes solus agreements and requirements 
contracts: see s 47(2) and (3). [Solus agreements are also 
referred to as "tied outlets"- They provide that the customer is 
expressly prevented from dealing in products which compete with 
the supplier's product- Requirements contracts provide that 
customers agree to buy some or all of their requirements of a 
particular product from the supplier and therefore effectively 
excluded from other suppliers. This contract therefore indirect-
ly achieves the same as a solus agreement-] 
Restrictions imposed in the opposite direction by a person from a 
chain of distribution higher up: Sees- 47 (4) and (5). 
Restrictions on 'third line forcing'. Under this practice a 
supplier will only supply goods or services on the condition that 
the customer agrees to acquire certain other goods and services 
not related to the supplier: Sees- 47 (6) and (7)-
Restrictions included in the last category are similar to those 
above but imposed or enforced in regard to leases and licences of 
land and buildings: see s47 (8) and (9). 
With the exception of third line forcing, exclusive dealing conduct 
Will not be in breach of the Act unless it has the likely effect of 
substantially lessening competition in the given market: sees 47(10). 
Regarding third line forcing, it is illegal irrespective of the effect 
on competition- All four kinds of exclusive dealing can be authorised 
if public benefits can be shown- As mentioned in the introduction to 
40 
this paper, the focus will be on the first category of exclusive 
dealing arrangements. 
The basic argument 
specifically define 
made in this paper is that provisions which 
exclusive dealing practices are not necessary tor 
effective regulation of such practices. This point has already been 
, discussed in relation to the form of the New Zealand provisions. The 
present section will examine the Australian case law relating to 547 · 
af the Trade Practices Act to discern whether these specific pro-
visions have resulted in effective regulation and/or certainty 
regarding the outcome of the exclusive dealing decisions. 
The structure of s47 of the Trade Practices Act results in two general 
requirements tor a breach: 
(i) that practices come within the specific categories proscribed 
under s47; and 
(ii) under s47(10) that, as a minimum, exclusive dealing has the 
purpose, or has or is likely to have, the effect, of substantial-
.;···· 1y lessening competition- The exception is thi rd-1 ine forcing · 
(defined in subss47(6), (7) and paras 47(8)(c), 47(9)(d)) which 
contravenes s47 whether or not it is anti-competitive. 
As exclusive dealing practices must be created by some form on 
"contract, arrangement or understanding", 
words are defined in the Commerce Act. 
in the terms that these 
Therefore s27 of that Act 
would regulate all exclusive dealing practices caught by s47 of the 
Australian Trade Practices Act. further s27 would provide the same 
minimum standard as the specific Australian exclusive dealing pro-
vision. Therefore it is not proposed to examine all the categories of 
exclu~ive dealing proscribed under s47. Analysis will be in two 
stages: 
(A) Exclusive dealing practices which avoid the specific provisions 
of s47 that may be cau~ht under the Commerce Act ss27 or 36 if 
they were anti-competitive; and 
(B) Other problems or ambiguities which may be evident in the 
Australian case law on s47-
~I - -
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(l(O}{A} Section 47 : Avoiding the ~xclusive dealing categories 
The avoidance of s47 itself poses no threat to trade practices 
regulation. Other general provisions exist in the Trade Practices Act 
especially the s45 ucatch-all" provisions. However some examples are 
provided to highlight the needless complexity which results. If anti-
competitive exclusive dealing practice(s) can avoid the specific s47 
provisions, particularly after significant amendment
137 and judicial 
consideration, then the provisions would seem to be largely redundant. 
This is even more pertinent when the effectiveness of the Australian 
provisions in the area of 
against a New Zealand Act which 
exclusive dealing is being considered 
focusses on 
achieve increased consumer welfare- It is 
promoting competition to 
submitted that this focus 
is difficult to maintain without being further obscured by unneces-
sarily complex and to some degree redundant provisions. 
Avoiding s47: Specific Examples of Avoidance 
1. Subs 47(2) refers to exclusive dealing arising where a cor-
poration supplies or offers to supply goods or services, or gives or 
allows (or offers to do so) a discount, allowance, rebate or credit, 
on the condition that the person supplied will not (or will not to a 
limited extent) acquire goods or services from a competitor of the 
supplier. 
An issue arises as to the timing of transactions required by this 
subsection• In SWB Family Credit Union v Parramatta Tourist Ser-
vices13• a majority of the full court agreed with the judge at first 
instance and held that in subs 47(6) the word "willN imparted a 
temporal requirement. Therefore the phrase "will acquireN required 
that the first supply preceded the acquisition of the other goods or 
services. 
' 
If this interpretation applies generally to s47, and there seems no 
reason why it should not, 139 then subs 47(2) will involve a similar 
temporal requirement and thus provide a way of avoiding s47. For 
instance discounts 1• 0 which relate to goods supplied on the condition 
that over a prior order the customer has exclusively purchased from 
the supplier would fall outside s47(2) according to the SWB Family 
Credit Union case. In practice this may not arise for several 
I JI 
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reasons· Firstly it is a complex manner in which to circumvent the 
provisions and in any event likely to be caught under s47(3) if the 
discount was refused to a customer who had not met the exclusive 
dealing condition. Secondly, even if s47 was avoided ss45, 46 or 49 
might apply. However this situation gives an indication of the 
additional avenues which may be considered to avoid specific pro-
visions- Such complex legal distinctions which may be utilised also 
compound the problem of certainty under the law. 
2· Ninimum quantity conditions conditions which require a pro-
portion of total acquisitions from a supplier seem to fall within 
s47(2)(d). This paragraph refers to limitations on the acquisitions 
of goods and services from a competitor- 141 The position is not clear 
regarding two other conditions- For convenience the labels used by 
Tape re 11 will be adopted here- 142 These are "minimum quantity 
and "tying conditions". The conditions" 
Committee recommended that minimum quantity 
report of 
conditions 
the Swanson 
should be 
covered by s47 in certain circumstances, namely where the supplier 
knows her customer's needs and frames the conditions of sale on the 
basis that supply will only take place in units of that 'needed' 
amount. This situation, where there is no economic rationale for such 
a condition, merely an attempt to "tie in" the customer was to be 
regulated under s4714::s. However, on the language adopted in 
is s47(2)(d), 
stipulated, 
where no proportion 
problems may arise 
of a customer's acquisitions 
in arguing that the nature of the 
condition 144 is to require the customer to buy exclusively or in part 
only from one supplier- It there is no required proportion then 
changes in the customer's needs would seem to undermine 
elusive' nature of such a condition. 
the 'ex-
As Taperel 1 points out "[t]o treat a minimum quantity condition as 
exclusive dealing is to confuse its purpose or effect with the terms 
of the conditions itself 140." The writer would agree that this is a 
sensible distinction- To include minimum quantity provisions of all 
sorts within s47 seems to deny the economic reality of many trans-
actions- However, the distinction which arises rests on the purpose 
of the supplier in requiring such a minimum quantity. It this purpose 
is to '!ie' the customer to the supplier then it will be caught under 
II I I 
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547(2) ( d) • This agreement between suppli
er and purchaser will then 
have to be analysed to determine whether it has the "purpose or has or 
is likely to have the effect, of substantially lessening competition". 
(This will be examined in more detail below). Again this would seem 
to be an unnecessarily convoluted method of excluding anti-competitive 
practices-
condition is 
Further, a finding that the purpose of a minimum quantity 
to tie the purchaser may influence decisions on whether 
the purpose or likely effect of such a practice is to substantially 
lessen competition. The latter issue involves examining at the 
effects on a market situation (per s47(13)(b) & (c)) while the prior· 
analysis of purpose will generally focus on individual persons er 
organisations and the arrangements between them. In the author's view 
this specific legislation for exclusive dealing may bring about 
unnecessary confusion. 
already poses problems 
The area of competition law is one which 
for the 
itional ideas of justice for the 
judiciary particularly where trad-
individual must arguably be ignored 
unless consistent with the common good. 146 This general difficulty 
some Australian cases 147 which, with respect, seems to have arisen in 
wi 11 be examined below together with other more general points 
relating to s47-
Section 47 : General Points 
This section will not cover all of the case law in this area. A 
number of Australian cases have been discussed previously which have 
assisted the New Zealand adjudicating bodies- In the main these have 
been on concepts of more general application to competition law, for 
instance the QCMA case- It is now proposed to examine exclusive 
dealing decisions- The aim, as in the immediately preceding discus-
sion, is to determine whether the specific s47 provisions of the Trade 
Pl"act ices Act have resulted in consistent decisions and thus some 
certainty for those whose actions the law may regulate. 
The Trade Practices Act and the application of the Act in leading 
cases by the Trade Practices Commission ("TPC") 148 has been strongly 
Cl"iticised by academics 14~. In two major cases Toohey's Ltd, Tooth & 
Si Ltd 1 ::,o ("Tooheys") and Application of Shell Company of Australia 
~
1 ::s 1 (the "Shell" case) the Commission decided that practices were 
anti-competitive under s47-
I JI 
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In the Shell case 1 e 2 , the Trade Practices Commission refused clearance 
of an agreement by petrol sellers to sell only their suppliers' petrol 
and other products. The TPC held, without detailed reasoning, that 
this restricted competition between the suppliers and between the 
resellers- However it is possible to glean much of the reasoning for 
this decision from the authorisation proceedings 1 e 3 • The Commission 
looked at "competition between the companies" rather than the broad 
test of competition in the entire market which is required by s47.
1 e 4 
The TPC seems, with respect, to have made other statements incon-
sistent with the Trade Practices Act and particularly s47
1 es. For 
instance the Commission relied heavily on the fact that requirements 
contracts were widespread throughout the industry (these were of the 
"tying" variety dis cussed previous 1 y) • The reliance of the TPC on 
this fact resulted in what Donald and Heydon 
11 industry wide aggregation fallacy. 1 e 611 
have referred to as the 
As Donald & Heydon state this aggregation approach repeats the errors 
of the Standard Oil Co v us 1 e 7 (discussed later) and also arises in 
the Tooheys 1 ee decision. If a practice(s) are common throughout an 
industry, such as requirements contracts, and one firm is judged on 
the basis of the anti-competitive effects of all those contracts on 
the market, this analysis is unfair and unjust. 
feel that it is unfair· Donald and Heydon 1 e• go further than this and 
if government attacks are made on "those whose new requirements 
contracts begin to affect competition substantially." By this they 
refer to attacks to stop undesirable future trends. The writer's view 
is that irrespective of the likely trends that may be caused the focus 
is upon the degree to which competition is reduced. Therefore even 
the innovator should be caught 
However, lessens competition. 
Heydon's basic point. The extent 
if the new practice substantially 
the writer agrees with Donald and 
to which all competitors use a 
Practise(s) is irrelevant to an analysis of the anti-competitive 
effects of a single company (or group) on the market. The extent to 
Which practices are generally used is relevant to determining con-
ditions in the market but should apply no further than this. Even if 
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the situation is, as in the Shell 160 case, that virtually all resel-
lers are tied to one supplier the adjudicating body must look at the 
practice(s) of the individual company in question and the effect this 
has on the market as a whole- The economic effects of such a sit-
uation may in fact be pro-competitive (as will be discussed in more 
detail in Section 6 of this paper)- Thus by analysing the effect of 
exclusive dealing on individual competitors rather than the market as 
a whole, the Commission negated any of the potential pro-competitive 
effects• As Horman put it: 1 & 1 "[T]his [approach of the TPC] always 
leads to the cone 1 us ion 
exclusive dealing by 
that the arrangement is anti-competitive as 
its very nature prevents competition between 
competitors in dealing with individual tied producers-" 
However, as Horman and others 162 point out, exclusive dealing may 
result in a greater level of market competition. In this context the 
development in the US case law and in economic analysis is particular-
ly useful add will be examined in later sections-
A final point regarding the Shell case 1 & 3 is what occurred after the 
denial of clearance and later of authorisation. The TPC opposed any 
res t rictions on lubricants, or on dealer controlled sales sites, but 
permit~ed petrol companies to stipulate for up to 100 percent of 
requirements on sites they used for Agency Depots 164 and 50 percent of 
requirements to be taken on retail sales they controlled. 16e The 
petro 1 companies could also stipulate that their pumps could only be 
used for their products 1 & 6 and that if their equipment was used for a 
competitor's product a fee 
that the fee could not be so 
could be charged. However the TPC stated 
large as to deter from using competitors 
Pl"oducts. The fee should only reflect the cost of capital invested in 
the equipment 167 • Thus, although the initial decision was against 
such practices and on s47 many of the practices listed above would 
seem to be caught, the TPC gave limited permission for such practices 
to continue. 
The second case examined in this section is Toohey's Ltd, Tooth & Co 
In this case the test for competition in the market ·was 
dubiously defined very widely- 16~ This definition included a number 
of discrete products "lumped together", namely beer, other alcoholic 
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products and soft drinks- Although a great number of anti-competitive 
factors arose here, arguably the Commission's decision contained a 
number of error-s- Notable among these was the so-called "industry 
aggregation fallacy" 170 by which the 
petitors is lumped together, rather 
behaviour of individual corn-
than looking at the effect of 
exclusive arrangements relative to the market as a whole- Again the 
TPC created a test that meant the practice of exclusive dealing had to 
be anti-competitive-
Although there have been clearer Australian judgments which have been 
more consistent with their general trade practices law, such as the 
oft quoted QCMA case, in the writer's opinion anomalies have occurred 
in the area of exclusive dealing and franchising. For instance, the 
view of single brand markets which arose in Top Performance Motors v 
Ira Berk 171 • This decision has been followed in two later cases
172 
and provides authority for the view that a single brand may constitute 
a "market". Thus a product franchise over that brand may result in a 
monopoly or something approaching this-
These dee is ions have been criticised in Australia1
73 and New 
Zealand174 and the Trade Practices Act (Aust-) 1974 amended to prevent 
such future decisions by including a test of substitutability in the 
statute. Although the cases have received much criticism, as Ian 
Eagles points out in his discussion 17~ the single brand market 
impossible but "the fact must be demonstrated- 176 " 
is not 
In these cases a question arises as to why the judges should focus so 
closely on individual brands- It is submitted that this problem comes 
about in part because of the traditional focus of adjudicating bodies 
remedying harm done to individual parties- It is not the contention 
of this paper that the Courts should cease their endeavour-s to provide 
a remedy for individuals, merely that the overall focus must be upon 
competition in the market. Cases such as Top Performance
177 and 
Tavernstock 178 although presenting market definitions which would 
"seem to be r-isible" 179 (they held respectively that there could be a 
local Gold Coast market solely for datsun automobiles; and a market 
for one brand of whiskey) do highlight the difficulties involved in 
focussing upon overall competitive effects rather than on the specific 
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harm done to individuals-
Arguably part of the difficulty for the Commission and the Courts in 
these cases is applying s47- Although each case must 
its facts, the disparity of the Australian tests 
largely rest on 
for the effect of 
exclusive dealing on competition is cause for concern- A clearer view 
of an appropriate test may be 
later discussion) 
gained from the US development- (see 
Comparative Comments : the Pro-New Zealand View 
It is submitted that the problem of focus is compounded by the complex 
exclusive dealing section of the Trade Practices Act (Aust) 1974 which 
even the Judiciary find difficult to comprehend 1 80 • Such provisions 
do not seem to add greater certainty. 
provisions can adequately regulate the practice 
Further, where existing 
of exclusive dealing, 
as it is argued the provisions of the 1986 Commerce Act can, there is 
no reason to clarify the approach of the adjudicating bodies unless 
legislative policy objectives are not followed- In Australia, 
arguably, policy objectives may be obscured by the greater specificity 
of the exclusive dealing provisions and the focus upon the actions of 
individual persons. 
ulating exclusive 
By contrast, the New Zealand provisions reg-
dealing are relatively clear and simple- Although 
the elements of these provisions (particularly ss27 & 36) require 
interpretation and analysis against case facts, the Act has a single 
clear objective- It is submitted that the New Zealand approach in the 
Commerce Act is more appropriate than that of 
the Australian Trade 
Practices Act 1974 and may result in greater certainty and consistency 
in the law- Land has described two 
cases on s36181 , as "not encouraging". 
of the first three New Zealand 
However, as stated, the writer 
would disagree slightly. Land's comment, though valid, would seem to 
require a caveat. All the cases to date have involved only a very 
limited analysis of the broader issues of competition law- As Justice 
Barker noted in the ARA v Mutual Rental Cars 182 case the adjudicating 
bodies are still carefully feeling their way in the application of a 
relatively new Act- Some encouraging comments have come from the 
Courts 183 but as yet broad principles relating tu the regulation of 
exclusive dealing practices may have to wait for further cases-
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48 
The F&P Draft Deter-mi nation, discussed later, provides further-
encouraging r-emarks and in the writer's opinion provides an ap-
propriate focus for futur-e cases- However, as stated it is fairly 
clearly a case where authorisation will be denied- More useful and 
detailed principles can be expected from a more balanced and therefore 
more difficult decision on exclusive dealing practices alone or within 
the franchising context. 
The next sub-section examines US legal developments in the area of 
exclusive dealing. Although the USA does not provide a comparable 
market to New Zealand it is a useful source of case material dealing 
with the economic analysis of restrictive trade practices. This is 
particularly important for exclusive dealing decisions where the 
or public benefits depends to a extent of any competitive effects 
large extent on the economic consequences of such practices. 
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II· THE UNITED STATES : DEVELOPMENTS IN THE AREA OF EXCLUSIVE DEALING 
In re cent years the US 
shifted dr·amat i call y: 
COUT'ts' treatment 
from a position 
of 
that 
exclusive dealing has 
exclusive dealing was 
primarily a device to lessen competition to a position that exclusive 
dealing can and often does promote competition- Encouraged by 
advances in the understanding of the economic role of exclusive 
dealing and of distribution practices in geneT'al, US courts are now 
inquiring into the business reasons for exclusive dealing. The courts 
are in creas i ngl y finding that exclusive dealing and other "ver-
tical" 184 nonpri ce 
while presenting 
restT'aints offer many pT'o-competitive benefits 
little likelihood of lessening competition. This 
development is impor·tant in the aT'ea of exclusive dealing as the 
extent to which it may be seen to "substantially lessen competition" 
depends on economic analysis. Changing views have also assisted the 
evaluation of what constitutes dominance in a market 10~. 
The US has almost a century of experience in adjudicating antitrust 
cases concerning exclusive dealing. These cases involve a wide 
variety of industT'ies and economic circumstances. The pro- and anti-
competitive consequences of exclusive dealing have been subject to 
Hence, the extensive evaluation by US economists and lawyers-
evolution of US thought on exclusive dealing can pT'ovide a useful 
background for analysing the manner in which New Zealand's legislation 
should develop. However the differences between the two economies 
mean that concepts and analysis from the US jurisdiction, although 
useful, must be 
situation. 
tempered by a 
A. Najo~ US Decisions 
consideration of the New Zealand 
The Clayton Antitrust Act passed by Congress in 1914, made exclusive 
dealing i 11 egal where its effect "may be to substantially lessen 
competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce." As 
With the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 and the US common law tT'ad-
i ti on, the wording of 
left up to the courts. 
the Act was vague and its interpretation was 
In the first major exclusive dealing case decided under the Clayton 
Act, the leading dress pattern manufactureT' in the US, Standard 
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fashion, was found to be illegally imposing exclusive dealing re-
strictions on retailers 186 • Exclusive dealing had in fact been used 
bY ~ost pattern makers for many years- However, the Court reasoned 
that in rural communities only a single brand would be available, 
creating a monopoly in patterns in thousands of small communities. In 
reality, such an event was unlikely, since all pattern makers had 
extensive sail order operations-~&7 
The next important Supreme Court decision involving exclusive dealing 
was Standard Oil Co v US188 • Here exclusive dealing between petrol 
refiners and retail petrol stations was held to lessen competition by 
restricting entry of new suppliers- In their written opinion the 
Court recognised the possible benefit of exclusive dealing, observing 
that: "Requirement contracts---may well be of economic advantage to 
buyers as well as to sellers, and thus indirectly of advantage to the 
consuming public---From the seller's point of view, requirement 
contracts may make possible the substantial reduction of selling 
expenses, give protection against price fluctuations, and of 
particular advantage to newcomers to the field to whom it is important 
to know what capital expenditures are justified offer the pos-
sibility of a predictable market.H But these recognised benefits 
carried little weight in the final decision. Ultimately, the Court 
simply noted the share of the market which the practice allegedly 
barred competitors from rforeclosure1, found it substantial, and 
invalidated the contracts between the refiners and station operators. 
It apparently mattered little to the Court that the exclusive dealing 
contracts for retail gasoline distribution were of short duration 
(only about one year), so that retail stations could easily switch to 
~ival suppliers; nor did they consider that it is generally unecon-
omical tor stations to carry more than one brand of petrol- 189 
like Standard Fashion and Standard Stations~ most of the major US 
antitrust decisions on exclusive dealing are quite old- The US 
Supreme Court has not ruled on an exclusive dealing case since the 
1970s. Relatively recent cases include a 1961 case concerning a long-
term exclusive dealing contract between a coal supplier and an 
electric power generating utility where the Court found exclusive 
dealing to be legal- 190 Again the Court mentioned the efficiency 
1 
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benefits of exclusive dealing, but the decision turned upon the small 
amount of market foreclosure (less than 1 percent of the coal market) 
potentially involved- In a 1966 decision, the Court ruled that Brown 
Shoe Company,which sold under exclusive franchise agreements with 
about one-third of its retail outlets, had engaged in a practice which 
foreclosed rival shoe manufacturers- 191 Brown's franchise dealers 
accounted for about one percent of the nation's shoe dealers. Under 
the Brown franchise program, Brown supplied franchisees with architec-
tural plans, inventory and accounting systems, low cost group in-
surance, and technical services from Brown's field representatives-
The Court, however, engaged in no economic analysis of the relation-
ship between Brown's willingness to make these investments and its use 
of exclusive dealing. 
Since the 1960s the lower Courts continued to hear cases on exclusive 
dealing, and showed an increasing awareness of the possible com-
petitive benefits the practice might generate. The lower Courts have 
made large strides in their understanding of the competitive effects 
of exclusive dealing by their use and acceptance of economic 
analysis- 192 In addition, retail franchising has become extremely 
widespread in the US and generally the exclusive dealing involved in 
the arrangement has not been legally challenged- In effect, exclusive 
dealing in retail distribution is now widely condoned in the US193 • 
Thus the increased development of economic analysis has significantly 
changed the anti-competitive perceptions of exclusive dealing. This 
effects th~ extent to which such practices should be regulated and the 
consequent need for specific provisions-
B. The Sylvania Case 
The more 0 economic" approach to vertical distribution practices was 
adopt@d by the US Supreme court in 1977 with Satellite Television & 
~sociated Resources Inc v Continental Cablevision of Virginia Inc 
(the "Sylvania" case) 1 -. Sylvania's practice of granting geographic 
a~eas of sales responsibility to its retail television dealers was 
,Upheld by the Court. This decision overturned a per se rule against 
territorial and customer restrictions for dealers (under certain 
conditions) as decided by the Court a decade earlier in a case 
involving bicycles- 1 ~ 8 In Sylvania, the Court concluded that nonprice 
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vertical distribution practices, including, among others, exclusive 
dealing, exclusive territories, and refusal to deal, are not per se 
illegal and should be decided by a rule of reason- Under a rule of 
reason approach, the business reasons for a practice are fully 
investigated and weighed against any possible anti-competitive harm. 
The Court concluded that: "Vertical restrictions promote interbrand 
competition by allowing the manufacturer to achieve certain efficien-
cies in the distribution of his products." 19• Some of the efficien-
cies noted by the Court included: "To induce retailers to engage in 
promotional activities or to provide service and repair facilities 
necessary to the efficient marketing of their products. Service and 
repair are vital for many 
household appliances. The 
affect a manufacturer's 
products"• 
products, such as automobiles and major 
availability and quality of such services 
goodwill and the competitiveness of his 
The Court adopted an analytical framework for examining vertical 
restraints in which the loss in intrabrand competition (competition 
between distributors of a single supplier's goods) is weighed against 
the gain in interbrand competition (competition among manufacturers of 
the same generic product, such as refrigerators). The Court recog-
nis~d that some vertical restraints, such as exclusive territories, 
restrict intrabrand competition, but do so in order to stimulate 
interbrand competition. The gains from increased interbrand com-
petition in most cases outweigh any losses from reduced intrabrand 
competition. i.-?7 
Since Sylvania, the US Department of Justice and Federal Trade 
Cofllftlission have brought fewer and fewer cases involving nonprice 
distribution practices- Exclusive dealing cases have dropped off 
sharply. From 1980 to 1984, the US antitrust agencies brought only 
four exclusive dealing cases- In contrast, from 1970 to 1974, they 
brought twenty-on~ exclusive dealing cases. 1 -?• 
C. Vertical Restraint Guidelines 
Further relaxation of the law on exclusive dealing is reflected in the 
U.s. Justice Department's Guidelines on Vertical Restraints. 1 - These 
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Guide 1 in e s , issued in 1985, explain the
 enforcement policy of the 
Justice Department• The Guidelines concentrat
e on two distribution 
p~ctices: exclusive dealing arrangements and territorial and c
ustomer 
restrictions. The Guidelines conclude that, " ••• vertical res
traints 
that only affect intrabrand competition generally represent
 little 
~ti - competitive threat and involve some form of economic inte
gration 
between levels of production or- distribution that tend to i
ncrease 
etficiency". 200 And, more generally that, "Vertical restraints
 rarely 
have a significant anti-competitive effect-
11201 The value of this 
guideline has been recognised by the New Zealand courts in t
he News 
ill case202 and in the Magnum/DB decision203 • In the area of ex-
clusi ve dealing these guide 1 i nes 
Commission in the F&P case. 
have also been referred to by the 
The Guidelines recognise that exclusive dealing can creat
e benefits 
including the facilitation of new entry and the protection o
f the 
investment of a manufacturer and its dealers from "free rid
ing" by 
rival manufacturers. Free riding refers to the use of the inves
tment 
of one manufacturer, such as advertising that draws customers
 into a 
store, by another manufacturer. (see also Section 6) 
The primary anti-competitive concern about exclusive dealing ex
pressed 
in the Guidelines is that it may, under certain circumstances, 
exclude 
rivals by increasing their cost of obtaining distribution. A n
ew 
producer may suffer a cost disadvantage if he cannot obtain a
 dealer 
cost comparable to that expended by existing manu-network at a 
facturers. The Guidelines caution, however, that this cost standa
rd 
must be applied carefully, since an existing manufacturer 
who es-
tablished an efficient distribution system in the past should
 not be 
Penalised for its superior skills or denied a return on its p
ast 
investments. In addition, if exclusive dealing is not used by all or
 
a large share of the manufacturers in the market, entrants can 
utilise 
the remaining available retail outlets. Moreover-, if the ter
m of an 
exclusive dealing contract is short, say one year or- less, and 
dealers 
Who switch suppliers are not subject to a manufacturer-
imposed 
Penalty, then new suppliers are 
market .204 
unlikely to be excluded from the 
it •,' 
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D· The Revolution
 in US Antit~ust Law 
This shift to a more accepting position on exclusive dealing is j
ust 
part of a major transformation in the application of antitrust law in 
the US· Experts on antitrust law, including judges and economists 
formed a strong consensus20~ in the late 1970s that much antitrust law 
has been misapplied in the past, to the detriment of consumers- This 
consensus was based on advances in economic theory, economic knowledge 
from empirical testing, gained 
cases· These analyses indicated 
and from analyses of past antitrust 
that all too often in the past, 
antitrust laws had the unintended effect of lessening competition by 
barring efficient business practices- For example, past anti-merger 
policy was found to be too restrictive, prohibiting many pro-corn-
petitive mergers. Cases against firms with large market shares, so 
called dominant firm monopolies, were in retrospect seen to have been 
in error, serving to penalise large firms for their superiority in 
innovation, management, distribution, product quality, and efficiency 
of production. Further, as noted above, past treatment of nonprice 
vertical restraints were recognised as much too restrictive, ignoring 
the many pro-consumer efficiencies stemming from these distribution 
agreements. Lacking sufficient knowledge of the business purposes of 
vertical restraints, such as exclusive dealing, the courts imputed 
anti-competitive motives without adequately considering the efficiency 
gains which actually lead to their adoption206 • 
Modern economic ~nalysis has changed these perceptions. Much has been 
learned about transaction costs and efficiency gains from contractual 
arrangements, especially vertical contractual arrangements. Antitrust 
law now recognises that large firm size is not, in itself. anti-
competitive and that market structure frequently results from f•m-
damental economic factors, such as the existence of large economies of 
scale and differences in efficiency across firms. A better under-
standing of the concept of barriers to entry has evolved in the US 
With the recognition that many historical notions of barriers to entry 
were, in reality, mistaken. 
simply the result of the 
What appeared to be a barrier was often 
superior efficiency of incumbent firms-
Further, vertical restraints have been recognised as pro-competitive 
and efficient marketing arrangements that generally have few anti-
competitive effects. In particular it has been stated by some
207 that 
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in the case of a 
manufacturer and retailer/distributor, exclusive
 
dealing is unlikely to have anti-competitive cons
equences when any of 
the following conditions hold: 
(1) Exclusive dealing 
than one year). 
contracts are of short duration (that is, less 
(2) The conduct of firm( s) using exclusiv
e dealing is limited by 
other manufacturers/distributors 
retail outlets. 
(3) The barriers (including economies 
that already have access to 
of scale) associated with the 
establishment of new retail outlets, or expansio
n of output using 
non-exclusive dealing outlets are low. 
When one or more of these conditions hold, no sig
nificant market power 
can arise from the use of exclusive de
aling, and no benefits to the 
competitive process result from the prohibition 
of exclusive dealing. 
Some theorists208 believe the fundamental con
cern of competition law 
should be horizontal market power- That is, ch
anges in the extent to 
which individual organisations can act inde
pendently of other market 
participants because of a practice(s) within
 a certain functional 
market. This has important implications for Ne
w Zealand (and Austral-
ian) legislation. 
in New Zealand, 
Although this view has not been expressly appro
ved 
the acceptance by the Commission that vertica
l 
nonprice practices are generally not anti-compet
itive implies a degree 
of approval of this approach. 
These views will be more closely examined in t
he following section-
However, as stated, overseas conclusions need 
to be tempered by new 
Zealand's unique commercial environment. 
I 
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SECTION 6 : AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 
Restrictive practices are broadly of two sort
s: those which result 
from agreements between independent businesses; 
and those resulting 
from single enterprises which have acquired sig
nificant market power 
(@ilateral actions). In the latter category o
ne would place mono-
poly, monopsony209 , 
purely from size2
10
-
some vertical integrations and power resulting 
Exclusive dealing fits into the first category-
It is an agreement, 
for present purposes, by which a manufacturer pla
ces conditions on her 
dealings with a retai 1 er/ distributor -
to that of vertical i ntegrat i on
211 • 
But it may have effects similar 
Restrictive agreements themselves 
~y be divided into two general classes which ha
ve been described as 
"exploitative" and "regulatory". 
212 Exp 1 o i tat i ve agreements as the 
term suggests seek to attain collectively higher 
rewards by affecting 
prices and therefore profits. Regulatory restr
ictions may have some 
of the same effects, but the aim of the particip
ants is often osten-
sibly not to 
prices or the 
impair 
removal 
competition- Participants do not seek higher 
of all independent competition, merely the 
prevention 
undesirable. 
purpose may 
or regulation of certain activities which are
 deemed as 
Exclusive dealing may fit into both categories-
Its 
in rare cases be to create barriers to entry
, though as 
will be discussed, this is seldom effective-
Alternatively, it may 
simply regulate territorial marketing areas for
 franchisees so there 
is no overlap. In both 
elements. 
recognised-
Today more 
instances, the activity has anti-competitive 
of the pro-competitive benefits are being 
A. EXCLUSIVE DEALING: THE TRADITIONAL VIEW 
The traditional mode 1 of the ideal competitive
 market is that of 
'perfect competition' - This is a useful m
odel in understanding 
economic forces- But because of its simplifying 
assumptions, perfect 
competition in itself does not provide a good ge
neral guide to the 
reality of the market place- Unfortunately this
 view of competition 
With many buyers and sellers, none of whom h
ave a controlling in-
fluence, has permeated thinking in this area. It
 has been accepted by 
John Collinge213 that competition as a goal in
 itself is not desir-
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able· Such a goal may not provide efficient resource allocation and 
more importantly the social benefits which may flow from 'appropriate' 
competition control. Thus a situation of oligopoly may not produce 
harmful effects for society. Profit maximisation even if it is in 
reality the goal of industries in such a market, may not result in a 
significant decrease in the level of output or an increase in 
price- 214 With the economies of scale that result from increased size 
prices may actually be reduced-
Perfect competition is seen as the ideal because it results in
 
'perfect' efficiency. Production occurs at the precise level where 
the market demand and supply for goods and the marginal costs of the 
ooits involved at this level are equal. From a legislative point of 
view, the social costs and benefits are equal; and perhaps as imp-
ortant, no single producer or purchaser has market power. But as 
stated the model is flawed, particularly as it assumes away a number 
of factors covered in reality. With regard to exclusive dealing and 
franchising, these may include: 
(1) Information, transaction and gathering costs - for example, about 
market preferences and production techniques. 
(2) Implementation costs - include: the costs of drawing up, monitor-
ing and enforcing contracts which specify the terms and con-
ditions for sales, purchases or payments for services including 
those which relate specifically to organising economic activities 
within firms. 
(3) Enforcement costs for instance, the costs of defining and 
enforcing property rights21 ~ including intangible assets such as 
image and reputation or those which provide other forms of 
information to consumers-
(4) Government Intervention costs these would include pre-emptive 
measures taken regarding potential intervention and particularly 
those costs involved in compliance with and administration of 
competition regulation. 
Thus it is not surprising that 
exclusive dealing have received some 
the traditional 
criticism- 216 
B. EXCLUSIVE DEALING TRADITIONAL EXPLANATIONS 
Two explanations of exclusive dealing are: firstly, 
explanations of 
that it is a 
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deVi ce to obtain increase
d dealer promotional effort;
217 and secondly 
that exclusive dealing is 
peti tors. 21e 
used to create entry barriers for corn-
Harve 1 discounts both 
grounds'. However it 
the USA market reality 
of these arguments219 largely on 'efficiency 
should be noted t~at his perspective reflects 
which arguably may not be transferred to the 
New Zealand environment in some 
efficiency reasons why exclusive 
used to create a property right 
cases. 
dealing is 
He puts 
used-
forward sti~ong 
It is "a device 
to information concerning potential 
customers for a manufacturers produce ••• [and] 
to ensure that dealers 
do not act opportunist i cal 1 y so as to avoid 
paying the manufacturer 
for valuable ancillary services in a tie-in to th
e product sold- 11220 
Exclusive dealing is thus seen as a
 way to protect manufacturers 
investments in advertising and brand-enhancemen
t activities. Manu-
tacturers try to charge tor the ex
tra custom dealers receive by 
incorporating the charge for the promotional eff
ort into the wholesale 
pr-ices of their goods- However, withou
t exclusive dealing or tie 
arrangements, dealers can take advantage of th
is investment. While 
receiving more customers (through the manufactur
ers image or advertis-
ing) dealers may also divert customers to "no-fr
ills" type products on 
whi eh the profit margins are greater ( "tree-rid
ing"). 
implies that the degree of free-riding depends 
on the 
This argument 
role of the 
dealer in the purchase division- For this reaso
n, the 'protection' of 
exclusive dealing is more likely to be use
d where products are 
technically 
unlikely to 
complex 
be used 
breakfast cereals). 
or 
by 
require substantial after-sales backup and 
producers of simple goods (for example, 
In considering the American material one m
ust 
differences between the two countries. Most not
able 
bear in mind the 
is the different 
levels of market share 
significant market power-
which, in 
In the 
the USA, 
US the 
are seen to give rise to 
threshold level for exam-
ination under the Vertical Restraint Guidelines
221 is only a 10% total 
market share- In New Zealand, because of the sm
aller economy and the 
necessity for less suppliers a larger individu
al market share is 
required for an organisation to be held to "su
bstantially lessen 
j ' 
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competition" or have a "dominant position in a market". As the 
commerce Commission noted in the F&P Draft Determination
222 "the 
background of industry experience in the United States market, is that 
market concentration is generally a great deal less than that found in 
the smal 1 er New Zealand market." 
However, the arguments and rationale of economis
ts such as Marvel, 
have found favour with the New Zealand Courts. In the early Commerce 
Commission determination in the Newspaper Publishers A
ssociation 
case223 whi eh decided authorisation for non-rebating provisions i
n 
advertising agency agreements with the NPA, the Commission adopted an 
economic analysis similar to the American approach- In the case of 
Fletcher Metals Ltd v Commerce Commission
224 the High Court, although 
:...=-~-"-----------
not examining exclusive dealing, accepted the US Department of Justice 
approach to vertical mergers. The analysis in these cases refl
ects 
the changing view towards vertical 
dealing. 
practices such as e>:clusive 
Whatever the arguments on the appropriate rationale tor exclusiv
e 
dealing it seems clear from the US case law (discussed previously
) 
that it may have pro-competitive effects- Further the anti-corn
-
petitive elements can be reduced where certain factors are present.
22~ 
Three re cent cases in the United States have found exclusive dealing 
to be pro-competitive on efficiency grounds-
226 In one of them, 227 
which involved industrial machinery, the court identified several 
'benefits' of exclusive dealing: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
a dealer does not have divided loyalties and commits his 
sales efforts totally to one brand, 
exclusive dealing prevents free-riding 
manufacturer's promotional efforts by 
from switching customers to brands 
defeating the manufacturer's ability 
by dealers on the 
preventing dealers 
with higher margins, 
to recover promotional 
costs, and 
exclusive dealing leads dealers to promote the manufac-
turer's brand name more vigorously than under non-exclusive 
dealing, resulting in a lower quality adjusted price (where 
quality includes information and other services rendered by 
dealers). 
In the writer's view and on current economic analysis, arguably these 
'benefits' may not always arise from exclusive dealing practices. It 
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is ac cepted22" that ex c 1 us i ve dealing does provide benefits by 
protecting manufacturer's promotional costs- This in turn may ensure 
the retailer receives a higher level of support services and promotion 
from the manufacturer. However, a question is raised as to whether 
these benefits to the retailer are sufficient to offset the potential 
loss in custom from stocking on 1 y one brand. This must be answered by 
individual retailers- Particularly in the New Zealand context the 
need to stock a major supplier may reduce the ability of retailers to 
choose freely- It is at this stage that the Commerce Act may inter-
vene. Thus in some situations the second 'benefit' may seem to only 
accrue to the manufacturer- However, especially in the context of the 
Commerce Act the effects on competition as a whole are central- If 
al 1 retai 1 er·s are "tied" interbrand competition and economies may 
arise which provide consumers with lower prices and better service. 
As the previous discussion has shown, the extent to which these 
pr-actices effect workable or effective competition must be decided as 
a matter of fact and commercial common sense. 
welfare benefit may on balance result-
Therefore, a consumer 
It is arguable whether the two other 'benefits' should be described as 
such. The first benefit may arise from an EDA but the degree to which 
it is advantageous to the retailer depends upon the services and 
promotion received in r·eturn for the limitation on brands- Thus in 
some situations a dealer may have little choice whether to accept an 
EDA. In such cases the retailer is forced to devote sales efforts to 
one brand-
The third benefit may often result from exclusive dealing, however as 
was mentioned in the F &P Drat t Determi nat i on22"" vigorous promotion and 
Par-ticularly quality services (such as information and sales service) 
ar-e often claimed to be generated by retailers themselves, therefore 
the extent to wh i eh lower quality adjusted prices are a benefit of 
exclusive dealing may be doubtful in some cases- Thus, although these 
benefits may have occurred in Roland Machinery v Dresser Industries
230 
mentioned above, any benefits must be proved as a matter of fact and 
common sense in each case. 
This intrabrand/interbrand competitive effect trade-off has been shown 
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in other cases, such as the Joyce Beverages case-
231 This involved a 
bottler with an ex c 1 us i ve contract to bott 1 e one cola, but with ihe 
wish to add a second cola- The court held that exclusive dealing 
increased competition by focussing the efforts of soft drink bottler-
distributors on a single brand- Quoting an earlier soft drink case 
the court stated: "A bottler with a dual franchise might be hesitant 
to strongly promote one co la product over the other, with competitive 
detriment to both syrup manufacturers· 11232 By remaining separate the 
two co la drinks compete di re et 1 y. If marketed by one company, they 
would rarely compete directly on price, advertising, self space (i.e. 
neither would receive particular promotional effort from the retail-
er/distr·ibutor). Although it is submitted that this may be generally 
the case, the qualifications mentioned above must be borne in mind and 
the facts proved in each situation. 
These cases exemplify the u.s. courts' decision to incorporate 
economic analysis into exclusive dealing cases- In most cases 
potential entrants are not foreclosed by exclusive dealing. Further 
the practice is only anti-competitive within a product brand and may 
actually stimulate interbrand competition. However, the analysis here 
would not be complete without examining the recent development in 
economic analysis- This examines economic activity in ter-ms of the 
contractual 
tivities. 
individual 
it: 2 ::s::s 
arrangements which are used to facilitate those ac-
Under- this analysis distinctions between the market and the 
company disappear- As Klein, Crawford and Alchian put 
"Many long-term contractual relationships (such as fr-anchising) 
blur- the line between the market and the firm. It may be more 
useful to merely examine the economic rationale for different 
types of particular- contractual r-elationships in particular 
situations, and consider the firm as a particular kind or set of 
interrelated contracts- Firms are therefore by definition, 
formed and revised in mar-kets and the conventional sharp distinc-
tion between markets and firms may have little general analytical 
importance. The pertinent economic question we are faced with is 
'What kinds of contracts are used for what kinds of activities, 
and why?'" 
Beal"ing in mind the comments made earlier r-egarding the requir-ement 
for- a degree of 'mutuality' under- s27 of the New Zealand pr-ovisions 
the approach suggested above is very useful. It focusses on the 
Choice between alternative contr-actual relationships and the compara-
! , I 
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ti ve costs of those alternatives. The essence of exclusive dealing is 
a reduction in choice· This approach necessitates an examination of 
costs and benefits of different alternatives- It is this which will 
pinpoint the effect on competition and more importantly whether 
society as a whole is a winner or loser under the chosen alternative. 
This approach has lead to greater understanding of those practices 
whi eh have traditionally been outside the ambit of the perfect 
competition model- These practices include vertical integration and 
other vert i ea l 
As was noted in 
activities such as franchising and exclusive dealing. 
the previous discussion the u.s. approach to these 
practices 
cases234 • 
has been accepted in 
Although there were no 
some of the 
decided cases 
recent New Zealand 
on exclusive dealing 
at the time, this paper was compiled, assistance can be gleaned from 
the F&P case23~ and other cases which deal with vertical practices. 
There are important similarities in the considerations which lead to 
the use of these practices and, as stated below, the way they should 
be viewed in the competition law context. 
C. PRO-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS: VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND OTHER VERTICAL 
PRACTICES 
In addition to Marvel's efficiency reasons for exclusive dealing which 
result in manufacturer promotional and image-enhancement investments 
there are a number of other pro-competitive effects which may result 
from these pr-act ices. 
(a) A further efficiency reason for exclusive dealing is to pr-otect 
manufactur·ers' investments in the development of distributor 
services by way of tr-aining and advice given to dealer-s. This 
argument is expr-essed by John Char-d as follows: 2
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"The manufacturer could supply information about management 
systems, staff training, selling techniques, and after-sales 
servicing. To the extent that the manufacturer's investment 
in providing such information can generate customers by 
increasing the efficiency of a distribution outlet indepen-
dently of whether the manufacturers's product is sold by the 
outlet, free-riding possibilities exist unless exclusive 
purchasing (or- a similar- restriction, such as a tie-in 
provision) is employed-" 
Because exclusive dealing prevents substitution of other sup-
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pliers' products 
the distributor 
for the 
services, 
product of the manufacturer supplying 
it effectively precludes any free-
riding on those services-
(b) Chard also argues that exclusive dealing may be used by manufac-
turers to protect their reputation for quality in situations 
where consumers find it difficult to know whether to assign the 
blame for quality faults to manufacturers or dealers. As an 
example, Chard refers to a report by The United Kingdom Mono-
polies Commission on liquified petroleum gas (LPG) where it was 
found that exclusive purchasing probably had a beneficial effect 
on safety because it enabled suppliers to exercise more effective 
control over the storage and handling of LPG by their dis-
tributors. Exclusive dealing allowed suppliers 
reputations for safety, an 
dangerous good such as LPG-
important asset 
to protect their 
in the case of a 
(c) Exclusive dealing may provide protection for investments similar 
to that afforded by vertical integration. Vertical integration 
may cover two or more separate stages of production and frequent-
ly occurs when there are significant investments in assets with 
low salvage value237 relative to cost. Vertical integration 
avoids problems which can arise in supplier-customer relation-
ships. One party will be in a position to act opportunistically 
and barter for the difference between the market and salvage 
value of the assets concerned. By internalising238
 the supplier-
customer relationship, vertical integration avoids the costs of 
opportunistic behaviour as well as the costs of contractual 
arrangements (where these are possible) designed to prevent such 
actions. Exclusive dealing fits into the latter category. It 
provides a contractual safeguard where investment is contemplated 
in assets with low salvage value- 239 
(d) Generally, reducing information costs and risk, - exclusive 
dealing may do this in the specific context mentioned in (c) 
above- However, generally where exclusive dealing is used, 
particularly under franchising arrangements, it provides a 
certainty of knowledge and therefore of risk- Customers are 
likely to have more knowledge of the products because of promo-
tional efforts and likewise in many situations with the dealers. 
It is submitted that all these effects may arise from exclusive 
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dealing. However EDAs 
competitive effects. 
arguably arise from 
may not be the only causes of such pro-
For instance, the last factor (d) may 
equally high level of dealer initiated 
development may occur bringing about the similar costs savings. 
Similarly the other practices may result on balance in anti-
competitive effects. For 
exclusive dealing 
functional levels 
may result 
involves 
instance, vertical integration or 
in market dominance if one of the 
a "bottleneck facility". This 
situation was referred to by Barker Jin ARA v Mutual Rental Cars 
Ltd & Anor240 as resulting 
As the Vertical Restraint 
in a dominant position in a market. 
Guidelines241 state, although it may 
not occur often, EDAs may present significant barriers to 
Thus again the author competition which 
would suggest that 
useful it still 
lessen 
although 
competition. 
falls upon 
recognition of these benefits is 
the adjudicating bodies to decide 
whether the facts are consistent which such benefits arising. 
o. EXCLUSIVE DEALING : REDUCING THE ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS 
Based particularly on the u.s. case law and economic analysis of 
exclusive dealing, it would seem that unless the practice provides the 
firms using it with a significant degree of market power it does not 
harm competition and may generate valuable economies- The major pot-
derives from the ential anti-competitive harm from 
possibility that its use will 
exclusive dealing 
raise barriers confronting com-
petitors242 • 
arrangement, 
In the case of a manufacturer-retailer- exclusive dealing 
exclusive dealing may make it more difficult for cam-
peting manufacturers to gain access to retail outlets243 • Where ex-
elusive dealing in conjunction with existing entry barriers results in 
a substantial barT'ier at the T'etai 1 level and the manufacturer' using 
exclusive dealing is not subject to a significant degree of discipline 
from competitor's that already have access to retailers, exclusive 
dealing may result in increased market power. This may lessen 
competition in itself or lead to a dominant position in the market for 
the organisation concerned-
The "Guide 1 i nes for Vertical 
in antitrust law should be 
RestT'aints" 244 emphasise that the focus 
on horizontal market power and that 
Vertical restraints rarely damage competition. The main concern the 
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Guidelines express regarding exclusive dealing is that it may raise 
the cost of distribution to rivals- However, the guidelines suggest 
that exclusive dealing is unlikely to be used for anti-competitive 
purposes unless it significantly raises rivals' costs of gaining 
access to distribution facilities- In applying this test, account is 
taken of extra costs incurred by firms using exclusive dealing so as 
to avoid penalising them for investments in improved product quality 
and distribution service-
exclusive dealing will 
The vertical restraint guidelines note that 
not facilitate anti-competitive exclusion 
unless entry into the "foreclosed" market is difficult- 2405 If within 
a reasonably short time frame a small or new firm is able to contract 
with the distribution outlets needed to operate at an efficient scale 
at the same effective cost as existing firms, the guidelines expressly 
state that there will be no exclusionary effect246 • 
by exclusive dealing is directly Further, the entry barrier posed 
related to the duration of the agreement. Exclusive dealing agree-
ments with a shorter duration than one year which impose no penalty on 
dealers that switch suppliers are considered to be innocuous by the 
u.s. Department of Justice. 247 
To summarise, the view expressed in the recent u.s. case law248 and 
the Vertical Restraint Guidelines regarding exclusive dealing is that 
the potential for competition to be damaged by the use of exclusive 
dealing flows from the possibility that exclusive dealing will raise 
the entry barriers confronting entrants to such an extent that it 
provides incumbent firms with market power by protecting them from 
potential competition- In the case of a manufacturing firm with 
exclusive dealing contracts with its distributors/retailers the 
exclusive dealing is unlikely to have anti-competitive consequences 
when any of the following conditions hold: 
(a) the exclusive dealing contracts are of short duration (i-e- less 
than one year) and/or there are no penalties 
mination; 
involved inter-
(b) the bar-r-iers (including economies of scale) associated with the 
establishment of new retail outlets or expansion of output using 
non-exclusive dealing outlets are low; and 
(c) the conduct of the firm(s) using exclusive dealing is constrained 
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by other manufacturers or distributors that already have access 
to retail outlets-
When one or more of these conditions hold, no significant market power 
will usually arise from the use of exclusive dealing and there is no 
benefit to the competitive process from prohibiting exclusive dealing. 
The US attitude to vertical integration has been accepted in New 
zealand249 - It is suggested by the writer that a similar approach be 
adopted for exclusive dealing. Unless significant market power 
results from such a practice the case law and economic analysis would 
suggest that on balance it has a pro-competitive effect particularly 
in the context of franchising arrangements· 
It is submitted that al though the USA does 
has developed 
not provide a comparable 
there should be used in New ~rket the analysis which 
Zealand exclusive dealing cases- However, because of the unique 
commercial environment in New Zealand, the results of such analysis 
~Y, as the Commerce Commission has notect2 eo, be different- This is 
cons i stent with the need to judge each case on its facts and according 
to commercial common sense for New Zealand markets. 
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: AN ANALYSIS OF THE DRAFT DETERl'IINATION ON THE APPLICATION 
BY FISHER & PAYKEL LTD (the F&P C.s•) 
Introduction : Background Facts 
This se et ion of the paper wi 11 briefly analyse the legal and economic 
analysis of the Commerce Commission's draft determination. 
concerns an authorisation sought by F&P ("the company") 
The case 
for its 
exclusive dealing practices- This practice is covered in all F&P 
Dealer Agreements under clause 5.:2e 1 This clause thus requires that 
dealers only stock and sell F&P brands. In return dealers receive 
promotional and service support• The EDA may be terminated by either 
party on 90 days written notice· Further F&P can terminate the 
franchise immediately on written notice to a dealer if that deal er· no 
longer wishes to adhere to the terms of the contract, or if agreements 
or modification cannot be reached or managerial control of that 
dealer's business changes materially. 
F&P (the applicant) sought authorisation under s58(1)(a) & (b) of the 
Commerce Act for the whole of clause 5-
made on clause 5(a). 
However, arguments were only 
The Commission discussed the history and fields of activity of f&p.:2e:2 
The company is listed with a significant asset base ($294-6m as at 
31. 3. 87). It has been in existence since 1934 and is at present the 
only New Zealand manufacturer of whiteware goods, producing electric 
ranges, washing machines, clothes dryers, dishwashers, refrigerators 
anct freezers. It also imports and distributes a range of smaller 
Whi teware products (e.g. food processors) together with various 
electronic equipment (e.g. VHS video recorders). 
The company sells its products under the "Frigidaire" & "Kelvinator" 
brand names and al so produces "Shack 1 o ck" products for distribution by 
the Whiteware Corporation Ltd. The strong position F&P has reflects 
to some degree many years of import protection (this is now largely 
removed) and the fact that F&P has in the past been the only New 
Zealand manufacturer to offer a complete range of whitegoocts. 
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The Commission briefly commented on the Australian whiteware industry. 
No tab 1 y the evidence indicated that there wer-e no EDAs. It is 
submitted that this situation is largely due to the fact that there 
are two major- manufacturers of refrigerators and of washing machines. 
As will be discussed in more detail in the market analysis of this 
case ( see later section) the pr-esence of two manufacturers of rel-
atively equal size increases the need for dealers to carry both 
products and also increases dealers ability to bargain on the terms of 
any arrangement with manufacturers. 
Market Definition 
This was defined by the Commission following the structure adopted in 
the Nathans/McKenz i e 2 ~ 3 merger case: 
Products - The manufacture and/or importation of certain household 
whi tegoods/whi teware pr-oducts, i-e- refrigerators, freezers, washing 
machines, clothes dryers, and dishwashers; 
F~ction Markets - The manufacture and/or importation and distribution 
(wholesaling), and the retailing of the whitegoods referred to above; 
Geographic Markets - The manufacture or importation and wholesaling of 
whi tegoods in a national market, and the retailing of whitegoods in 
regional and/or local markets. 
The Commission carried out a market analysis- Points of note: 
(i) licensing requirements for- imports of whitegoods have largely 
been removed and tariffs have been reduced or in the case of 
Australia, removed since 1 July 1987-
(ii) Other Major Brand Competitors - 11 Pr-estcold 112~ 4 & "Simpson" - are 
imported and distributed in New Zealand by Ceramco thr-ough its 
subsidiary Appliance Marketing Ltd (AML). AML also imports 
limited volumes of other brands (e.g. "Samsung" & "Zanussi" 
refrigeration products). "Hoover" 
clothes driers) are distributed by 
products (washing machines and 
the New Zealand branch of 
Hoover (Aust-) Pty Ltd- Previously they were imported by F&P. 
The Commission noted2 ~~ that F&P had, at the time Hoover estab-
lished its own New Zealand office, put Hoover on notice that it 
would introduce a new model to compete "head-on" with Hoover. 
This has since occurred. 
(iii)Other wholesalers selling whitegoods on the New Zealand market 
I I 
69 
which compete with F&P products include L D Nathan Ltd & Robinson 
Industries Ltd. 
(iv) Substitutability of Product Generally whitegoods are sub-
stitutable, however the New Zealand building standards in 
following space modules in house construction designed to F&P 
standard specifications may be a limiting factor especially for 
washing machines and refrigerators. 
(v) Size of market - A detailed breakdown of the market is provided 
in the F&P draft determination2 e 6 • 
ticular note: 
Several facts are of par-
(a) Overall market size Total number of units distributed on 
the local market for the year ended June 1987 were between 
275,000 and 300,000 in 1987. 
this total-
Imports were around 25~ of 
(b) F&P Brand Products (NKelvinator" & Nfrigidaire") accounted 
(c) 
for 60X of the total market share for whitegoods2 e 7 • Total 
F&P production, imports and contract manufacturing (par-
ticularly tor the Whiteware Corp) accounted for SOX of the 
total market. 
Retail market data2ee The concentration of F&P stores 
tends to increase inversely to the population size of a 
centre- Particularly in centres where the population is 
lower, the whitegoods dealers tend to be smaller and as such 
unable to market a great number of manufacturers Products 
particularly if a full range of goods is not offered due to 
economics of scale (i.e. advantages that accrue to an 
organisation with increases in size e.g. Increased spread of 
overheads and other fixed costs.) Further, the smaller 
centres seem to perceive goods as of lower quality and more 
difficult to service- Thus F&P stores tend to dominate the 
smaller population centres-
F&P also seem to have franchised the better quality outlets 
(i-e. those which have better store reputation and sales 
turnover). In total F&P had (at the time of application) 
approximately 450 of the 866 whiteware retail outlets2e~. 
However, because of factors mentioned above, although F&P 
accounts for only 50~ of the whitegoods stores, its share of 
(d) 
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the market (local production and imports) was estimated 
nationally for- the year- ended June 1987 at approx. 70%. 
Retail price comparisons : Australia and New Zealand-
Distributor mark-ups in New Zealand are about 40% (from 
wholesale to recommended retail price) whereas in Australia 
the markups are much lower-, averaging around 25%, represent-
ing a 20% margin- As the Commission stated260 : 
These margins are said to reflect a relatively more 
open market situation operating in Australia---there 
are no regulatory controls on imports of whiteware and 
imports are a significant share of the domestic market, 
there are two major manufacturing competitors---and 
there are no EDAs operating in the whiteware market. 
Thus retail prices are 
for equivalent models 
lower on 
the price 
the Australian market and 
differences range from 
almost $400 for expensive items to $150 for less expensive 
goods-
sion261 
According to 
"economies 
nificant factor in 
prices" between the 
information received by the Commis-
of scale are not likely to be a sig-
explaining the di ffer·ences in retail 
two countries262 • In both countries 
after-sales service charges for whitegoods are reflected in 
consumer prices- However in New Zealand many of these costs 
are borne by the retailer and reflected in the mark-up. In 
Australia these costs are borne by the manufacturer who 
takes on responsibility for providing such services-
Other Actions 
Prior to this application, L D Nathan on behalf of Bond & Bond Ltd 
brought proceedings in the High Court under the Commerce Act 1986 
against F&P. Damages were sought for the losses incurred by F&P's 
r-efusal to supply it with whitegoocts to some of its stores- The 
application for interim inunction was refused by Barker J 263 who said 
the case should proceed to a ful 1 hearing in the High Court. In 
February 1987 F&P sought authorisation of its EDAs. Shortly after-
a judicial conference was held before Barker J where it is 
r-eported he commented that "there would be little point in proceeding 
to the High Court to hear matters already before the Commerce Commis-
5ion provided the Commission will deal with them expeditiously." 
' I 
71 
F&P Application 
F&P claims, with support fr·om expert submissions, that no net anti-
competitive effects result from F&Ps EDAs. The economic experts 
viewed the increase in the level of import competition over the last 
three years, the existence of a large number of retail outlets outside 
the F&P dealer network, the short duration of the EDAs and public 
benefits associated with the practice as factors outweighing any 
~ticompetitive effects resulting from the practice. 
In short, almost all the factors examined in this paper which produce 
pro-competitive or reduce the anticompetitive effects of exclusive 
dealing were claimed to be relevant in the F&P case. The author's 
opinions are consistent with those of the Commission and a number of 
other interested parties, 264 namely that facts do not support such 
claims. The analysis of the Commerce Commission leading to such a 
conclusion is examined below-
Draft Determination : Substantive Points 
F&P's application was sought under s58(1)(a) & (b) which provides for 
authorisation of persons for contracts, arrangements or understandings 
to which section 27 of the Commerce Act applies. Submissions opposing 
the application contained allegations which fall within ss36 and 37-
Although market dominance and resale price maintenance may be as-
sociated with franchising or exclusive dealing arrangements, the 
Commission emphasised that it cannot authorise practices falling under 
ss36 or 37. These are to be decided by the Courts. Therefore the 
~alysis here focusses only upon s-27-
Pur-pose & Effect 
~ initial issue in evaluating an application under s58 is whether the 
Pl'act ice 
effect") 
Commission 
in 
of 
question has 
substantially 
held that the 
the " p u rp o s e " or "effect" 
lessening 
intention 
competition. 
(or "likely 
The Commerce 
of clause 5(a) was clearly to 
Prevent the use of F&P franchise stores for the sale of non F&P 
The Commission Pl'oducts as part of the company's market strategy. 
therefore considered the purpose of the clause to be the "lessening of 
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competi tion" 26~-
In analysing whether there was a substantial effe et upon competition 
the Commission followed the view of Deane J in the Tillmann Butcheries 
case 2 6,6, that substantial means: 
"···'real or of substance' in New Zealand [this] was intended to 
mean not insignificant, not ephemeral, not nominal or minimal." 
The effect of clause 5(a) was seen as cl early to i nh ib it new entrants' 
abi 1 i ty to gain access to the whiteware market. Measures to gauge 
whether such an effect was "real or of substance" included: 
(i) the high proportion of outlets which are F&P franchised 
(ii) the majority market share held by F &P products 
(iii)the importance which the company places 
its marketing strategy267 
on clause 5 as part of 
On this basis the Commission concludes that 
purpose and effect of "substantially lessening" 
of s27 and according that it has j uri sdi et ion. 
clause 5(a) has the 
competition in terms 
F&P claimed in their application that clause 5(a) has pro-competitive 
effects. The Commission stated the effect on competition of this 
clause must be evaluated according to the test under s61 (6) of the Act 
as to whether the substantial competitive effect is outweighed by a 
benefit to the public that will, or is likely to result. 
Although the Commission carried out little explicit analysis in 
deciding they had jurisdiction it is submitted that the facts provided 
clause 5 exclusive dealing agreements did indicate clearly that the 
have the purpose or effe et of substantially lessening competition-
The Commission therefore turned to an analysis of the practice as 
Pl'ovided tmder s61(6). This requires 
likely lessening in competition to be 
561 (6) provides that: 
the extent 
taken into 
of the actual or 
account. Further-
The Commission shall not make a determination granting an 
authorisation under section 58(1)(a) to (d) of this Act unless it 
is satisfied that 
(a) The entering into of the contract or arrangement or the 
arriving at an understanding; or 
(b) The giving effect to the provision of the contract, arrange-
73 
mentor understanding .•• ; 
as the case may be, to which the application relates will in all 
the circumstances result, or be likely to result, in a benefit to 
the public which would outweigh the lessening in competition that 
would result or is deemed to result therefrom. 
In defining "competition" the Commission referred to three cases, (all 
of which have been discusse,1 above). 
(i) QCMA268 - the quote from this 
There were: 
case implies that a market is an 
area of "rivalrous competition". In itself this quote is of 
little use but combined with the factors mentioned in the case 
which define this area, guidelines are provided for assessing the 
market. 
(ii) Dandy Power· Equipment Pty Ltd v Mercury Marine Pty Ltd269 - the 
reference in this case focusses upon the need to analyse com-
the need to look at the petition in the market and highlights 
effect of the practices of the individual person on the market as 
a whole-
(iii)Whakatu/Advanced Meats highlighted from this case is the 
antithesis of competition and market power. The Commission 
defines market power in the following terms: 270 
The degree of market power can be represented by the degree 
of independence of behaviour exercised by a person in a 
market - in other words, conduct that is pursued indepen-
dently of the presence, actions or reactions of existing or 
potential competitors, suppliers or consumers. This 
suggests a lack of restraint on the behaviour of a person-
restraint that would be assumed to be associated with 
condditions of affective competition. While it can be 
presumed that market power increases as market share rises, 
it is the cumulative impact of various factors that is 
important in determining market power. 
Thus as implied in the judgment, an increase in the market power of 
0 ne organisation will result in a decrease in competition. However 
it must the writer would submit that although this is generally true, 
he shown to be so in each case· 
Power of several 
actually be a net 
organisations 
increase in 
If there is an increase in the market 
in the market the net 
the level of competition. 
result may 
Thus in-
creases in market share do not necessarily result in increases in 
market power. However the two factors would usually be expected to 
follow. As the Commission notes271 restrictive trade practices such 
as exclusive dealing can increase market power- They state that the 
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independence of an organisation can be a useful measure to the amount 
of lessening in competition which results from the practice. It is 
submitted that a proviso should be added to this view, that a clear 
connection must be made between the trade practice and the market 
independence· Organisations should not be punished for gr-eater 
efficiency which provides them with a degree of market power-. The 
focus must be upon the degree to which the practice in question 
substantially lessens competition, or further, the degree to which 
such a practice(s) results in market dominance-
The Commission embarks on a review of the economic effects of vertical 
restraints on 
case law272 , 
competition. 
particularly 
The review refers to economic writing and 
the Tampa Electric Co case273 and the 
Sylvania case. It is submitted that the general verdict of the 
Commission is that such material provides a framework for analysis but 
no definitive solutions- 274 However note is taken of the Vertical 
Restraints Guide! ines (1985):2"7::5. These acknowledge the pro-corn-
petitive effects of practices such as exclusive dealing but state that 
although generally not the case, these practices may exclude corn-
peti tors from the market by increasing the costs of obtaining dis-
tribution channels- This is balanced by a statement emphasising the 
need not to penalise organisations for- superior skill and it is 
recognised that new market entrants may suffer a cost disadvantage 
ir·respe et i ve of such practices. However an overall caveat is made 
that the USA does not provide a comparable economy and different 
results wi 11 be appropriate in New Zealand, particularly in the area 
This fact is borne out by the fact of market concentration levels. 
that ~ of the US authorities cited concern companies with market 
shares approaching that held by F&P276 • 
After noting the dynamic nature of the market, particularly the 
continuing reduction in import restrictions the Commission turned to 
an evaluation of the impact of EDAs on competition277 -
At Para. 120 of its determination the Commission states that278 : 
F&P through its EDA has in effect vertically 
wholesaling market and thus through this 
directly with the dealers in its products. 
existing or new entrant into the whitegoods 
integrated into the 
integration deals 
Accordingly amy 
supply market must 
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also enter the wholesaling market and deal directly with retail 
outlets for access to the retail market. 
On its face this may not be strictly true. Access to the retail 
market would be possible through a wholesale distributor. Ho.-,ever 
even if an organisation would take on this distribution role the 
, access ' gained i s l i k e l y to be mini ma 1 • Further the options for a 
new entrant discussed by the Commission could be modified to permit a 
manufacturer-who 1 esal er re lat i onsh i p. Thus according to the Commis-
sion279 the effect of the EDA on competition will depend on an 
analysis of: 
(a) The e},tent to which competition in the retail market is fore-
closed by the EDA; 
(b) The extent to which the foreclosure (if any) in the retail market 
makes more restrictive the conditions of entry to the sup-
ply/wholesaling market; 
(c) Any anti-competitive and pro-competitive effects of the EDAs. 
Thus the Commission has adopted a framework which reflects (to a large 
degree) the Amer-i can approach to vertical r-estraints280 • Analysis 
will follow on each of the three factors listed above. 
(a) Retai 1 Market Foreclosure 
F&P franchised stores amount to approximately 50% of the market 
and as the previous facts indicate, this concentration increases 
in the provincial centres- The Commission outlines three options 
for potential or existing competitors wishing to gain or- increase 
access to the retail market and thus final consumers. 
(i) Convince F&P franchised stores to forego their franchises in 
favour of a new brand (the "rival" brand). 
Under the clause 5 of F&P Dealer Agreement this would be 
possible within 90 days. However significant problems could 
be encountered. The rival would have to convince dealers of 
likely sales volumes, the degree of risk involved and offer 
significant margins or support services. The author· would 
agree with the Commission that this is not really a reason-
able proposition- Experience in Australia such as that in 
the case of Ford Motor Coy (Aust.) Ltd v Ford Sales Company 
t I 
76 
of Australia281 noted that althctlgh the dealer agreement was 
easily terminated, Ford's relatively high market share (22%) 
meant that it was unlikely that dealers could adequately 
replace the Ford franchise- This problem is accentuated in 
the F&P case where the market share for products ranges 
between 65 and 85 percent. 282 
(ii) Use Existing Non F&P franchise Stores as Outlets: 
Assuming that such stores were willing to stock a new brand, 
which may not be the case particularly for small dealers, 
there are still problems- Although F&P provided evidence 
indicating a large number of available outlets the "quality" 
of such outlets is important. On this point the Commission 
referred to the 
Others283 where 
case of Southern Cross Beverages Pty &-
the importance of factors such as location 
and turnover were seen as requirements when analysing the 
availability of outlets. On the facts presented F&-P has 
many of the "quality" outlets. F&P claims that its own 
investments in support services have contributed to this 
fact. 
point 
The Commission acknowledged this fact but made the 
that many of the stores involved, particularly the 
larger departmental stores, have independently achieved 
significant quality status- Thus the number of such outlets 
is limited by F&P EDA practice-
(iii)Vertically integrate into a Chain(s) of Retail Outlets 
As the Commission states284 : 
This option would be costly in terms of establishing a 
reputation for the store and in capital outlay. F&P 
has itself chosen not to incur costs of this kind-
Further in New Zealand it would be difficult to find a chain 
which would provide nationwide coverage. The need to 
purchase several chains and rationalise would greatly 
increase the costs of integration-
A further factor mentioned in the draft determination was brand 
awareness. As the evidence presented highlighted, because of its 
long existence and prominence public awareness of F&P brands is 
high. Further there is suspicion (particularly provincial) of 
foreign products. In the Dunlop/Goodyear case28~ it was noted 
that high promotional costs are in themselves not a barrier. 
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However the Commission noted that the number 
of competitors and 
access to the retail market is linked to the lev
el of promotional 
costs required- Thus the existence of EDAs 
in the relatively 
small sized New Zealand whiteware market pre
sents an adverse 
e f fect on a rival's perception of establis
hing a franchised 
dealer network and thus successfully entering th
e market. 
(b) E>!tent that Retail Market Foreclosure has 
made more Restrictive 
the Conditions of Entry to the Supply/Wholesale 
Market 
Foreclosure in the retail market does effect 
the ease of entry 
into the supply/wholesale market. Although it 
is submitted that 
the Commission's statements on this are not par
ticularly clear286 
several points are evident. F&P's control of h
alf of the retail 
outlets reduces the scope for those in the 
wholesale market. 
This control is reflected in F&P's market powe
r their ability 
to act independently of other market participa
nts - which would 
b e a negative factor for 
wholesale market- Several 
this market power: 
rivals considering entry into the 
factors are relevant to the level of 
(i) the historical protection of New Zealand
 whiteware manu-
facturers, which has permitted F&P to achieve s
uch a strong 
position to be the only local whitegoods produc
er today; 
(ii) the need for entrants to combat F&P's contr
ol (through EDAs) 
in the retail market it is submitted that the
 options for 
new entrants (discussed above) are severely lim
ited- In the 
case of a wholesale competitor there would 
be a need to 
establish a distribution system- Again, the c
osts of this 
would be high, even if limited to the Auckland a
rea, because 
economies are limited as F&P's EDAs reduce th
e number of 
outlets which are available-
The costs of constructing a whitegoods manufact
uring plant in New 
Zealand are seen as prohibitive due to the siz
e of the market. 
Thus imports, though involving transport costs
 and delays, are 
the only likely avenue of supply-
As the Commission point out the above factors 
are not in them-
selves restrictive, but as the writer has ind
icated, the effect 
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of EDAs is to increase the costs of entry. Thus the exclusive 
dealing practices of F&P effect costs sufficiently so that the 
market is perceived as difficult to enter successfully. 
F&P's Market Power 
This is assessed by 
(i) the competition F &P' s products receive from imports (as the only 
local producer); and 
(ii) the behaviour of F&P in the market place. 
(i) Import Competition. F&P accounted for nearly all imports in 1985 
and around 5~ in 1985 thus import competition experienced by F&P 
up to June 1987 had increased by only 20%- Imports for yeaT' 
ended June 1987 represented aT'ound 25Z of the market shaT'e• 
However evidence shows a decline in import levels for 1988 
despite the removal of many import controls- Thus the total 
level of import competition is not of great significance although 
there are variations over different products-
(ii) Behaviour of F&P in Supply/Wholesale Market 
From the evidence presented, it would seem that F&P has very 
significant market power- As the Commission stated287 : 
Actions taken by Fishel' & Paykel to deter the entry of 
competitors OT' generally to consolidate its maT'ket position 
can be used as a measure of the lack of competitive con-
straint imposed on Fisher & Paykel or market power possessed 
by Fisher & Paykel- These actions, when taken in ass-
ociation with the operation of EDAs have the effect of 
raising the costs of entry to the market. 
The Commission detailed a variety of facts illustrating this 
market power- These included: 
Removal of Hoover pT'oducts even though many dealers prefer-
T'ed to carry them. 
Significant delays which have been incurred by F&P in 
supplying dealers without losing these franchised outlets. 
Contract manufacturing for Whiteware Corporation. 
increases problems of access for competitors. 
This 
The enforcement of F&P EDA (as occurred in the Bond & Bond 
case288)• 
As the Commission stated28~ "many F&P franchised dealers, while 
' ·' 
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preferring to stock more than one brand of whiteware, elect not 
to do so for fear of losing their F&P franchise-" The facts 
provided do illustrate the very significant level of market power 
which F&P wields- It is submitted that these facts, though 
pertinent, should not mask the overall focus. This must be 
whether the EDAs substantially lessen competition or alternative-
ly (in the court setting) whether F&P has a dominant position 
which it has used for any of the prohibited purposes under s36 of 
the Commerce Act. 
~ the basis of the information before it the Commerce Commission 
concluded that the company has a significant amount of market power 
~d that the EDAs "prevent or hinder the entry of new suppliers/whole-
salers into the retail market and the expansion of existing non F&P 
brands share of that market, competition is to a significant degree 
less than it would otherwise be without the EDAs-" 2 ~ 0 The Commission 
detailed the competitive (anti and pro) effects of the EDAs. 
~ti-Competitive 
(i) Reducing product choice - on average 50% of retailers are limited 
to stocking F&P goods only; this percentage is greater in 
provincial areas. 
(ii) Reducing dealer choices EDAs limit the ability of F&P dealers 
to bargain over price and supply terms. This limit on the 
ability to respond to market changes was seen as the greatest 
"vice" of EDAs in Broken Hill Pty & Anor v TPT291 • To the extent 
that F&P cannot perform to the same standard as other overseas 
suppliers the public and dealer suffer a detriment from the EDAs. 
(iii)Price competition is reduced - the intra-brand/inter-brand trade-
oft discussed above (and below) rarely occurs because F&P have 
such a strong (50%) control over retail outlets. Further F&P 
issues a Recommended Retail Price (RRP) list to dealers. 
Although this arguably does not contravene the provisions of the 
Commerce Act regulating pricing, under s3(5) of the Act the 
Commission may investigate the effect of price lists on com-
petition in terms of s27- Under the EDA F&P dealers must provide 
for after-sales service out of their gross margin. This is a 
strong incentive to keep to the RRPs particularly as F&P in its . 
letter stresses its preference that dealers adhere to such prices 
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to "ensure an adequate standard of after-sales service". 292 
(iv) Inter brand competition - As detailed by the facts this has been 
relatively low for many years. This is highlighted by the 
differences in retail prices for equivalent products in Australia 
and New Zealand- 293 
(v) Supply shortages The Commission notes294 that despite sig-
nificant delays only one dealer has chosen to terminate their 
agreement (which itself reflects a lack of choice for dealers). 
However it is submitted that the Commission has not really 
provided a connection between the supply shortages and the EDAs-
lt is submitted with respect that such shortages arise because of 
the number of dealers that must be supplied. The number of 
dealers and their lack of effective choices in supply may be 
attributable to the EDAs, but in itself the EDAs do not result in 
supply shortages- The EDAs merely increase the market power of 
F&P and reduces the ability of dealers to switch to another 
supplier-
Pro-Compet it i ve 
F&P claimed significant savings and efficiencies arise from its EDA 
practice particularly in the marketing of products. However, the 
Commission was not satisfied that such benefits would not arise in the 
absence of the EDAs29e. Particularly the Commission noted that some 
of the costs claimed by F&P have also been claimed by dealers in their 
own right as paid for out or profits: e.g. promotional costs296 • Thus 
the Commission concluded in the draft determination that it was not 
satisfied that pro-competitive effects Nould results from the ex-
clusive dealing practices- As the Commission stated297 : 
On the evidence available to the Commission it is questionable 
whether such effects as claimed are directly attributable to the 
practice and thus diminish the net anti-competitive detriments 
identified above- The Commission thus concludes that the EDAs 
result in a lessening in competition to a high degree • 
The Commission therefore examined the public benefits resulting or 
likely to result from the practice as required under s61 of the Act. 
These benefits must outweigh the lessening of competition which 
results from the practice. 
~lie Benefits 
Previous Commission guidelines 2 ~ 8 were followed in evaluating these 
henef its. Two factors are re l evant29"': 
,, 
81 
(a) 
(b) 
The benefits 
probability; 
That they must 
must be demonstrated as a matter of evidence and 
flow from the practice-
F&P claimed a number of benefits resulted from this practice. 
relate to cost efficiencies in300 : 
(i) manufacturing wh i teware; 
(ii) meeting customer service requirements; 
(iii)promotion of innovative product design; 
(iv) export and manufacturing development; and 
(v) employment creation-
These 
However, the writer would agree with the Commission that on the 
evidence presented, these benefits are not clearly to he viewed as 
resulting from the EDAs. Indeed the benefits "appear to derive from 
the efficiency claims" 301 rather than the exclusive dealing practice-
It is submitted that EDAs may assist in providing sufficient dealer-
numbers for economies and greater efficiency to result. However as 
the Commission states, such benefits are not attributable to the 
existence of the EDAs. Further, and of particular importance to the 
development of this area, the Commission emphasises that302 : 
The (1986 Commerce] Act is predicated on the basis that the 
promotion of competition in a market is the best way to ensure 
the efficient allocation of resources among competing industrial 
ends. 
The writer would agr·ee that this is the appropriate focus- The 
comments general 1 y in the F&P draft determination seem to reflect, to 
a large extent, this approach and it is submitted that this is an 
encouraging sign in the developing approach of the adjudicating bodies 
to the Commerce Act and more par-ticularly, in the area of exclusive 
dealing. 
Draft Determination : Conclusion of the Commerce Commission 
% balance the Commission felt that the anti-competitive effects of 
the EDAs were not outweighed by any pro-competitive or public bene-
fits. Therefore the tentative conclusion of the draft determination 
Was that the exclusive dealing practices in question could not be 
authorised in ter-ms of s61(6) of the Act- However, the Commission 
sought more infor-mation particularly on the public benefits likely to 
r·es1.11 t. Ther-etore further submissions were called tor- on this point 
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tobe received at a conference- This conference has occurred but at 
the time of compiling the paper final determination material was not 
available• 
conclusion -The material presented and the conclusions reached (above) only relate 
to the F&P Draft Determination. However, from the information 
presented in the draft and the additional material presented at the 
conference303 it seems unlikely that the final view of the Commission 
will change from the tentative view expressed above. In the writer's 
opinion, a denial of authorisation seems the correct decision- The 
~aft tended to state the facts and the framework (legal and economic) 
used in reaching conclusions without a great deal of analysis of the 
Mnner in which specific facts should be applied under the framework 
adopted- However, it is submitted that the facts present a fairly 
clear situation of an exclusive dealing practice which has usub-
stantial ly lessened competition"• Further, the facts evidence clear 
market dominance,as Land has noted in his recent article304 • This 
decision is therefore one which should improve the potential for 
competition in the Nhi tegoods market. More importantly, in the 
writer's opinion, it provides an appropriate focus for future ex-
elusive dealing decisions to follow-
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SECTION 8 : EXCLUSIVE DEALING : A NARKETING PERSPECTIVE 
Exclusive dealing particularly where it i
s part of a franchising 
agreement may be central to a company's corporate 
str·ategy- The F &P Draft Determination
30~ referred to 
submission that the EDAs are crucial 
and marketing 
"the statement 
to the company 
bY F&P in its 
maintaining an economic size of production; clearly in
 the absence of 
the EDA F &P i tse 1 f expects to 1 ose market share." 
128 This section of 
the paper focusses brief 1 y on the marketing approach of comp
anies 
using exclusive dealing in New Zealand and a marketing mod
el which 
provides another way of analysing the effects of this practice on 
competition- This model will then be applied to the F&P
 facts and 
cone lus ions drawn. 
A, EXCLUSIVE DEALER PROFILE 
A profile of the types of organisations which use exclusive dealing is 
extremely di ff i cult. However, several general 
suggest a greater likelihood of exclusive dealing: 
(1) A high degree of product differentiation 
factors emerge which 
(2) Complex Higher Order306 Goods or Services - Both of these factors 
necessitate a substantial investment in promotion and advertising. In 
terms of efficiency this best occurs at the manufacturer level- This 
may also entail assistance to distributors in training, layout a
nd 
design 
factor. 
of systems, particularly where product quality is a m
ajor 
As mentioned exclusive dealing is utilised in these cases to 
safeguard return on that investment. 
(3) Dealer Role is significant - again, this links to the factor
s 
above. If dealers are in a position to free-ride on investments made, 
then exclusive dealing is the most efficient method of pro
tection 
short of vertical integration-
(4) 'Image" Goods - this relates particularly to the franchisin
g 
s i t 1Jation-
fr-anchi se. 
Preventing 
Exclusive dealing is 
case 
used to preserve the image of a 
For example, in the 
free-riding, e>:clusive 
of McDonalds, 
dealing maintains 
in addition to 
the standard-
isation essential to the perpetuation of the public image. It 
requires franchisees to deal only with the franchisor allowin
g a 
general standard to be set across all operations. 
. ,, ' 
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~en some or- all of these factors are 
litiood that ex c 1 us i ve dealing wi 11 be 
present there is a high like-
utilised, often together- with 
territorial restrictions and resale price maintenance- (The latter 
~d their position under- the Commerce Act 1986 will not be examined 
Exclusive dealing as a safeguard of investment and franchise here) • 
image is thus a marketing tool- It provides a 'risk cushion
' against 
losses wh i eh would otherwise be possible- In its absence othe
r 
safeguards would need to be found-
fees for manufacturer- pr-omot i onal 
One possibility would be direct 
efforts, however- in practice this 
may be difficult to quantify and manage for individu
al dealers-
Without some form of protection arguably the level of manufacturer 
investment and services would decline- So as with other restrictive 
devices, such as patents, it does 
some 
have beneficial effects- The 
previous section looked at economic analysis of competition
-
Her-e it is proposed to use a marketing mode 1. Although there is some 
over-lap with economic concepts, it provides another perspective for 
the analysis of the effects of exclusive dealing. 
B, MODEL : PORTERS FIVE FORCES OF cnMPETITION 
This model is adapted from that used at the Harvard Business School
307 
as a tool for the analysis of competition in the mar-ket. It pr-ovi des 
another framework for analysing competition- Particularly this model 
provides an approach which focusses on the marketing factors relevant 
to competition- As F&P's submissions to the Commerce Commission in
 
its application and elsewhere308
 suggest, EDAs may be a crucial 
element in a company's marketing strategy and thus its over-all 
profitability. Thus the model provides a further framework fo
r 
analysing competition and is 
three levels: 
designed to assist decision-making at 
1. Corporate strategy the choice of industries and market
s in 
which an enter-prise competes and the balance of the business 
portfolio- It includes decisions regarding acquisition (vert
ical 
integration), divestments and new ventures- Particularly for 
present purposes it gives a guide as to the competitiveness of a
 
market and the viability of entry-
2. Business strategy - the specifics of how a firm competes within a 
single industry or market- This would include decisions on the 
use of practices such as exclusive dealing and franchising-
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3, functional Strat
egy - the deployment of resources at the fun-
ctional level as implied by the business strategy. 
The five forces seen as relevant are: 
1, The threat of entry which includes barriers to entry and the 
likely reaction of incumbent firms; 
2• The threat of substitutes; 
3. 
4. 
5. 
The bargaining power of customers; 
The bargaining power of suppliers; and 
The intensity of rivalry between firms. 
difficulty of exit. 
This includes the 
The factors relevant to F&P exclusive dealing practice will be 
examined below-
c. APPLYING THE MODEL TO THE F&P CASE 
I, Threat of Entry 
This depends on:-
(a) Barriers to Entry which include: 
(i) Economies ot scale F&P though not large by international 
standards has the only local manufacturing plant for 
whitegoods- However the recommended retail prices (RRPs) 
for its products are significantly higher than Australian 
equivalents. Ranging from $43 - $387 more tor F&P goods- 130 
(ii) Capital requirements - these would be significant to set up 
just a manufacturing plant. 
'sunk costs' relative to 
In analysing these costs, the 
the possible returns must be 
compared• In the New Zealand whiteware market the sunk 
costs would be large. Therefore, in view of the small 
market such a plan is probably not viable. 
(iii)Access to distribution channels - here is where the real 
impact of exclusive dealing comes- Approximately 50% ot all 
the whiteware outlets are F&P franchised. Further, f&P has 
tended to franchise the better quality distributors. This 
would be a factor in considering competition or entry. As 
disucssed, an entrant would almost need to enter as ver-
tically integrated in two functional markets: manufacturing 
and retailing. This could have a bearing on the necessary 
capital costs- As the Draft Determination pointed out~
1 ~ 1 
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other- options 
their- f r·an chi s e 
such as persuading F&P franchisees to forego 
or use e:<isting non F&P franchise outlets 
also have pr-oblems-
(iv) Product differentiation this is quite high. To some 
degree F&P's true market power- is disguised through dif-
ferent brand names (e.g. Frigidaire, Kelvinator) but 
promotional activity has been such that much of the market 
clearly recognises F&P products- Further, there is some 
negative reaction to foreign products which assists in the 
positive differentiation of F&P products. 
(v) Other factors - these include government policy (of pr-os-
pective importance regarding exclusive dealing and cost 
advantages-
Note that it is arguable whether some of these are r-eally barriers to 
entry- For instance, economies of 
in themselves are not barriers in 
scale and 
economic 
product differentiation 
terms- They may merely 
reflect an 
efforts. 
organisation's efficiency, innovation and promotional 
To what extent factors such as economies of scale and 
di ffer-ent iat ion should be taken account of together with restrictive 
practices is unclear. Should a company be sanctioned merely because 
it is first in a market which is not sufficient to sustain two 
participants at present demand levels? As long as the criteria of 
maintenance of 
answer would 
efficient resource allocation is not violated the 
seem to be no-
tr-ibution channels, 
this case arguab 1 y 
exclusive dealing 
does form a 
However, regarding access to dis-
is a 
major 
factor which can, and in 
barr-ier. This may have 
concomitant implications for the capital investments required. 
(b) Likely Reaction of Incumbent(s) 
Here this is really only F&P- It has indicated through its 
actions that it will fight competition that encroaches on its 
market share- Examples include the dropping of Hoover prod
ucts 
to introduce a model to compete in the mar-ket niche occupied
 by 
Hoover goods; and F&P's response to dealers who try to sell non-
F&P products- (These activities in themselves show the large 
degree of market power wielded by F&P power which could he 
brought to bear on any serious rivals). 
',1 
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II• Threat of Substitute Products 
M discussed in the F&P draft determination, although there is a large 
degree of differentiation between products and different features 
available in whitegoods, product brands may be fairly easily sub-
stituted• Thus the threat of substitutes may be a significant element 
·of competition.::so-. This threat will be more severe wher-e: 
(i) Substitutes are subject to trends improving their price perform-
ance - although this is the case with the reduction in import 
restrictions, the reality is that whitegoods imports have 
declined in 1988. However, this is consistent with a general 
decline in New Zealand's import levels-
(ii) Substitutes are produced by organisations earning high profits or 
of very large size (particularly multi-nationals) These 
organisations can enter the market and afford to suffer losses in 
the short term, however the evidence received by the Commis-
sion3 ~ 0 is that F&P production capacity is approximately equiv-
alent to that of the large Australian producers which reduces any 
economy of scale advantages. Further, the existence of EDAs 
which tie half of the market outlets make the potential for 
reaching a large proportion of the consumer- market difficult. In 
such a small market as New Zealand this is a significant problem. 
III. Bargaining PoNer of Custoaers 
At present this does not have a significant effect on competition in 
the whitegoods market. However if customers' perceptions of foreign 
goods continue to change (as they have to some degree in the metro-
politan areas) this may effect both the demand for F&P goods and the 
effective choice of dealers considering abandoning the F&P franchise. 
IV. Supplier PONer 
As a supplier F&P is very powerful· Some of the factors relevant 
Under the model for increasing supplier power are: 
(i) The degree of connection of the supplier(s). If they are more 
concentrated than the industry they supply then their market 
power is greater- In the ~ase of F&P it is the only local 
producer and one of the few manufact-urers, until recently, to 
provide a full range of whitegoods-
(ii) The supplier's product is important to buyers business - the~~ 
f l 
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point is central to F&P's market power. It has EDAs with 50% of 
the market and for many of 
p r oduct- 311 
these whitegoods are a dominant 
(iY) Products are differentiated - The draft determination high 1 i ghted 
this fact and its impact on the perceptions of new entrants
312 • 
v. Intensity of Rivalry Between Firms 
Intense rivalry between firms is not, on the analysis of the Commerce 
commission in the F&P Draft Determination, a strong feature of the New 
Zealand wh i tegoods market. However r·i val ry is likely to be more 
intense where: 
( i) Numerous or equally balanced competi tor·s are present Neither· 
factor applies- Competitors are, as yet, not numerous & F&P on 
the evidence presented is in a much stronger position to the 
extent that it is seen as 
market. 
having a dominant position in the 
(ii) Slow industry growth and/or high fixed costs - Although both
 
factors apply to the New Zealand whitegoods industry because F&P 
is the 
enhance 
only local producer these factors would actually tend to 
its strong position by deferring much competitive 
investment. 
(iii)Lack of product differentiation and low switching costs - A
s 
mentioned in the draft determination significant differentiati
on 
occurs. 
switching 
However the products are homogeneous 
can occur relatively easily bearing 
evidence on building standards
313 -
enough that 
in mind the 
(iv) High exit barriers 
particularly be the high 
In the are of whitegoods these would 
costs involved in specialised assets. 
These cannot 
only local 
easily be recovered314 -
producer this factor, 
However because F&P is the 
rather than promoting corn-
petition is another factor which hinders it- Com
petitor-s 
perceive profits as difficult to attain considering F&
P market 
power- Therefore significant investments of a sp
ecialised kind 
in a market which is unlikely to be very profitable, 
made. 
~eluding Comments 
are not 
Overall this model would seem to confirm the decision of the Commerce 
Commission in the F&P Draft Determination- In the F&P case th
e 
evidence was such that a denial 
of 
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the authorisation was in the 
However in exclusive dealing author's opinion almost undeniable. 31 e 
practices wher·e the results are more balanced in their competitive 
effects Porter's model may provide another useful tool for discerning 
This would particularly be the case the competitive effects of EDAs. 
in situations where, as in the F,1P case, 
integral part of the marketing strategy. 
the EDAs were considered an 
fl 
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coNCLUSION -
n,e Australian Trade Practice Commission stated that316 : 
"Exclusive dealing is not illegal, only exclusive dealing that is 
substantially anti-competitive. There is a lot of exclusive 
dealing in Australia like other countries and Parliament recog-
nised that much of it should be allowed to continue." 
such is al so the case in New Zealand. The Commerce Act 1986 seeks to 
promote competition as a means of ensuring efficient resource 
allocation and ultimately greater consumer welfar·e. 
The basic proposition contained in this paper is that the gener·al 
pr-ovi s ions of the New Zealand Act are an appropriate means for 
regulating e!<clusive dealing. In reaching such a view the writer's 
conclusions on the Commerce Act have changed- New Zealand has "got it 
right"• The situations in which exclusive dealing practices will be 
anti-competitive will generally fall under the sections discussed in 
Therefore additional provisions the paper (particularly s s27 and 36). 
to specifically deal with exclusive dealing practises seem somewhat 
redundant. 
to draft 
Additional exclusive dealing provisions can be difficult 
(as s47 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 perhaps evidences. 
More impor·tantly the provisions add another legal test which may 
obscure the objective of the Commerce Act and may hinder the 
development of certainty in this area of the law. As discussed there 
ar·e prob 1 ems in applying the policy objectives of the relevant trade 
pl'actices legislation. The degree to which the Australian cases have 
r·etained this policy focus has varied considerably
317 • By contrast 
the writer would submit that the New Zealand cases, although still at 
an early stage in applying the Commerce Act, have made a reasonably 
promotion of competition. The comments encouraging start in the 
the Application by F&P31181 make it clear that a competitive focus 
in 
is 
required under the New Zealand Act· However, the F&P case was the 
first New Zealand decision on exclusive dealing and was a fairly 
extreme example of this practice- Thus detailed principles cannot be 
expected without more case law development.
319 
Al though fran eh is i ng was not the topic 
competitive effects have been mentioned-
Worse viewed in isolation than in 
of this paper-320 some of its 
Exclusive dealing may look 
the usual franchising context. 
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Again greater clarity of the adjudicating bodies view of exclusive 
dealing wi 11 on 1 y arise with further cases. 
In reaching a conclusion that the New Zealand approach was the most 
~propriate, several criticisms were refuted- Most important of these 
was that unilateral actions would avoid the "catch-all" provisions of 
s27 of the Commerce Act. As stated the writer's view is that by their-
nature e>:clusive dealing arrangements will involve some agreement 
which will fit within the wide definition of "contract, arrangement or 
@derstanding" under s27- Unilateral actions which relate to EDAs, 
to supply in the Bond & Bond case321 will such as the 
therefore be 
r·efusal 
caught- However, if the legislature wished to clarify 
this point a definition could be added stating that: 
"provision" refers to any matter forming part of, 
the understanding, arrangement or underst~nding 
provision has been imposed by one party. 
or related to, 
even if this 
The only other misgiving the writer had, although not relating to the 
main emphasis of the paper, concerned the protection of parties to 
EDAs who wished to challenge these ar-r-angements. As the Act stands it 
~pears that persons involved in EDAs who bring actions under the Act 
could themselves be potentially liable to pay damages or pecuniary 
penalties. Under ss80(1)(e) & 82(1)(e) persons who are directly or 
indirectly, knowingly concerned in or party to, the 
s47 may be liable322 for damages or pecuniary damages. 
contr·avention of 
However as Justice Barker pointed out in the Bond & Bond case
323 
"under s80(2) the Court has to have regard to all relevant matters and 
one would consider it unlikely that the Court would impose a penalty 
on a party such as the plaintiff when it sought but failed to gain an 
interim injunction-··" Thus in situations where one of the parties to 
~ EDA has not been a willing party to such an arrangement or· mor·e 
Par·ticularly has suffered harm there is scope for that party to bring 
an action without being vulnerable itself to attack under sSO. In the 
Wr-iter's view the fact that such protection depends on the court's 
~alysis of the situation is appropriate- There is an assumption that 
EDAs do involve mutuality. Thus unless a person can present relevant 
matters to the court which would negate the appropriate penalty, that 
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person as a party to an arrangement must face the consequen
ces of a 
decision that the practice has anti-competitive effects. 
At present s82, unlike s80, does not detail the matters which the
 
court must consider in determining an appropriate penalty. 
be remedied in two ways: 
This could 
(i) through judicial interpretation however this may 
prove 
difficult as a comparison of the sections would seem to indi
cate 
that this 'omission' was intended; or 
(ii) by amendment - such an amendment would be fairly simple, mer
ely 
involving the copying and adjusting of part or all of s80(2).
 
Certainly such an amendment would be simpler (and in the auth
or's 
view more effective) than the drafting of a specific sectio
n on 
exclusive dealing. 
Even if neither of the above remeaies are available it w
ould appear 
from s82 that the court has a discretion in determining the 
"loss or 
damage caused by that person". This would permit the court 
to take 
account of the particular circumstances of the parties to an E
DA-
The Australian QCMA case~24 and the New Zealand cases which fo
llowed 
it have stressed that competition is a means of allocating re
sources. 
The fact that firms with a significant degree of market power 
may be 
~le to increase price and/or lower output below that which is
 optimal 
from society's viewpoint implies that anti-competitive behavio
ur (in a 
legal sense) involves actions and outcomes which hi
nder the 
achievement of an efficient allocation of resources-
It is the writer's view that in the area of exclusive 
dealing the 
objective 
provisions 
of promoting competition is achieved by the existi
ng 
of the Commerce Act 1986 while stil
l effectively 
regulating exclusive dealing practice. 
,, 
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As the paper details, competition law, particularly in the area of 
exclusive dealing involves a variety of disciplines, therefore it was 
suggested that some indication be made of the author's qualifications 
in any of the areas concerned. 
Law: 
Marketing: 
Economics: 
Finishing the requirements for an Honours degree in Law 
with this paper-
Completing a 
Administration 
Administration-
Bachelors Degree in Commerce and 
in June 1989 
The focus 
majoring 
of courses 
in Business 
has been on 
marketing and management studies-
Acceptance to interview stage for Pembroke College 
Oxford in Philosophy, Politics and Economics (PPE). 
However New Zealand qualifications are not extensive 
with courses only to 200 level at Victoria University-
The writer has an interest in the "Contractual 
Analysis" of economic problems which ties in nicely 
with the framework in the Law of Contracts. Studies in 
this area proved particularly useful in compiling this 
paper. 
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FOOTNOTES 
Based on information supplied by Richar
d Fletcher of the Commerce 
Commission, exclusive dealing and fran
chise arrangements involve 
approximately 20% of registered New 
Zealand companies (private 
and public). However, their indirect e
ffect is much wider-
Application by Fisher & Paykel Dra
ft Determination 
Commerce Commission, 13 July 1988. 
of the 
This was Clause 5 of Fisher and Payk
el Ltds's ("F,iP") standard 
form franchising agreement. 
The final determination will follow the
 conference that was held 
on 30 August 1988- At the time of co
mpiling this paper a final 
determination was not available-
In this paper "competition law", 
trade practices" will be used 
purposes the terms are identical. 
W Pengilley "New Zealand Commerce 
on commercial conduct in the 
(1986) NZLJ III at P· 117 
"antitrust" and "restrictive 
interchangeably; for practical 
Legislation: the likely impact 
light of Australian experience" 
s47 Trade Practices Act 1974; see also 
SECTION 5: OTHER JURIS-
DICTIONS in this paper. 
a. Those with an extensive knowledge of the Co
mmerce Act and its 
background may wish to merely skim this
 section-
9. For instance, the Monopoly Preventi
on Act 1908 and the Commercial 
Trusts Act 1910 - the latter being base
d on the Sherman Antitrust 
Act 1890 in the USA. 
10. Res tri et i ve Trade Practices Act 195
6-
11. See Collinge, The Law Relating to 
Restrictive Trade Practices & 
Monopolies, Mergers and Takeovers i
n New Zealand (2nd ed.) 
Butterworths, Wellington, 1982-
12. See later discussion on this concep
t later in this paper. 
13. Supra n-2· 
14. Othe practices could be added under 
s23(1). 
15. See Vautier K- "Competition Policy 
and Competition Law in New 
Zealand", in A Bollard and RA Buckle, 
Economic Liberalisation in 
New Zealand, Allen & Unwin, 1987, p-59.
 
16. Historically, this can also be se
en as parallelling the move 
(particularly in recent times} from l
egislation consistent with 
that of the UK to that more in line wit
h Australia. 
17. This has itself caused 
and practically. See, 
1986: some theoretical 
problems in the administrative law ar
ea 
for example, L. Stevens, "The Commerce Ac
t 
and practical observations''. (1986)NZ
LJ 
•I 
tS· 
t9· 
197 at 202-
Supra n-6, slll(l) 
Supra n • 15, p • 46 
20
, See also SECTION 6 : ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE in this paper. 
21· 
see John Co 11 i nge, "Fi r·st Steps Under the Commerce Act 1986", at 
13 , an address given at a seminar at the Beehive on 26 March 
introducing the new Act; and Department of Trade and Industry 
"Competition Policy and the Government's Legislative Proposals in 
the Commerce Bill" (1985, Wellington). 
22, See J Land, "Monopolisation: The practical 
implications of 
section 36 of the Commerce Act 1986'' 1988 18 VUWLR pp-53-54 
23 · See later discussion in SECTION 6 : ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE in this 
paper-
~ . See for instance supra n-4 at p-112-
~ - The exceptions are those which breach s36. 
~ - See also Yvonne Van 
Laws (1987) Commerce 
following-
Roy, Guidebook to New Zealand Competition 
Clearing House, New Zealand, p-2 and 
27, See Collinge, supra n-21 at p-18-
28, There are many examples from Australia's development. Notably 
competition legislation is labelled as "too blunt" or "in-
sensitive'' as was stated in a letter to the Australian Prime 
Minister in June 1980 from the Australian Council of professions-
29 , See The Dominion, 10 October 1985. 
30. Ibid 
31. National Business Review, 21 October 1985-
32 , Rob Cameron in NBR, 14 October 1 ·~35. 
33 • NBR , 18 Ju 1 y 1 986 • 
~ - Input suppliers are those organisations which supply all the 
components and/or raw materials required for the manufacture of 
35. 
the final product-
In this paper the practice adopted as 
arbitrarily mix the use of "he" and 
clumsy "he or she" conjunction and it is 
way of provoking thought in this area-
to gender will be to 
"she". This avoids the 
hoped is a more sensible 
36 . See H- p. Marvel, 
om i c s, 25, p. 1 
"Exclusive Dealing" Journal of Law and Econ-
37 . Richard v Golden Fleece Petroleum Ltd (1983) ATPR 40, 392 at 40, 
'' 
~I'· 
.)0' 
40 • 
41 • 
596 
However agency may exist 
terms of the franchise. 
in some situations depending on the 
See also Martin 
for International 
Mendelson, "international Franchising", 
Franchising Conference (1984). 
Paper 
Franchises which involve intellectual property r·ights.may be 
protected under s45 of the C~mmerce Act. However, the subJec~ 1s 
quite complex and tangential to the focus of this paper. 
Further, there is some suggestion that the present review of the 
Commerce Act will recommend the abolition of this intellectual 
property protection because of its abuse. Therefore, this paper 
will not deal with this area. 
For instance The 
initially a group 
operate together 
and prices-
Four Square Co-operative Grocery chain was 
of independent grocery stores who chose to 
under the same name and using similar systems 
42. Harkins, "Tying and the Franchise" (1979) 47 Anti Trust L J 903 
at 904° 
~- Similarly, it is also conceivable that exclusive dealing arrange-
ments may exist outside the context of a franchise-
44. See SECTION 6 : AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE later in this paper. 
45. Supra, n • 5 
46. For the precise wording of the sections see Appendix One where 
these sections and other relevant portions of the Act are 
reproduced-
47. Sections 27 and 28, unlike s36, are authorisable. 
48. See for instance J F Northey Cheshire & Fifoot's Law of Contract, 
6 ed Butterworths, Wellington, 1984-
4 9 • [ 1 961 ] NZ L R 1121 
50. See Re New Zealand Master Grocers Assoc. [1961JNZLR 177 and The 
New Zealand Council of Registered Hairdresser [1961JNZLR 161, 
51. (1963-1964)LR 4 RP 116 at P· 154 
52. The earlier test was propounded by Cross J for a fuller 
53. 
54. 
55. 
analysis of both cases see particularly supra, n-11 at pp-152-154 
G Q Taperell 
Protection (3rd 
See also supra, 
Supra, n-50 
Supra, n-51 
& R B Vermeesch Trade Practices and Consumer 
ed-), 1983, Butterworths! Sydney, p-201, para 523 
n-5 
Idem 
Note that this is also relevant in authorisation 
and 61)• 
This was adopted from the US Clayton Act 1914 s7. 
decisions (ss58 
Tillmanns Butcheries Pty Ltd v Australasian Meat Industry Employ-
ees Union (1979) ATPR 40-138. 
From the Radio 2UE Sydney pty Ltd v Stereo FM Pty Ltd (1982) ATPR 
46, 912 which is of virtually no use on this point. 
61. BG Donald and J D Hey
don, Trade Practices law (1978) Vol 1, P· 
91; 
~- For a useful collection of the relevant Australian case law which 
is particularly useful for examining the fundamental terms, see 
Russell and Miller Annotated Trade Practices Act, 7 ed, Sydney, 
1986; and the Dandy Power Equipment Case (1982) ATPR 40, 315 at 
pp 43, 887 - 43, 888. 
~. Decision number 205 of the Commerce Commission, 22 July 1987. 
~- Decision no. 84 of the Commerce Commission, 21 June 1984-
65· Queensland Co-operative Milling Assoc v Defiance Holdings Ltd 
(1976) ATPR 40-012 at P• 17, 246° 
66° 
67-
68-
69. 
70. 
71. 
Ibid p-17,247 
Idem 
Supra, n-63 
Ibid, p-17 
Idem 
The comparative 
this paper-
JURISDICTIONS 
case material, 
merits of the Australian approach are central to 
These are discussed in SECTION 5 : OTHER 
later in this paper; see also the collection of 
supra n-62-
72. Commerce Act 1986 s3(5) 
73. This gives legislative sanction to the Commerce Commission's 
decision in the Visionhire Holdings Case [1984]NZAR 288. In that 
case the Commission gave primacy to ''effective competition" and 
choosing from the statutory objectives listed in s2A of the 1975 
Act. 
74. This will be briefly examined in SECTION 6-
75. See SECTION 6; see also Ransom & Pengilley infra n-134 where they 
reproduce Nienwehuysen "The Theory of Competition'' (1976)- This 
article comments that at least 18 writers have proposed criteria 
for workable competition. 
Supra, n-61, p-90 
76· 
77 • 
Similar comments were made in The Report of the Attorney Generals 
National Committee to Study Antitrust Laws, (1955), Ch 7. 
79· 
SO • 
81 • 
Supra, n-61 
Supra, n • 75 
Supra, n-21 at p-12 
Idem 
82· [1985]2 NZLR 338 at P· 348; (1985)1 NZBLC 
102, 262 at p 102, 271-
Also see y. van Roy supra, n-26 PP· 57 - 59-
93 . Supra, n-65 
M· Visionhire Holdings Ltd v Sanyo Rentals Ltd (1984] 4 NZAR 292 
85· Supra, n-65 at p-17,223 
86- The term "contestable market" 
describe a market structure where 
too great to dissuade entrants. 
in QCMA will be relevant-
at this stage will be used to 
particular entry costs are not 
Thus the five factors outlined 
87, See cases referred to in supra, n -22 
88 , Supra, n-63 
89. Supra, n-84 
90 • I b i d , p • 1 9 
91, Proposal by News Ltd ( 1986) 6 NZAR 47. 
92 , US v Dupont (1957) 353 US 586-
93 . This definition comes from the Edmonds Food/Tucker case-
decision 84, Commerce Commission, 21 June 1984, at pp 4 and 5. 
94. Supra, n-65 at p-17,247 
95. Supra, n-64 
%. Re The Proposed Takeover by L D Nathan & Co Ltd of McKenzies (NZ) 
Ltd (1981) 2 NZAR 321, para- 120, 
97. Supra, n-51 
98 . But see: Lion/Superliquorman (1985)5 NZAR 92; and Central Feed 
Mills Ltd/Sandy Lodge Ltd Decision No, 131, Commerce Commission, 
12 June 1985-
99 , [1985JBCL 1250 
100• 
101 · 
102 . 
103-
104-
Re Continental Can Co. Inc [1972] CMLR D11, P· D27 
and see also the case of Akzo Chemie (1986)14 Int Bus Lawyer, No 
3 at 47-
For the purposes of sections 36, 66 and 67 of this Act, a 
dominant position in a market is one in which a person as a 
supplier- or an acquirer of goods or services either alone or 
together with any inter-connected body corporate is in a position 
to exercise a dominant influence over the production, acquisi-
tion, supply, or price of goods or services in that market and 
for the purposes of determining whether a person is in a position 
to exercise a dominant influence over the production, acquisi-
tion, supply, or price of goods or services in a market regard 
shall be had to-
Note 
under 
(a) The share of the market, the technical knowledge, the 
access to materials or capital of that person or that 
person together with any interconnected body corporate: 
(b) The extent to which that person is constrained by the 
conduct of competitors in that market: 
(c) The extent to which that person is constrained by the 
conduct of suppliers or acquirers of goods or services 
in that market-
that the full s36 test will be discussed in more detail 
SECTION 4. 
Supra, n-91 
Idem 
TPC V Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd (1978) 
ATPR 40-071; 20 ALR 31 
105- Idem at pp 17, 717 et seq : Reference is made to Re Continental 
Can Company Incorporated (197~)_ CMLR Dll; United Brands Co v 
Commission of European Commun1t1es (1978); and Akzo Chemie (1986) 
14 Int Bus Lawyer, No 3 at 47 
106. US v Aluminium Co- of America 148 F 2d 416-
0THER JURISDICTIONS in this paper-
107. Supra, n-2 
108. Supra, n-15 
109 . Supra , n . 2 
110. Supra, n-5 
See also SECTION 4: 
111. This report formed the basis for the section 47 provisions in the 
Trade Practices Act 1974• 
112. Supra, n-53 
7 see supra, n-5; c.f. B M Hill and M R Jones 
"New 
11-> • etition" (1986) NZLJ 190 at 192-
114. Supra, n-5, p-117 
115 • Supra, n-1
13 
Pules on Comp-
116, 8 De
cember 1986, H.c., Auckland, Barker- J (CP 1435/8
6) 
ll 7 · s2(5) (b) Commerce Act 1986 
l18· Supra, n-22; and J Land "Monopolisation
 : Section 36 of the 
Commerce Act 1986" LLM Research Paper, VUW, Sept
ember 1986 
119· Idem 
120· See the comments of the US Court of Appe
als in Ball Memorial 
Hospital Inc v Mutual Hospital Insurance Inc 78
4 F-2D 1325, 1338 
( 1986) 
121· Marginal cost relates to the incremental i
ncrease in costs of 
producing one more unit of output. For a clos
er examination of 
the relevance of this concept, see SECTION 6-
122· (1986) 6 NZAR 278 
123. f.g. Coercive price leadership; and tie arr
angements; see Berkey 
Photo Inc v Eastman Kodak Co 603 F-2D 263 (1979)
 at 275-276 
124· Supra, n-22 at p-53; see also supra, n-118 
125. Supra, n-122 at P• 
126, Unreported, Auckland Registry, CP 1373/86 
127. Information supplied by Richard Fletcher in
 interview- Further, 
note that exclusive dealing is not covered by an
y of the pamphlet 
material provided by the Commerce Commission w
hich also reflects 
the unclear status that this practice has at 
present under the 
Act. 
128. Unreported CP 1502/86 
129, This developed from Continental TV v GT
E Sylvania, 433 US 36 
(1977) 
130. Up until the 1974 Trade Practices Act Austr
alian legislation and 
decisions tended to follow the UK's "case b
y case" pragmatic 
assessment of trade practices. 
131. This view was echoed in comments by Rich
ard Fletcher of the 
Commerce Commission• 
132. For a full discussion of s47 of The Trade
 Practices Act see: W 
Pengilley, "Exclusive Dealing Under the Ti-ad
e Practices Act" 
[1975] 3 ABLR 174; or Infra n-134; or RV 
Miller, Annotated 
Australian Trade Practices Act (1985) 6 ed. 
133· TPC V 
Tooth & Co (1980) ATPR 40-127, at P· 18, 366 -
134 • A A 
Ransom & w J Pengilley, Restrictive Trade Practices : 
.[!_td•;rments 2 Materials and Polic::t:, Legal Books, Sydney, 1985-
135 • It, i d at p • 7 4 9 
136.
 Ibid at p-614 et seq. particularly for their "map" for defeating 
the maze of s47-
137. Much amendment to 11 owed the Swanson Committee Report. 
138• (1986) TPC 242 at 261 
139· On this point see supra, 
c:-~ TI•-•~:::., Ch-7 at p-343 et seq 
140· Instances of exclusive dealing involving discounts or offers of 
discounts are provided by: Cool and Sons v O'Brien Glass (1981) 6 
TPC 816; and Victorian Egg Marketing Board v Parkwood Eggs (1978) 
4 TPC 124 
141 • See s47 Trade Practices Act (Aust) 1974-
142. Supra, n • 53 at p • 355 
143· Swanson Committee Report, para 4-108 
144· Note that "condition" is defined widely in s47(13)(a) 
145. Supra, n-53 at p-356 
146. In the Commerce Act 1986 this "common good" has been defined by 
the legislature as the promotion (of consumer welfare) through 
competition-
147. e.g: Top Performance Motors v Ira Berk (1975) 5 ALR 465; 
Tavernstock Pty Ltd v John Walker and Sons (1980) ATPR 40-184; 
Toohey's Ltd 2 Tooth & Co Ltd (1974-5] ATPR (Comm) 8, 708 
148. Note that under the Trade Practices Act 1974 there are two bodies 
involved in trade practices regulation: the Trade Practices 
Tribunal and the Commission-
149. See particularly supra, n. 53; see al so Horman, I G "Competitive 
Impact of Exclusive Dealing in Australian Motor Spirits Markets" 
(1979) ABLR, pp-3-33; and Donald and Heydon, Trade Practices Law 
vols I and II and Supplement, 1982, The Law Book Company Ltd, 
Sydney 
150. Supra, n-147 
151. Shell Company of Australia [1974-5] ATPR (Comm) s, 621 
152. Ibid 
153. [1975-6] ATPR (Com) 16, 701; see also Harmon, supra n-149 
l54. See paras- 47(13)(b) & (c) 
155
• For instance the TPC saw four barriers to entry as relevant, yet 
none of them relate to exclusive dealing practices- See for 
example supra n-149-
156· Idem 
157 • 337 us, 293 (1':149) 
158· Sup1--a, n -147 
159· Supra, n-149, Vol- I 
160· Supra, n-151 
161· I G Hor·man, "The Competitive Impact of Exclusive Dealing in 
Australian Motor Spirits Markets" ABLR 1979, pl, 33 
162· See supra n • 149 and supra n. 62 
163· Supra n -151 
lt,4· Shell Coy of Australia Ltd [1976-77] ATPR (Com) 15, 568 
165· See idem and Total Australia Ltd ATPR (Com) 15, 680 
166· Supra n. 164 
167, Ampol Petroleum Ltd [1976-77] ATPR (Com) 15, 644 
168- Supra n-147 
169. For a mor·e detailed analysis, see supra n-149, Vol- I p-312 
170. Idem 
171. Supra n. 145 
172. See Top Pert orman ce Motors, supra n. 147; and J Ah Toy Pty Ltd v 
Theiss Pty Ltd (1980) ATPR 40-155 
173. See for instance Walker's comments in 50 ALJ 89 
174. Smellie J in Trutone v Festival Records, Unreported, Auckland 
Registry 17 February 1988 (CL 31/87) 
175. I Eagles, "Franchising and the Commerce Act 1986 (I) and (II)" 
(1986) NZLJ at P· 351 (I) 
176. Idem 
177. Supra n-147 
178. Idem 
179. Supra n -175 
180. E.g. Stephens J in supra n .133 
181 . Th e s e ca
se s in c 1 u de d Bond & Bond s up r a n • 122 • Th i s i s t he O n I y 
New Zealand court case to expressly deal with exclusive dealing. 
182 • Supra n • 126 
193. E •
 g. : Barker J ibid at p • 56 
Vertical practices refer to those 
than one functional market. (c.f. 
previously). Vertical practices 
and/or franchising. 
195. Supra n • 75 
which have effect over more 
horizontal practices discussed 
may include exclusive dealing 
1%· Standard Fashion v Magrane - Houston Co., 258, US, 346 (1922) 
187. Supra n • 36 pp • 1-6 
188· Standard Oil Co v United States, 337, US, 293 ( 1949) 
189· For more analysis of exclusive dealing factors which effect 
competitive see SECTION 6-
190- Tampa Electric Company v Nashville Coal Company, 
(1961) 
365 us 320 
191• Federal Trade Commission v Brown Shoe Company, 384 US 316 (1966) 
192- See, for example, Satellite Television and Associated Resources 
Inc v Continental Cablevision of Virginia Inc, 714, F-2d 351 
(1983), where the Court engaged in a detailed economic analysis 
of the cable television market and concluded that the use of 
exclusive contracts increased competition between cable tele-
vision suppliers-
193. Posner & Esterbrook, Antitrust Cases, Economic Notes and Other 
Materials, 2d ed., 1981, West Publishing Co; and Neale, The 
Antitrust Laws of the USA, 3d ed., 1981, Cambridge University 
Press 
194. Supra n-129 
195. United States v Arnold Schwin and Company, 388 US 365 (1967). 
196. Supra n-95 at P· 55 
197. When exclusive dealing is used without exclusive territories, 
inter-retailer or intrabrand competition is not lessened- It may 
appear, at first glance, that interbrand competition is reduced 
since competing products are not sold side-by-side in the same 
store. However, depending on the good or service, consumers 
commonly shop from store to store- In any event, closer exam-
ination of exclusive dealing, as discussed in Section 6 below, 
indicates that it also works to increase interbrand competition. 
198. Joseph C Gallo, Joseph L Craycraft, and Stephen C Bush, "An 
Empirical Study of Federal Antitrust Enforcement for the Period 
1963-1984," Review of Industrial 
106-130-
Organisation, 2, 2 (1985), PP· 
1
99. United States Department 
lines, January 23, 1985-
of Justice, Vertical Restraint Guide-
Ib id at P· 7 200-
201 • I b i ct at p • 30 
202- Supra n-91 
203· Commerce Commission Decision No- 182, 25 November, 1986 
204· Supra n • 199 at P • 35-36. 
205· E • g. supr·a n -193 
206· For a general discussion 
period, see supra n-193; 
Law (1978), Little Brown & 
of the cases and development of this 
and also Areeda and Turner, Antitrust 
Co, vo 1. I I I 
207 • For example see J S McGee & C R Bassett, "Vertical Integi-at ion 
Revisited" (1976) Journal of Law and Economics, 17, PP· 17-38-
208- Idem 
W9 - Monopsony refers to monopoly control by a single purchaser in the 
market-
210. For a general discussion of restrictions, though 
see C D Edwards, Maintaining Competition : 
Government Policy, McGraw Hill, NY, 1949-
somewhat dated, 
Requisites of A 
211. Vertical integration refers to the undertaking by a single firm 
of successive stages in the production process of a particular 
good: e.g. major oil companies are vertically integrated- They 
undertake the exploration, drilling, extraction, transport, 
refining, distribution and sales of petroleum products-
212 . Supra n-210 at P· 19 
213 . Supra n .21 
214. The degree to which oligopoly will 
distortions' (relative to perfect 
degree of joint profit maximisation-
produce the same 'market 
competition) depends on the 
215. Property Rights will be used here to refer to those rights to use 
and receive the income from resources and assets-
216 . Note particularly that by H-P- Marvel supra n-36 at p-2 et seq 
217 . For example FM Schezer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic 
Performance, 1980-
218. See L E Pr·eston, "Restri et i ve Dis tr·ibut ion Arrang
ements 
Economic Analysis and Public Policy Standards"
, 30 L & Contemp. 
Prob 500 (1965) 
219 . Supra n-36 
at PP· 3-4 
220· Ibid 
221 • Supr·a n
 -199 
222· Supra n-2 a
t p-27 
223· Supra n-91 
n a. Un r eported, Auckland, M600/85 at p.14. See particularly comments 
received from Robert Crandall, a US economist. 
ns. These will be discussed below in SECTION D: EXCLUSIVE DEALING 
REDUCING THE ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS. 
n 6• Belton Electronics Corporation 100 FTC 68 (19
82) Roland Machinery 
v Dresser Industries 749 F 2nd 380 (1984) Sumeye
r v Cola Company 
5 15 F 2nd 835 (1975) 
227 • Roland Machinery v Dresser Industries 749 F 
2nd 380 (1984) 
228 - By Mar-vel, supra n-36 and J S Chard, 
"Economic Effects of 
Exclusive Purchasing Agreements in the Distribu
tion of Goods in 
Pellegrin, Luca and Srinigs'', RK Marketing Chann
els Relationships 
and Performance, 1986, Lexington. 
229. Supra n. 2 
230 . Supra n. 227 
231- Joyce Beverages v Royal Crown Cola Com
pany, 555 F-Supp. 271 
(1983). 
232. Sulmeyer v Cola Company, 515 F-2d 835, 840 n
-2 (1975). 
233 . B Klein, R G Crawford, A A Ar-men, "Verti
cal Integration, Ap-
propriate Rents,and the Competitive Contracting P
rocess'', (1978), 
Journal of Law and Economics, 21, P· 326 
234. Supra n-91 and supra n-224 
235 . Supra n. 2 
236. Supra n-228 
237. "Salvage values'' refer to those costs which
 are not retrievable 
by an organisation on exiting an industry. P
articularly this 
would include costs of selling assets and inve
ntory. If the 
value of such assets is low (low salvage 
value) then the 
incen tive to protect such an investment by a vert
ical integration 
(or EDAs) increases- Thi s situation may also be 
described by the 
"sunk costs" involved- This refers to t hose cost
s invested which 
cannot be retrieved on exit and are therefor-e "su
~k". 
"Internalising" of costs in this context refers to the process by 
which an organisation converts external costs (such as those 
involved in delayed payments, loss of bargaining power and 
customer dissatisfaction) to costs internal to the organisation. 
This would usually occur through acquisition of another 
independent organisation. 
See for example the General Motors and Fisher Body agreement 
referred to by Chard supra n-228 at p. 309. For a fuller list of 
specific pro-competitive factors see supra n-133 at pp. 750-752. 
240. Supra n-126; and also see
 supra n-134 at p-985 r·e 
Bankcard case-
241. Supra n • 19''3 
242· Idem 
243. See for example supra n-2 at p-7-16 
244- Supra n-199 
the Australian 
245. I.e. "Foreclosing inputs or distribution facilities would present 
no problem to a firm seeking to expand in or enter into the 
output market if it could easily enter into the foreclosed market 
itself or count on entry by other firms in response to the 
increased demand for input production or distribution facil-
ities." Vertical Guidelines, 1985, P· 20 
246- Ver·tical Guidelines, 1985, P· 35 
247. I.e. "large supp 1 i ers' ex c 1 us i ve dealing arrangements that ar·e 
limited to a one-year term and that do not penalise dealers that 
subsequently switch suppliers are unlikely to exclude new 
suppliers from the market'' Vertical Guidelines, 1985, PP· 35-36. 
Note also the statement by Richard Posner: "If the contract is 
terminable on short notice ..• the exclusionary effect will 
normally be zero, since the distributor is free to take on anew 
supplier at any time." from R A Posner, Antitrust Law, An 
Economic Perspective, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1976, 
P· 201. 
248. See that described in SECTION of this paper; also see 
discussions supra n-206 
249. F 1 etcher Metals 
NZAR 33. 
v Commerce Commission (1986) ~ NZCLC 99, 680; 6 
250. E.g. supra n-2 at p-27 
251. Supra n. 2 para. 5. See also Appendix III-
252 • I b i d p • 5-7 
253. Supra n. ·~6 
254. Note that previously Prestcold products were subject 
between McAlpine (purchased by Ceramco) and its dealers. 
to EDAs 
Supra n-2 p-9 
Ibid p-10 et seq 
Whitegoods in this section will refer to refrigerators freezers ' ' washing machines, clothes dryers and dishwashers. Estimates of 
total market share for all goods are on a weighted average basis. 
See also Appendix III of the Draft Determination supra n-2· 
~8 · This material is provided in detail in the Draft Determination 
p -16, para 73 et seq and in Appendix VIII of that document-
~ 9. This has since been extended with F&P acquiring further outlets 
through merger and takeover activity e.g. Irvin and Stern-
260· Supra n-2 p-18 
261. lb id 
%2 · Fisher and Paykel's production volumes are as great as those of 
any of the plants of its major Austral i an competitors: 
Hoover/Phillips and Email/Simpson-
263, Supra n -122 
264 . Supra n • 2, p • 20 
265 - Ibid, p-22 para 103 
266 , Supra n-59- This view is also 
Meats, Decision no-205, supra n-63 
followed in Whakatu/Advanced 
26 7. Th i s in f ere n c e 
case by Bal"'ker 
NBR 18 July 
referred to by 
is drawn from the letters cited in the Bond & Bond 
J; and from the statement by F&P reported in the 
1986- (This statement, though hearsay, was also 
Barker J in the Bond & Bond case-) 
268. Supra n-65 
269 . Supra n-62 
270. S~Jpra n-2, p-25, para 110 
271. Supra n-2 para 111 
272 . Ibid p-25-26 
273 . Supra n -190 
274 . Supr·a n-2, p-25, para 113 
275 . Supra n-199 
276 . Supra n-2, p-27, para- 118 
277. Note that some further evaluation of these factors will occur in 
the following section on a marketing analysis-
VB· Supra n-2, p-27, para 120 
V9· Ibid, para 120 
~O· See particularly cases referred to at supra n-2, p-28, para 120. 
zSl• (1977) ATPR 40-043 
~ 2 · See Appendix VI of the Draft Determination-
283 · (1981) ATPR 40-200 
284· Supra n-2, para 131 
285· Commerce Commission Decision No- 204 2 July 1987 
286· Supra n-2·, particularly para 135 
287· Ibid, p-33, para 144 
288 · Supr·a n-122 
289- Supra n-2, para 145 
290- Ibid para 148- This conclusion was based in 
definition of "substantial" in the Dandy Power case, 
291 - (1981) ATPR 42-807 
292- Supra n-2, p-37, para 152 
293 - See earlier 
Determination-
discussion 
294 - Supra n-2, para 156 
and Appendix VI of 
part on the 
supra n-62 
the Draft 
295 - One benefit wh i eh may not arise is the prate et ion of manufactur·er 
promotional investments from "free-riding"• However the extent 
to which this is a benefit depends on the facts of each 
situation- (See earlier discussion) 
296 . Supra n-2, para 158 
297. Ibid p-39 para 159 
298 . [.g. Whakatu/Advanced Meats supra n-63 
299. Supra n-2, p-40, para 161 
300 . Ibid para 162 
301. Ibid, para 163 
302 . Ibid, p-40, para 163 
303 . Although the writer did not attend the conference, much of the 
information was made available through the Commerce Commission-
304- Supra n-22 at p-75 
305- Supra n-2 
306- Higher Order Goods - these are typically complex and high cost 
items which require more dealer/manufacturer assistance, both in 
terms of after-sales service and information at the time of 
purchase. The potential for free-riding is increased with higher 
order goods- Examples of such goods include larger whiteware 
items, stereo and TV equipment and cars. 
307- This model is adapted from that 
Competitive Forces Shape Strategy", 
April 1979. 
308- Supra n-2 
out Ii ned in M Porter·, "How 
Harvard Business Review, Mar-
309- And one which arguably F&P's EDAs seriously limit. 
310- See discussion in previous section. 
311- See supra n-2 Appendix III, Schedule 4 for an indication of the 
businesses of Fisher and Pay kel dealers. 
312 - S upra n-2, p- 2 7 - 39 
313- Supra n-2, para. 45 
314- I.e. High sun k costs wh i ch result in a low salvage value . 
315. Supra n-22 at p-53-54 
316. See supra n-134, Ch. 6, 
317. Supra n-22 
318. Supr·a n. 2 
319. See the comments of Barker Jin supra n-126, p-56 
320. For an excellent review of the pro- and anti-competitive effects 
of franchising and the likely implications of the Commerce Act 
1986 see I Eagles, "Franchising and the Commerce Act(I)" (1986) 
NZLJ 349 
321. Supra n-122 
322. Note: The requirements provided in this section of the paper only 
constitute pa r t of the section s concerned. 
323 . Supra n -1 22 a t p- 286 
324. Supra n-65 
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granted, or conferred in trade; and, without limiting 
the generality of the foregoing, also includes the rights, 
benefits, privileges, or facilities that are or are to be 
provided, granted, or conferred under any of the 
following classes of contract: 
(a) A contract for, or in relation to,-
(i) The performance of work (including work of a 
professional nature), whether with or 
without the supply of goods; or 
(ii) The provision of, or the use or enjoyment of 
facilities for, accommodation, amusement, 
the care of persons or animals or things, 
entertainment, instruction, parking, or 
recreation; or 
(iii) The conferring of rights, benefits, or privileges 
for which remuneration is payable in the 
form of a royalty, tribute, levy, or similar 
exaction: 
(b) A contract of insurance, including life assurance, 
and life reassurance: 
(c) A contract between a bank and a customer of 
the bank: -
(d) Any contract for or in relation to the lending of 
money or granting of credit, or the making of 
arrangements for the lending of money or granting 
of credit, or the buying or discounting of a credit 
instrument, or the acceptance of deposits;-
but does not include rights or benefits in the form of 
the supply of goods or the performance of work under 
a contract of service: 
"Substantial", means real or of substance: 
"Supply",-
(a) In relation to goods, includes supply (or resupply) 
by . way of gift, sale, exchange, lease, hire, or hire 
purchase; and 
(b) In relation to services, includes provide, grant, 
or confer;-
and "supply" as a noun, "supplied", and "supplier" 
have corresponding meanings: 
"Trade" means any trade, business, industry, profession, 
occupation, activity of commerce, or undertaking 
relating to the supply or acquisition of goods or 
services or to the disposition or acquisition of any 
interest in land: 
( ; 
I 0 
I 
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"Working day" means any day of the week other than-
(a) Saturday, Sunday, Good Friday, Easter Monday, 
Anzac Day, Labour Day, the Sovereign's birthday, and 
Waitangi Day; and 
(b) A day in the period commencing with the 25th 
day of December in any year and ending with the 
15th day of January in the following year. 
(2) In this Act,-
(a) A reference to engaging in conduct shall be read as a 
reference to doing or refusing to do any act, 
· including-
(i) The entering into, or the giving effect to a 
provision of, a contract or arrangement; or 
(ii) The arriving at, or the giving effect to a provision 
of, an understanding; or 
(iii) The requiring of the giving of, or the giving of, 
a covenant: 
(b) A reference to conduct, when that expression is used as 
a noun othenvise than as mentioned in paragraph 
(a) of this subsection, shall be read as a reference to 
the doing of, or the refusing to do, any act, 
including-
(i) The entering into, or the giving effect to a 
provision of, a contract or arrangement; or 
(ii) The arriving at, or the giving effect to a provision 
of, an understanding; or 
(iii) The requiring of the giving of, or the giving of, 
a covenant: 
(c) A reference to refusing to do an act includes a reference 
to-
(i) Refraining (otherwise than inadvertently) from 
doing that act; or 
(ii) Making it known that that act will not be done: 
(d) A reference to a person offering to do an act, or to do 
an act on a particular condition, includes a reference 
to the person making it known that the person will 
accept applications, offers, or proposals for the person 
to do that act or to do that act on that condition, as 
the case may be. 
(3) Where any provision of this Act is expressed to render 
a provision of a contract or a covenant unenforceable if the 
provision of the contract or the covenant has or is likely to 
have a particular effect, that provision of this Act applies in 
relation to the provision of the contract or the covenant at 
any time when the provision of the contract or the covenant 
has or is likely to have that effect, notwithstanding that-
\· 
\ 
' 
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Cf. 1975, No. 113, ss. 2(1), 67A(3); 1976, No. 67, SS. 22, 
23(3); 1979, No. 140, s. 2; 1983, No. 144, s. 26; Trade 
Practices Act 1974 (Aust.), ss. 4, 4c, 4F, 4H 
3. Certain" terms defined in relation to competition-
(1) In this Act-
·"Competition", ~@ans workable or effective competition: 
"Market", meansamarket for goods or services within 
New Zealand that may be distinguished as a matter 
of fact and commercial common sense. 
(2) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, 
referen~~_Lto t~~J~~ing _oJ c:_ompetit.ion include referer~ces 
to the hindering_q_£__P.reventi!!_g__~f ~ompetition. 
(3) For the purposes of. this Act, the effect on competition 
in a market shall be determined by reference to all factors that-
affect competition in that market including competition from , 
goods or services supplied or likely to be supplied by persons· 
not resident or not carrying on business in New Zealand. 
·t4/ 111 secuons 'l.7 and 28 of this Act, a reference to a market 
in relation to the purpose or effect in respect of competition 
of a provision of a contract, arrangement, or understanding, 
or of a covenant, or of conduct, shall be read as including a 
reference to-
(a) A market in which a person who is a party to the contract, 
arrangement, or understanding, or any inter· 
connected body corporate, or, as the case may be, 
the person or any associated person (within the 
meaning of section 28 (7) of this Act) who requires 
the giving of, or gives the covenant, supplies or 
acquires or is likely to supply or acquire, or would, 
but for that provision, covenant, or conduct, supply 
or acquire or be likely to supply or acquire goods or 
services; and 
(b) Any other market in which those goods or services may 
be supplied or acquired. 
(5) For the purposes of section 27 of this Act, a provision of 
a contract, arrangement, or understanding shall be deemed to 
have or to be likely to have the effect of substantially lessening 
competition in a market if that provision and-
(a) The other provisions of that contract, arrangement, or 
understanding; or 
(b) The provisions of any other contract, arrangement, or 
understanding to which that person or any 
interconnected body corporate is a party-
® 
A 
\I 
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taken.-1.oge.ther,..__.haye_or are_!i_1'.ely~o _have_ the_ effect of 
substan.i.iallr- lessening competition in tha~_!12'.1rket. 
(6) For the purposes of section 28 of this Act, a covenant 
shall be deemed to have or to be likely to have the effect of 
substantially lessening competition in a market if-
(a) That covenant; and 
(b) Any other covenant to the benefit of which that person 
or an associated person (within the meaning of section 
28 (7) of this Act) is entitled or would be entitled if 
the covenant were enforceable-
taken together, have or are likely to have the effect of 
substantially lessening competit.ion in that market. 
(7) For the purposes of sections 27 and 28 of this Act, the 
engaging in conduct shall be deemed to have or to be likely 
to have the effect of substantially lessening competition in a 
market if- · 
(a) The engaging in that conduct; and 
(b) The engaging by that person in conduct of the same or 
a similar kind-
taken together, have or are likely to have the effect of 
substantially lessening competition in ~ -at market. 
(8) For the purposes of sectioni-36, 66 and 67 of this Act, a 
dominant position in a market is 'one in which a person as a · 
supplier or an' acquirer· of goods or services either alone or 
together with any interconnected body corporate is in a 
position to exercise a dominant influence over the production, 
acquisition, supply, or price of goods or services in that market 
and for the purposes of determining whether a personj_s in a 
pos~~n to exerci~_ dominant influence over the psod_u_c.tion, 
acqu_1si.~on, supply, or pr_iq:....9lg9ods o~k.e.s....in..a_ma.cket 
n;g~rd shall be had_ to-
(a) TJ:ie share of the market, the technicai knowledge, the 
access to materials or capital of that person or that 
person together with any interconnected body 
corporate: 
(b) The extent to which that person is constrained by the 
conduu_of competitors or potential competitors in 
that market: · 
(c) The extent to which that person is constrained by the 
·~c_onduct of suppliers or acquirers of goods or services 
in that market. 
ln,~1 1• 
Cf. Trade P;act.ices Act 1974 (Aust.), ss. 4, 4E, 4c, 45 (3), 
(4), 45B (4), 46 
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PART II 
REsTRICTIVE TRADE PRACTICES 
Practices Substantially Lessening Competition 
21 
27. Contracts, arrangements, or understandings 
substantially lessening competition prohibited-(1) No 
person shall enter into a contract or arrangement, or arrive 
at an understanding, containing a provision that has the 
purpo~e, or has ~r. is l!kely to have the effect, of substantially 
l~,ssenmg_!=Og]pJ:t1t10n m a ruarh:t. 
· (2) No person shall give effect to a provision of a contract, 
arr~ge_ment, or understanding that. has · the pu!'P.os~,.~ has . 
or 1s likely to · have the ' effect,· of substantially lessening 
competition m a market. 
(3)-SUbsecuon (2)ofiliis-.section applies in respect of a contract 
or arrangement entered mto, or an understanding arriv,ed at, 
wh~ther before or after th!! commencement of this Act. 
(4) No provision of a conti-ac~l1ether:madebefor~ or after 
the _con:imencement of this Act, that has the purpose, or has 
or 1s l!~ely . to have th~ effect, of substantially lessening 
compet1t1on m a market 1s enforceabl-e.--- · 
Cf. Trade Practices Act l 9°74 (A~st.), s. 45 (1), (2) 
28 .. c.ovenants substanti_ally lessening competition 
proh1b1ted-(l) No person, either on his own or on behalf of 
an associated person, shall-
(a) Require the giving of a covenant; or 
(b) Give a covenant-
that has the purpose, or has or is likely to have the effect, of 
substantially lessening competition in a market. 
(2) No person, either on his own or on behalf of an associated 
person, shall c·arry out or enforce the terms of a covenant that 
has the .purpose, or has or is likely to have the effect, of 
substantially lessening competition in a market. · · 
. (3) Subsection (2) of this section applies to a covenant whether 
gwen before or after the commencement of this Act. 
(4) No covenant, whether given before or after the 
~ommencement of this Act, that has th_e purpose, or has or is 
likely to have the effect of substantially lessening competition 
in a market is enforceable. 
(5) No person shall-
(a) Threaten to engage in particular conduct if a person who, 
but for subsection (4) of this section, wou1d be bound 
by a covenant, does not comply with the terms of 
the covenant; or · 
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(b) In the case of a covenant to which section 28 of this Act 
applies, that the covenant is subject to the condition 
that it shall not have effect unless and until 
authorisation is granted to give effect to it and that 
application shall be made _for that authorisation 
· within 15 working days after the covenant is made. 
(3) Nothing in this section- , 
(a) Prevents the giving effect to a provision of a contract or 
an exclusionary provision, as the case may be, from 
constituting a contravention of section 2 7 or section 
29 of this Act, as the .case may be: 
(b) Prevents the giving effect to a covenant from constituting 
a contravention of section 28 of this Act. · . 
Cf. Trade Practices Act 1974 (Aust.), ss. 45 (9), 45n (8) 
Use of Dominant Position in a Market · 
36. Use of dominant position in a market-(1) No person 
who has a dominant position in ;i. market shall use that position 
for the. purpose,·of-
(a) Restricting the entry of any person into that or any other 
market; or 
(b) Preventing or deterring any person from engaging in 
competitive conduct in that or in any other market; 
or 
(c) Eliminating any person from that or any other market.\ 
(2) For the purposes of this section, a person does not us~ 
a dominant position in a market for any of the purposes 
specified in paragraphs (a) to (c) of subsection (1 ) of this section 
by reason only that that person enforces or seeks to enforce 
any right under or existing by virtue of any copyright, patent, 
protected plant variety, registered design or trade mark. 
(3) Nothing in this section applies to any practice or conduct 
to which this Part of this Act applies which has been authorised; 
pursuant to Part V of this Act: 
Cf. Trade Practices Act (Aust.), s. 4 6 
Resale Price 'Maintenance 
37. Resale price maintenance by suppliers rrohibited-
(1) No person shall engage in the practice o resale price 
maintenance. 
(2) For the ur oses of this section a erson en~ in the 
practi_ce _ o .. ~esa e pnce maintenance ~ t a t person (in this 
section referred to as the supplier) <4:>_c!i __ ~1_n~e acts referred 
to in subsection (3) o f this section. 
. , .... --r,,.. .. -
-';I . 
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PARTY 
AUTHORISATIONS AND CLEARANCES 
Restrictive Trade Practices 
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58. Commission may _ grant authorisation .. · for certain 
re~trictive tr~de practic'es_;_(l) Subject to the provisions of 
this Part of this Act, the Commission may, upon application 
by or on behalf of any person, grant an authorisation for that 
(a) To entec into a contract oc arrangement,' oc arrive at an (d) In the cm of an authorisation to carry out oc enfoccc 
pers_?~~-
, , undmtanding; to which ,.cction 2 7 of thi, Act applies, the terms of a covenant to which section 28 of this 
lb) To give df ect, to a pcovi,ion of a con,:act oc arrangement. Act a pp lies, nothing in that section ,hall pcevent any 
or understanding to which secuon ·. 27'-'of_ this ,.Act ( ,,f!'.!\ person from carrying out or enforcing the terms of ,applies• · .. ·· ... ·· ·" · · ' 'iJj/ the covenant in accocdance with the authorisation. 
(cl To requice the giving of,"octo give, a covenant ·to which (3) Every authorisation gcanted by the Commi,sion to a 
section 28 of this Act applies• pmon undec any of the pceceding pcovision, of this section 
(d) To carry out or enforce a covenant.to which.section.28 to-of this Act applies, ·· · ·· · · · · · · (a} Entec into a contcact oc arrangement oc arrive at an 
(e) To enter into a contract .. 'or:'arrangement'. or arrive at an understanding; or understanding, to which section 
29 
of this Act applies: (b) Give effect to a provision of a contract, arrangement, or 
(f) 
. er understanding; or 
To give eHect to an exclusionary provision: of a contract I§ (c) Require the giving of, or give, a covenant; or 
or arr~gement or understanding to which . section '{_ · CP (d) Carry out or enforce the terms of a covenant-
29 of this Act 'applies.' ':<' " · -.~ · · · · ---· 
shaJI have effect as if it were also an authorisation in the same 
121 While any such authorisation remain, in focce- terms to every other pmon nimed oc referred to in the 
(a) In the case of an authorisation to enter into a contract application for the authoris_ation as a party to the contract, 
oc .arrangc,ment, oc arrive at an undemanding, to arrangement, oc undmtanding, oc a, a pecson who is oc would 
which secuon 27 or secuon 29 of this Act applies, be bound by, or entitled to the benefit of, the covenant, as 
nothing in thos~ sections shall prevent any person the case may be. from- (4) An authorisation to a person under subsection (1) of this 
(i) Entering into, or in accordance with the section may be expressed to apply to or in relation to another 
authorisation, giving effect to or enforcing any person who,-pcovision of the contract; oc (al In the case of an authorisation to entec into a contcact 
(ii) Entering into, or in accordance with the or arrangement or arrive at an understanding, 
aum..orisati~n, giving effect to the arrangemenc oc becomes a pacty to the proposed contract oc 
(m) Amvmg at, or in accordance with the arrangement at a time . after it is entered into or 
authorisation, giving effect to the understanding: becomes a party to the proposed understanding at 
(b) In the case of an authorisation to give effect to a provision a time after it is arrived at: of a contcacc arrangement, oc undmtanding to (b) In the case of an authorisation to give effect to a provision 
which section 27 oc ,ection 29 of this Act applies, of a contract, arrangement, oc undmtanding, 
nothing in those section, ,hall prevent any pmon ,<C ·"?) becomes a pacty to the contracc arrangement, or from- I(_ '§ii understanding at a time after the authorisation is 
(i) In accordance with the authorisation, giving granted: dfect to or enforcing the contract; oc (cl In the case of an authorisation to require the giving of, 
Iii) In accordance with the . authorisation, giving oc to give, a covenant, becomes bound by, or entitled 
effect to the arrangement or understanding• to the benefit of, the covenant at a time after the 
{c) In the case of an authorisation for · requiring the giving covenant is given: of, or to give, a covenant to which section 28 of this Id) In the case of an authorisation to carry out or enforce 
Act applies, nothing in that section ,hall prevent any the terms of a covenant, becomes bound by, N pmon from- f ·o entitled to the benefit of, the covenant at a time after 
(ii Requiring the giving of, or giving, the covenant; · · the authorisation i, granted, 
~
l'!'::""_...,....,. ................... ~ .... --..."':::::=-~
0
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80. Pecuniary penalties-(!) If the Court is satisfied on the 1 • 
application of the Commission that a person-
(a) Has contravened any of the provisions of Part II of this 
Act; or 
(b) Has attempted to contravene such a provision- or 
(c) Has aided, abetted, counselled, or procured ~y other 
person to contravene such a provision; or 
(d) Has induced, or attempted to induce, any other person, 
whether by threats or promises or otherwise, to 
contravene such a provision; or 
(e) Has been in ~y way, directly or indirectly, knowingly 
concerned m, or party to, the contravention by any 
other person of such a provision; or 
(f) Has conspired with any other person to contravene such 
a provision, -
the C<:>Urt may order the person to pay to the Crown s'uch 
pecuniary penalty as the .court determines to be appropriate, 
not exceeding S l 00,000 m the case of a person not being a 
?ody corporate, or $300,000 in the case of a body corporate, 
m respect of each act or omission. 
(2) In determining an appropriate penalty under this section, 
the Court shall have regard to all relevant matters, including-
(a) The nature and extent of the act or omission: 
(b) The nature and extent of any loss or damage suffered 
by any person as a result of the act or omission: 
(c) The circumstances in which the act or omission took place: 
(d) Whether or not the person has previously been found 
by the Court in proceedings under this Part of this 
Act to have engaged in any similar conduct. 
(3) The standard of proof in proceedings under this section 
shall be the standard of proof applying in civil proceedings. 
(4) In any proceedings under this section, the Commission, 
upon the order of the Court, may obtain discovery and 
administer interrogatories. 
(5) Proceedings under this section may be commenced within 
3 years after the matter giving rise to the contravention arose. 
(6) Where conduct by any person constitutes a contravention 
of~ or. more provisio~s of Part I.I of this Act, proceedings may 
be msututed under this Act agamst that person in relation to 
the contravention of any one or more of the provisions; but 
no perso~ shal) be .liable to more than one pecuniary penalty 
under this section m respect of the same conduct. 
. ' Cf. Trade Practices Act 19 7 4 (Aust.), ss. 7 6, 7 7 
I 
I 
\ 
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8L !_!1junctions may be granted by Court for 
contravention of Part II-The Court may, on the application 
of the Commission or any other person, fant an iajunction 
restraining a person from engaging in con ~et that constitutes 
or would constitute any of the following-
(a) A contravention of any of the provisions of Part II of this 
Act: 
(b) Any attempt to contravene such a provision: 
(c) Aiding, abetting, counselling, or procuring any other 
person to contravene such a provision: 
(d) Inducing, or attempting to induce, any other ·person, 
whether by threats, promises or otherwise, to 
contravene such a provision: 
(e) Being in any way directly or indirectly, knowingly 
concerned in, or party to, the contravention by any 
other person of such a provision: 
(f) Conspiring with any other person to contravene such a 
provision. 
Cf. Trade Practices Act 1974 (Aust.), s. 80 (1), (2) 
82. Actions for damages for contravention of Part II-
(l) E~erson is liable m· damages for any loss or damage 
caused..h.~P-erson engwng in conduct that constitutes any 
of the following-
(a) A contravention of any of the provisions of Part II of this 
Act: 
(b) Aiding, abetting, counselling, or procuring the 
contravention of such a provision: 
(c) Inducing by threats, promises, or otherwise the 
contravention of such a provision: 
(d) Being in any way directly or indirectly, knowingly 
concerned in, or party to, the contravention of such 
a provision: 
(e) Conspiring with any other person in the contravention 
of such a provision. 
(2) An action under subsection (1) of this section may be 
commenced at any time within 3 years from the time when 
the cause of action arose. 
Cf. Trade Practices Act 19 7 4 (Aust.), s. 8 2 
Mergen and Takeovers 
83. Contravention of section 50 an offence-(!) Every 
person who contravenes section 50 of this Act commits an 
offence and is liable on conviction on indictment- · 
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